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Corruption related money laundering is a peculiar and systemic challenge, that can 
undermine development. This is the problem in Nigeria. 
 
The roots of money laundering in Nigeria are different from the drug crime and later 
terrorist financing. The typology of money laundering offence prevalent in Nigeria is by 
politically exposed persons. Since the nation’s independence, the problems of corruption 
and abuse of office by those who have been appointed by her citizens, persists. 
Corruption by politically exposed persons, has affected the growth and development of 
every aspect of the Nigerian economy. The potential consequence of corruption and 
money laundering in a nation is underdevelopment and a rapid decline of institutions, 
particularly the anti-money laundering regime. 
 
To understand this problem, the application of prosecutorial discretion in the anti-money 
laundering regime is examined. An analysis of discretionary powers by prosecutorial 
agencies and anti-money laundering regulatory bodies and its application of such powers. 
Prosecutorial discretion in the criminal justice system and the anti-money laundering 
regime encounters challenges. One of which is the delegation of discretionary powers, 
solely to the Attorney General of the Federation by the constitution. These powers 
include the discontinuance of cases at will, plea bargaining and charging. The application 
of prosecutorial discretion rightfully or wrongfully, plays a key role in the prosecution of 
politically exposed persons and the anti-money laundering regime. The rule of law is 
central to the rightful application of prosecutorial discretion. 
 
If the rule of law is central to the appropriate application of prosecutorial discretion, then 
the ethical stand of those who have powers to apply this discretion should not be in 
question. Hence, ethical consideration of lawyers, particularly prosecutors play an 
important role in ensuring the appropriate application of prosecutorial discretion in the 





application of discretionary techniques, particularly in the prosecution of politically 
exposed persons for money laundering related offences. Our findings reveals a need to 
re-examine S174 of the constitution, which gives sole discretionary powers to the 
Attorney General and the integration of the rule of law in the anti-money laundering 
regime, amongst others. 
 
For this reason, the methodology of this research is doctrinal. Lon Fuller’s work is used as 
a means to analyse the role of the rule of law in the application of prosecutorial discretion 
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Aim and Objectives of Research 
 
 To investigate and evaluate the efficacy of the AML regime in Nigeria 
 
 To investigate and evaluate the efficacy of prosecutorial discretion in the anti-money 
laundering regime in Nigeria. 
 
 To examine the integration the of prosecutorial discretion in the anti-money 
laundering regime in Nigeria and the application of this discretion in the prosecution of 
politically exposed persons [PEP]. 
 
 To evaluate the constitutional authority delegated to the office of the Attorney- General 
as the sole administrator of prosecutorial discretion, and the role of the rule of the AG in the 
integration of prosecutorial discretion with the anti-money laundering regime 
 
 To evaluate the integration of professional ethics of lawyers and other professionals 
and the anti-money laundering regime in Nigeria. 
 
 To identify reforms that might bridge the gap between the successful prosecution of 
other typology of money laundering offences and the unsuccessful prosecution of the 




A doctrinal approach has been implemented in this thesis as the methodological 
approach. This has provided an in-depth understanding to analyse and evaluate the 
critical nature of Nigeria’s anti-money laundering regime, with regards to the typology of 
Politically exposed persons. This research has been carried out using a wide range of 
domestic and international sources, which includes primary and secondary sources of law 
relevant to the challenge this research addresses. In this research, an outline of relevant 
comprehensive discussions with the aim of contributing to the existing literature of 
money laundering and corruption by PEP. These include Textbooks, case law, statues, 







“The doctrinal research thus involves systematic analysis of statutory provision and of 
legal principles involving therein, or derived there from, and logical or rational ordering of 
the legal propositions and principles”. It also said that doctrinal research is basically a 
research into law. Mostly the researchers also give more emphasis on substantive law, 
rules, doctrines, concept and judicial pronouncements. Doctrinal research is based on the 
legal proposition and judicial pronouncement of the appellants’ courts and other 
conventional legal material such as parliamentary debates, revealing the legislative intent, 
policy and history of the rule or doctrine.1 
 
In doing so, the structure of the AML regime is examined using legal theory which gives 
the thesis the theoretical framework it needs to discuss the challenge. In this research Lon 
Fuller’s work is used to examine the criminal justice system of Nigeria and indeed the AML 
regime.2 It examines how laws are made, the applicability of these laws and the potential 
challenges if there are lapses in these laws that regulate AML regime and the criminal 
justice system in general. The application fuller’s work provides the fundamental element 
in which societies must operate, which is the rule of law. The integration of the works of 
theorist for example Aristotle, Tom Bingham, A.V Dicey and other theorist provides the 
theoretical framework to discuss the intricate issues and challenges of the anti-money 
laundering regime in Nigeria. 
 
1.0 Evaluative Frame 
 
This research tackles the negative effect of corruption and its effect on prosecutorial 
discretion. It also takes cognisance of the policy and aims of the anti-money laundering 
[AML] policy as enacted in Nigeria. It also takes as valid, the assumption that the effective 
application of the rule of law will improve the efficacy of the Nigerian regime. In this 
regard, the perspective is internal to the Nigerian regime and its internal policy discourse 
which also reflects policy discourse at international level. 
 
The role of rule of law, and how well the Nigerian legal system manages to deal with the 




 Vijay Gawas, ‘Doctrinal Legal research Method a Guiding Principle in Reforming the Law and Legal System 
Towards the Research Development’[2017]3 International Journal of Law 128.  




understood from internal sources but must be developed as a genuine but critical account 
informed by perspectives external to the Nigerian regime. If the efficacy of the regime is 
to be assessed in view of notorious failures of the regime, an external assessment is 
needed. In this research, Fuller’s Morality of law is a source used to evaluate the 
application of prosecutorial discretion in the AML regime. 
 
This research takes notice of the typology of money laundering offences that most affects 
Nigeria, which hinges on corruption and abuse of office by a specific type of person, 




























































































1.2 An Introduction to Lon Fuller’s Morality of Law 
 
Fuller a renowned legal philosopher has been famous for his views concerning law and 
morality, particularly in his debate with Hart. Fuller disagrees with Hart over law and morality 
but agrees on the fundamental issues of the rule of law.3 Fuller’s approach on the rule of law 
appears to institutionalise certain core principles. Fuller believes that the application of the 
rule of law must be internalised and accepted by members of the society. The rule of law is 
not a document or data that can be transplanted.4 The internalisation of core principles could 






3 Lon Fuller, ‘Positivism and Fidelity to Law: A Reply to Professor Hart’[1958]71 Harvard Law Review 630. 
 
4 Graham Ferris, ‘The Path-dependent Problem of Exporting the Rule of Law’[2012] 101 The 




It can be argued that from Fuller’s assertion, the acceptability of law and the integration 
of law in a society is dependent on the core principles which necessitated the formation 
of the law in the first instance. Hence, for the successful integration of the rule of law in 
any society, there should be an element of moral value in the formation of a law. This 
moral value could in turn form a strong basis for the acceptability of the law and make the 
citizens of state willingly subject themselves to the superiority of the law. A bad law is a 
bad law. A law that is repugnant to equity natural justice and good conscience is a bad 
law. A law that subject’s citizens to oppression, anarchy, destruction and death is a bad 
law. The distinguishing factor between good and bad is morality and not legality. 
However, nations are not governed based on morality but legality. Hence in my opinion, 
Fuller attempts to create an atmosphere of legality, from an inspiration of morality.5 
 
Fuller sets eight principles in his morality of law, which could serve as a guide to the 
application of rule of law in societies, and a template in determining the difference 
between a good law from a bad law. First and foremost, there must be set rules, and 
these rules must be general.6 The generality of the laws and its acceptability are inter 
linked. These rules must be in existence and must be clear to everyone in that particular 
society. It is important that laws are not enacted with the intention of applying these laws 
to a particular class of persons, either because these persons appear to have more 
privileged status in the society or for any other reason. The generality of a law is central 
to the integration of the rule of law in any society. 
 
From Fuller’s assertions, it can be argued that the existence of set rules in a society cannot be 
enough for the successful implementation of the ideals of the rule of law. The applicability of 
these rules across all classes of persons in a society appear to be more important. In any 
justice driven society, equity is usually of primary consideration. The reason why equity is 
considered first is because, it is natural that in any society there would be different categories 
or classes of persons. These categories of persons are usually classed according to either 





5 See note on Positivism and Fidelity of Law. 
 





central principle which connects these categories of persons is the equality before the 
law. No matter how highly or lowly placed one is, everyone is equal before the law. 
Hence, it can also be argued that there is a connection between the existence of set rules, 
the generality of these rules and the acceptability of these rules. 
 
Laws must be widely promulgated or widely accessible. Fuller asserts that laws must be 
publicized. 7 It’s important that the members of a society must be able to know and 
understand that there is a law which is in existence. This could pass as a guide for 
members of the society. For a law to pass as a guide for the members of a society, the law 
must be publicly accessible. Most nations that lack institutional transparency, with 
autocratic leaders do not promulgate laws. A law is made by a decree and such laws may 
not even be known to members of the public. Often these laws are made to punish 
dissenting voices or opposition in the country. 
 
In Nigeria, the Abacha regime issued the decree 109. It was mainly for the abolition of 
gathering in public places, either as civil right groups or activism. This decree was not 
known and was nonexistent until the agitation of the Niger Delta Emancipation 
movement, headed by Ken Saro Wiwa, who requested for a better sharing formula of the 
oil revenue, in favor of the oil producing region in Nigeria.8 Decree 109 was promulgated 
and announced months into the trial of Ken Saro Wiwa, he was subsequently sentenced 
to death in accordance with the decree. 
 
The non-promulgation of laws and its inaccessibility can create an opportunity for 
anarchy. It is impossible for the members of the society to obey rules that they are not 
aware of. In democratic systems of government, the parliament makes laws , efforts are 
made to publicize these laws. Hence, Fullers assertions that laws must be promulgated 







7 Ibid, 49. 
 
8 ‘Why Nigerian Activist Ken Saro-Wiwa was Executed’ (Africa Magazine,9 November 2015) < 





Fuller asserts that laws must be prospective. A good law should serve a guide as to how 
individuals ought to behave in the future rather than prohibiting a behavior that 
happened in the past. 9 
 
A good law should not be retroactive. This is because a person cannot be charged for an 
offence that was not existing in law, at the time the offence was committed. A good law 
should take effect from the day it is enacted. A law should be prospective, what this 
means is that it should be able regulate future occurrences and not past deeds that are 
prior to the date of the enactment. Any law that does not take effect from the day it is 
enacted is a Laws must be non-contradictory. 10 Fuller asserts that law must not 
contradict itself. One law cannot prohibit what another permits. It can be argued that 
there is a linkage between Fullers clarity and non- contradiction. This is because if laws 
are clear, then the issue of contradiction may not arise. However, legislators who’s 
responsibilities are to make these laws may be ignorant of the fact there is a law in 
existence which contradicts a law that has been promulgated. This could be a potential 
problem for the successful administration of justice in societies, as there could be no clear 
stand on the position of the law with regards to the issues before the court. Hence, 
Fullers principle of non-contradiction is pivotal for the existence of the rule of law in any 
society. 
 
Laws must not ask the impossible.11 This is an essential element in the administration of 
justice and the application of the rule of law. In any situation where a law asks for the 
impossible, those who are responsible for enacting the law should be blamed. The test of 
reasonableness should be applied when enacting laws that regulate human behavior in a 
society. This is sacrosanct to the development of the rule of law and the administration of 
justice in a society. A law that asks for the impossible might also be impossible to 
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Another principle which Fuller advocates for is that, laws must be constant.12 A law should 
not change too frequently. The stability of laws that have been enacted could determine how 
stable the justice system of any society is. One of the elements of developed societies is the 
predictability and stability of their justice system. The predictability and stability of thriving 
nations could be attributed to the stability of their laws.13 It is almost impossible for nations 
to thrive when laws have the tendency of changing very fast. This could not only have a 
negative effect on the administration of justice but could also stifle the economy. 
 
For example, Nigeria prior to the advent of democracy in 1999, suffered from successive 
military regimes.14 Military regimes are notable for getting power through coups and the 
government governs by decree. Apart from the autocratic nature of military 
governments, the problems this causes is that the laws otherwise known as decrees could 
change very fast. This is because most military governments do not have a parliament 
which makes and deliberates laws. Such powers are left with the military dictator who 
issues new decrees and repeals these decrees at will. 
 
This was enough reason to make the economy very unattractive to invest in, as investors 
need to be sure that their investments wouldn’t face regulatory problems as a result of 
the instability of laws. Hence, the inconsistency of laws can have a negative effect on the 
administration of justice and the economy. This is also because it would be hard to give a 
persuasive commitment to safeguard the investment if the law is unreasonably flexible. 
 
Fuller is of the opinion that there should be a congruence between written laws and how 
officials enforce these statute’s.15 Government officials whose responsibility is to enforce 
these laws, should ensure that these laws are enforced. Those who have been given this 






 Katerina Kocevska, ‘Rule of Law –Condition for Economic Development (Republic of Macedonia)’ 
 
[2015]11 See Review 185. 
 
14 Ehi Oshio, ‘Rule of Law, Military Governments and Dilemma of Nigeria Courts’[1988]30 Journal of the 







could be in form of corruption or abuse of public office, which is primary source for 
concern in developing nations particularly in Nigeria. 
 
Government officials cannot effectively enforce or expect members of the society to 
obey laws when those who are given the responsibility to serve as gatekeepers in the 
realm of law and order, disobey the law. For any society to develop and integrate the 
principles of the rule of law in the administration of justice, officials must be ready to 
enforce these laws and in enforcing these laws, they must do so with regards to ethical 
principles and values. Government officials must possess virtue, which could assist in 
enforcing deontological principles (rules or laws) in the society. How officials enforce 
these rules could be a reflection on the application of the rule of law in a society. 
 
Fuller’s principles are very essential to the successful application of the rule of law in the 
AML regime in Nigeria. His eight principles in the inner morality, forms a cardinal point for 





1.3 An Introduction to the Concept of the Rule of Law: A Reflection on Aristotle 
 
The concept of the rule of law is an ideal concept which has shaped the administration of 
justice and governance globally. This concept has no precise origin however, the concept 
can be dated back to Aristotle between 355- 370 BC.16 This concept of rule of law has no 
precise definition. Many legal scholars have made positive attempts to define and expand 
the framework of the rule of law which notably includes AV Dicey, Tom Bingham and Lon 
Fuller amongst others. However, priority will be given to Lon Fuller by using the morality 
of law to integrate the role of the rule of law in the AML regime of Nigeria. 
 
Some philosophers argue that, in pre-law society all rules are customary. Proponents of 
this thought argues that these customary rules eventually evolve into laws. These rules 












these rules evolve into a constitution which is more or less an amalgamation of certain 
rules and practices of members of a society. Followers of Hart’s argument, also argue that 
in societies there must be a guide otherwise known as a constitution, which should serve 
as a binding rule on its citizens. These rules which could be in form of a constitution, 
should set limits on powers. The constitution should serve as a guide in limiting the 
excesses of those in power and the people, who those in power are to govern.17 The 
application of rules and limitation of powers by persons in the government of a society, 
provides grounds for orderliness and a sense of volition from the common members of 
the society to obey the rules. 
 
The application of these rules or constitution irrespective of whom it’s been applied to, 
makes the acceptability of rules easier by the members of the society. This in itself, is the 
rule of law.18 
 
Aristotle argues that in societies there should be rule of law which overrides powers being 
held by the state or individuals. He further argues that these powers held by individuals 
on behalf of the state and the people could be overreaching at some point, which could 
provide grounds for abuse of powers by persons who hold these powers. 19 
 
Aristotle proposes that there should be laws in every society which should serve as a guide to 
human behaviour no matter how highly placed these humans are in the society. Aristotle 
distinguishes between political or rotational rule one the hand and mastery on the other 
hand.20 He is of the view that mastery could be inimical to political life. Aristotle argues that 











17 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (2d ed, Clarendon Law 1994). 
 
18 Robert Stein ‘Rule of Law: What Does It Mean?’ [2009]18 Minnesota Journal for International Law 294. 
 








referred to as a government.21 He further argues that there should be a consistent 
feature in any regime, and this consistent feature is the rule of law. 
 
However, to have a better understanding of Aristotle’s argument, it is important a brief 
introduction of the concept of virtue ethics, which Aristotle is a proponent of. A brief 
introduction of deontological ethics will also be given which contradicts the principles of 
virtue ethics. 
 
What is virtue ethics? Virtue ethics are positive traits which deals with the motive and not 
the form. Virtue ethics deals with the inner qualities of human behaviour which separates 
right from wrong. Virtue looks at the motive and rationale behind the actions taken. 
Virtue might be described as the conscience that guides the thought process.22 Hence 
virtue looks at moral nature of the act, unlike deontology which deals with the laws or 
regulation that governs the act. 
 
Deontology as a kind of ethics deals and focuses on the rules that guide a particular class 
of persons or members of a society. These ethical approach is founded on Immanuel 
Kant’s principles. Deontology focuses on the strict adherence to rules irrespective of the 
moral nature of the rule. Proponents of deontology unlike virtue ethics, insist on the 
application of rules rather than taking into account the moral nature of the action. For 
deontology, it is irrelevant whether the action is morally right or wrong.23 What is 
important is that the action is backed by law and the law is obeyed. Hence, Aristotle’s rule 
of men can be likened to the principles of virtue ethics. 
 
Aristotle argues that there is a clear difference between the rule of law and the rule of men. 
From Aristotle’s perspective, it can be argued that the rule of law is the binding rule of nation 
or a society, that all members of the society must obey, which should be sovereign. While the 









 Frank Dauman, ‘Evolution of the Rule of Law, Hayeks Concept of the Liberal Order Reconsidered’[2007]21 
 
Journal of Libertarian Studies 126. 
 
 See Chapter 3.2 on the discussion on virtue ethics.  




moderate the excesses of the potential over reaching powers of the sovereignty of law.24 
Proponents of Aristotle’s concept on rule of law argue that, bad laws should not be 
obeyed by good people. If a law is considered unjust, then the citizens of the society 
should not obey the law. He further argues that the rule of men which could moderate 
the excesses of the sovereignty of law plays a key role in the administration of justice. This 
rule of men could be the conscience, or the ability to differentiate from good and evil.25 
Hence, the importance of virtue ethics in the application of the rule of law in the 
administration of criminal justice. It can be argued that there is a connection with 
Aristotle’s rule of men and virtue. If the rule of men is determined by the inner decision or 
conscience in determining whether or not to obey a bad law, then it can be argued that 
there is a role virtue ethics plays in the rule of men and the application of the rule of law. 
If Aristotle argues that the conscience of man should serve as a guide in obeying laid 
down rules and regulation in a society, then it can be argued that what guides the 
conscience in the separation of good from bad while obeying these laws is virtue. 
 
However, it is important to also note that the rule of law moderates’ men and invariably 
moderates the rule of men. From Aristotle’s proposition, we can argue that there is an 
amalgamation between the rule of men and the rule of law. This enables a check and balance 
on the activity of men in the society and the activity of the government. It can be argued 
further, that if we are to go by Aristotle’s concept of good judgement in the application of the 
rule of law, it means that ethical consideration plays a pivotal role in the application of the 
rule of law.26 The application of “good judgement” by men in the application of the rule of 
law, gives the citizens the moral obligation of choice as to whether or not to obey a law just 
because it is a law. It can be argued that there is a relationship between good judgement and 
virtue ethics.27 In fact, man cannot exercise good judgement 
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without virtue. Man needs certain “inner qualities” to exercise good judgement either as a 
spectator of an event or a facilitator.28 The same applies to the application of the law in the 
dispensation of justice. In the dispensation of justice, there are facilitators and there are 
spectators. The prosecutor and the defence lawyer need to have certain positive traits in 
distinguishing right from wrong as a facilitator, for justice to be dispensed. These positive 
traits which could be described as good judgement by Aristotle or inner qualities, is virtue.29 
 
The Judge (in a non-jury system e.g. Nigeria) in the process of trial acts as facilitator, but 
as an unbiased facilitator. However the “inner qualities” or “good judgement” or “virtue”, 
serves as a guide alongside with the laid down rules (laws) for justice to be dispensed. 
This could mean that, for the effective application of the rule of law, there has to be an 
integration of good judgement. The essence of existing laws is not to have these laws in 
existence but to give justice to the citizens of the society. A society could have laws in 
existence yet at the same time, there could be an absence of an effective justice system. 
The sovereignty of these laws will be present but the dispensation of justice will be 
absent.30 
 
The application of the rule of law in the governing of the affairs of man should be 
sacrosanct, however, it can be argued that the application of strict rules without 
cognisance to conscience in the governing of mankind is a deontological aberration. 
Hence it cannot be overemphasised that the importance of virtue/ good conscience or 
rule of men as Aristotle may put it, should be applicable alongside with the strict 
adherence to rules (deontology). When this is done, it would create an environment 
where the rule of law is supreme with an element of a humane touch. 
 
The absence of good judgement or judgement of men or virtue is what differentiates the 
application of the rule of law in dictatorships from democracies. This is because in countries 
governed by dictators, it can be argued that the “rule of law” is applied to governance. 
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There could be a “formal existence” of the principles of separation of powers, where there is 
a parliament which makes laws and a judiciary, however the dictator governs the citizens in 
the most draconian style.31 It can be argued that a nation with laws that are considered very 
unreasonable, e.g. nations with laws where adultery is punishable by death.32 
 
The criminalisation of adultery with the penalty of a death sentence is against the 
principles of equity natural justice and good conscience, and by all standards, goes against 
the principles of virtue ethics. However, it can be also argued that the law is the law and 
the law is supreme. In this situation most draconian leaders with draconian laws will insist 
that the rule of law is supreme, and that forms the basis for their decision to execute the 
law in detail. Dictators could even go a step further to state that the law wasn’t made by 
them but by the parliament, hence the law is the law. The members of the parliament 
who make these laws must make laws that are in accordance with the rationale behind 
the separation of powers, and not to give the “executive” more powers.33At the end, it 
makes a mockery of the basis of the rule of law, which is to govern the citizenry based on 
justice and fairness. Hence, the importance of the application of virtue ethics in the 
integration of the rule of law in a nations justice system. 
 
Another example of a society with the absence of good judgement in the application of the 
rule of law is the apartheid past of South Africa. There were separate systems and separate 
laws which regulated the activities of citizens of the society. A different legal system and set 
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separate one for the apartheid rulers.34 The application of laws in the criminal Justice 
system was anchored on the colour of one’s skin rather than the general application of 
laws within the society, yet it was the law. One could argue that the provisions of the law 
are supreme, and members of the society must obey the law to avert a breakdown of law 
and order. However, can such a law be considered a good law where separate laws are 
enacted for separate classes of persons in a society, particularly if it’s considered 
repugnant to equity, natural justice and good conscience? Such draconian laws show the 
absence of good judgement or judgement of men as Aristotle would put it, in the 
administration and integration of the rule of law in the society. 
 
1.4 An Introduction to AV Dicey’s Concept on Rule of Law 
 
A renowned proponent of the rule of law was Dicey. A.V Dicey coined the phrase “ rule of 
law”. Dicey’s discussions on the rule of law focused on institutional arrangement and the 
perils of institutional lawlessness, rather than political ideals and the application of law to 
political ideals. Dicey’s ideas of the rule of law has sparked ideas in contemporary debates 
on this issue, particularly with regards to constitutional theory and the application of the 
constitution to governance.35 
 
Dicey advocates for the supremacy of the rule of law and criticises extreme imperialists of the 
nineteenth century. He argues that there should be liberal imperialism and advocated for the 
preservation of the British empire and patriotic projects of national greatness in the world of 
imperial states.36 He argues that this can only be achieved through the rule of law. 
 
Looking at Dicey’s account of the rule of law, in his Law of the Constitution [LOTC] Dicey 
analysed the application of the rule of law from three perspectives. The first is the ‘rule 
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on how to govern the people.37 The institutional framework of a society is sacrosanct and 
Dicey argued that it is a fundamental element of the society, which must be adhered to. 
Dicey argued that the business of government must be carried out according to legally 
established procedures, which would reduce the potential risk of an abuse of power or 
the arbitrary use of power. Going by Dicey argument in this principle of the ‘ the rule 
through law’, it provides a platform for those who have the responsibility of governing the 
people to be held accountable, if they do not follow the necessary procedure in the 
administration of governance. This is very essential to the administration of governance 
and justice in a developed society. 
 
The institutional framework of a country plays a crucial role to the development of a 
nation. This institutional framework focuses on established legally acceptable norms, 
which in turn assists to regulate the behaviour of citizens of the society. The institutions 
of government and the way these institutions are run should be done in the most 
transparent and procedural manner.38 
 
From Dicey’s argument, it can be argued further that nations grow stronger due to strong 
institutions and not because of strong leaders. This means that the institutions of a nation 
should be more powerful than those who govern these institutions and the government. In 
more advanced societies where the rule of law thrives, these institutions have been 
empowered as a means to check the excesses of government.39 The phrase ‘strong leader’, 
cannot translate into an effective government with intentions of providing good governance 
to the people. There is no such thing as a strong leader without strong institutions. In fact, it 
can be argued that there is a relationship between strong institutions and good governance. 
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The strength and efficacy of the regime should be in the institutions that regulate the 
regime, and not the individual actors in the institution. 
 
The second perspective Dicey raises in his LOTC on the rule of law is that ‘every man, 
whatever be his rank or condition, is subject to the ordinary law of the realm and amenable to 
the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals.’40 Dicey argues that a fundamental element in the 
application of the rule of law in any society, is the equality before the law. For the 
development of the justice system of any society, all persons no matter how highly placed 
they are, should be subject to the rules and institutions that govern the society. 
 
The third perspective from which Dicey analyses the rule of law is on civil rights and civil 
liberties.41 Dicey is of the opinion that in every society, the rights and liberties of members of 
the society should be guaranteed from bottom – top, rather than from top – bottom. 
 
These civil rights and liberties should not only reflect in the constitution but also be 
applied to the daily lives of the citizens of the state. Some of these civil rights and liberties 
include the freedom of speech, freedom of association, right to fair hearing and the 
presumption of innocence until proven guilty by a court of competent jurisdiction.42 
 
The application of the rule of should know no class and status, irrespective of whom an 
offender is, the rights and liberties of the offender must be respected. 
 
1.5 An Analysis on Tom Bingham’s Rule of Law 
 
Tom Bingham who was an eminent jurist, has given his views on the rule of law and the 
application of this principle in societies. Bingham’s perspective on the rule of law is that 
there must be certain principles present in the application of the rule of law in societies. 
Just like Fuller, Bingham highlights eight principles which should be central to the 
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 All persons and authorities within the state, whether public or 
private, should be bound by and entitled to the benefit of the 
laws publicly and prospectively promulgated and publicly 
administered in the courts. 
 
 Questions of legal right and liability should ordinarily be resolved 
by application of the law and not the exercise of discretion. 
 
 The laws of the land should apply equally to all, save to the 
extent that objective differences justify differentiation 
 
 The law must afford adequate protection of fundamental human 
rights. 
 
 Means must be provided for resolving, without prohibitive cost 
or inordinate delay, bona fide civil disputes which the parties 
themselves are unable to resolve. 
 
 Ministers and public officers at all levels must exercise the 
powers conferred on them in good faith, for the purpose for 
which the powers were conferred, without exceeding the limits 
of such powers and not unreasonably. 
 
 Adjudicative procedures provided by the state should be fair. 
 
 The rule of law requires compliance by the state with its 
obligations in international law as in national law. 
 
Bingham advocates that, the equality before the law is essential and plays a significant role in 
the application of the rule of law in societies. This is advocated in his first principle. The justice 
system in nations cannot afford to be discriminatory or have set rules applied to a particular 
class of persons and another set of rules applied to another group of persons. Bingham argues 
that, no matter how highly placed a person in the society, the long arm of the law is far above 
the person. Equality before the allow is a fundamental principle for the integration of the rule 
of law in a justice system. As argued earlier, the rule of law means the application of set rules 
to all categories of persons in a society. The application of these rules must be done in 









society.43 One of the problems with the integration of the rule of law in the administration of 
justice in Nigeria is equality before the law. The integration of the rule of law in the criminal 
justice system appears to be lopsided. For example, the application of plea bargain as a 
discretionary technique appears to favour only PEP and high net worth individuals.44 
 
When a PEP who has stolen the funds meant for the development of the country is given 
the opportunity for a plea bargain as seen in the Cecilia Ibru and Igbinedion cases, and 
other typology of money laundering offenders are not given the same opportunity, then 
we can say there is a lopsided application of rules in the AML regime. Hence, Binghams 
argument for equality before the law as it plays essential role in the rule of law is eroded. 
Same treatment melted out to PEP must be given to other typology of money laundering 
offenders. 
 
Bingham also advocates that the legal rights of individuals should be enforced through 
the application of the law and not through discretionary actions. The individual rights of 
persons in a society are essential for the advocacy of the rule of law. For any society to 
pride itself as a society that adheres to the rule of law, individual rights must be 
respected.45 However, the application of these individual rights must be done in 
accordance to the set laws of the land. These rights cannot be enforced or resolved 
without recourse to extant laws and regulation that govern the society, else there will be 
a breakdown of law and order. To enforce a right, members of a society do not need to 
resort to self-help. The organs of government are there to enforce these rights, hence the 
importance of law enforcement in societies.46 This could avert any potential danger in a 
society, particularly when the organs of government responsible for enforcing these laws 
carry out their functions. 
 
Bingham’s principles can be directly linked and applied to the Nigerian state. Nigeria as a 
nation has had reported issues of human right abuses especially by officials that are meant 
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to protect the citizens. For example, the problem of police brutality in Nigeria is a clear 
violation of the rights of the citizens.47 The maltreatment and abuse of suspects goes 
against the principles of “innocent until proven guilty”. It is important that for the 
sustainability of the Nigerian state, the rights of the citizens are respected in the 
enforcement of laws. 
 
Bingham argues that the law must afford adequate protection of fundamental human 
rights.48 The fundamental human rights of the citizens of any society must be guaranteed. 
Bingham’s argument extends to Dicey’s argument that the fundamental rights and 
liberties of citizens must be respected. This is essential to the growth of the justice system 
of any nation. The justice system of a nation is centred on the rule of law, and the 
fundamental human rights of the citizens of that nation is central to the rule of law. It can 
be argued that there is a linkage between the rule of law, justice systems and 
fundamental human rights. In the enforcement of the rule of law, the fundamental 
human rights of the citizens must be respected. 
 
Having introduced Fuller, Dicey, Aristotle and Bingham to this discussion, their works 
would be used as a reference, with emphasis on Fuller, in analysing the application of 
prosecutorial discretion in money laundering offences by PEP. 
 
1.6 Problem of Money Laundering in Nigeria 
 
Nigeria gained independence from United Kingdom in 1960. Nigeria, a nation of diverse 
people and diverse mineral resources has not developed as much as she should have which is 
the side effect of political corruption and abuse of office by PEP. This has not only affected the 
development of the nation but also the perception she has from the international community. 
It has been proven that there is a link between the underdevelopment of the nation and 
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amenities for example: good schools, health care, infrastructure and an effective justice 
system. These are some of the side effects of institutional corruption.50 
 
Monies appropriated for the development of the nation are stolen and are laundered by 
these PEP hence, the health of the commonwealth is jeopardised by the self-interest of a few 
powerful individuals who have unjustly enriched themselves. This is the reason why the AML 
regime of Nigeria needs to be focused on a typology of money laundering offence, which is 
institutional corruption by PEP. Of course, as in other jurisdictions, there exist other typology 
of money laundering offences in Nigeria. However, what affects the nations development the 
most and the prevalent typology in Nigeria is money laundering by PEP.51 
 
If we agree that there is a link between institutional corruption by PEP and 
underdevelopment, then we could also agree that Nigeria needs to have a strong AML 
regime where offenders no matter their class or status are prosecuted diligently. 
 
1.7 Definition and Process of Money Laundering 
 
It is accepted that money laundering is a global issue which undermines the economic 
stability of states.52 Money laundering is a criminal offence and the definition of this 
offence varies. The distinction between the various definitions depends on the context, 
jurisdiction and typology of the parent crime. 
 
However, money laundering can be defined as the disguise of the proceeds of crime. The 
Financial Action Task Force [FATF] defines money laundering as “the processing of criminal 
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2011 has defined money laundering as the conversion and transfer of resources and 
proceeds that is derived directly from any form of crime.54 
 
This process involves the placement of the proceeds of crime, layering and integration 
which is the final stage of the chain of event. Placement means the entry of “dirty cash” 
or illicit money into the financial system. Layering is more complex as it entails the 
movements of funds. Sometimes this needs some international assistance to avoid trail 
and sever link with origin of crime. Integration is when the money is returned to the 
criminal to make it look as if the source is legitimate. At the point of integration, it is more 
difficult to trace the origin if funds as it has been converted to clean money. Below is the 
classic typology of money laundering. This classic typology is quite different from how 
money laundering is perpetuated in Nigeria. The criminal act in the Nigerian context is 
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The diagram above, shows the typical technique of money laundering. This technique is at 
best a classical approach, as the movement of illicit money has evolved over time. The 
evolution of the movement of illicit funds evolves the same way the typology of money 
laundering evolves. This diagram above is at best connected with the typology of Drugs 
and narcotics, human trafficking, arms trafficking and other money laundering related 
offences, but PEP. 
 
The typical PEP might not move funds from the proceeds of corruption and abuse of office 
through his technique. The sophistication and influence of the PEP makes the movement of 
funds more sophisticated than the typical typology of drugs and narcotics. The issues of 
beneficial ownership and fronts by blue chip companies are easier ways the PEP can move 
proceeds of corruption without going through the stress of placement and integration. 
Contract kickbacks through contract inflation, using gatekeepers within the AML regime 






companies are certain “privileges” which the typical drug baron might not be able to access. 
 
Hence, this diagram is at best applicable to the typical typology other than PEP. 
 
Money laundering has had a devastating effect on the economic development of 
countries particularly developing nations. 56 The offence of money laundering and its 
impact on nations has been a major topic in the heart of national and international policy 
discourse. The effect of money laundering can stunt the growth of emerging economies 
and could weaken developed economies. Money laundering offences ranges from the 
proceeds from the sale of drugs and narcotics, human trafficking, arms dealing, terrorist 
financing, and corruption. 
 
The nature of money laundering offences in Nigeria differs from what is frequent in other 
jurisdictions. The discourse of money laundering is more affiliated with proceeds of sale 
from drugs and narcotics or insider dealings in financial regulation and terrorist financing, 
as it is a more related offence in other jurisdiction.57 This is not the typology of money 
laundering offence in Nigeria. The issue in the Nigerian context is corruption by PEP and 
stealing of public funds. 
 
First, who is a PEP? The Financial Action Task Force [FATF] has defined a PEP as a person who 
has been entrusted with a prominent public office for example Heads of State or government, 
senior politicians, senior government officials, judicial or military officials, senior executives of 
state owned corporations, important political party leaders etc. 58 From the definition of PEP, 
we can say that a PEP is someone to whom the citizens or members of a society or state have 
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and corruption by government officials, theft, and money laundering in Nigeria has 
reduced the confidence bestowed on PEP by the citizens of the country.59 
 
The problems of corruption by PEP and money laundering in Nigeria goes beyond the 
underdevelopment this crime causes. It goes further to weaken institutions like the 
criminal justice system which has made it difficult in the application of the rule of law and 
the successful prosecution of money laundering cases involving PEP.60 
 
The FATF, which is the international organisation regulating AML has not paid enough 
attention to the typology of money laundering offences that are prevalent in Nigeria. The 
FATF came up with 40 recommendations at the formation of this body, to regulate the 
activities of money laundering globally. This regulatory guideline focused on the proceeds 
from the sale of drugs and narcotics, financial services and other money laundering 
offences with no clear guideline for money laundering offences by PEP prior to 2003. 
Many countries including Nigeria did not include corruption by public officials in their 
AML framework. This created a gap which PEP’s could capitalise on and perpetuate 
money laundering. Nigeria suffered because of this gap in her AML regime.61 The Abacha 
case, was a clear example that the world had neglected money laundering offences by 
PEP’s. This was the turning point on AML regulations with regards to PEP.62 The damage 
caused from Abacha’s case and lessons learned was that, nations should have an internal 
mechanism to regulate AML activities to attract investment opportunities. 
 
This is because there is a strong link between political corruption and underdevelopment. 
Where there is corruption, there is a high tendency of the presence of weak and corrupt 
institutions. Investors are not ready to invest funds in an environment that is considered to be 
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to get justice. The chain effect of political corruption is enormous hence, there was a 
need to have an internal mechanism to regulate money laundering with emphasis on PEP. 
 
Nigeria is populated with about 180 million people.63 The nation possesses several 
mineral resources, including crude oil. Nigeria is the largest producer of oil in Africa and 
the 6th largest producer of oil in the world.64 Despite her huge natural resources and 
wealth, Nigeria has not been able to achieve her potential by creating wealth for her 
citizens, developing infrastructure, and providing an enabling environment for foreign 
direct investment, due to corruption.65 The successful prosecution of money laundering 
offenders particularly PEP, would have positive impact in the AML regime and the nations 
development to a substantial extent. 
 
One measure by which the efficacy of a nation’s AML regime can be measured, is by the 
number of convictions the prosecution has recorded, as against the number that are been 
prosecuted with regards to the prevalent typology. This is because if the AML regime 
records more conviction of PEP, it would be a clear indication that the AML regime is 
effective. More convictions within the regime would deter people from corruption if 
people suffered, it would serve as a form of punishment for offenders, the loss of asset 
and proceeds of crimes could deter offenders. Nigeria would also reclaim her stolen 
wealth from public officers that have stolen her wealth. This could also serve as a 
preventive measure on those who intend to steal and launder public funds. These are 










63 Nigerian population, 'Population 2018' (Nigerian Population Review, January 2018) > 
http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/nigeria-population/ > accessed 12 may 2019. 
 
64 Nnpc, 'Oil Production' (Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, February 2018) < 
http://nnpcgroup.com/NNPCBusiness/UpstreamVentures/OilProduction.aspx > accessed 12 May 2019. 
 
65 Duncan Ekweremadu, 'Anti-Corruption Policies in Nigeria' [2010] 6 National Library of Nigeria 
Journal 236. 
 
 Aluko,(n52) 454. 
 
36 
1.8 A Brief History International Recommendations and the Typology Gap in Nigeria 
 
At the beginning of Nigeria’s AML regime, the regime had a stereotype focus. The focus on 
the regime was on the proceeds of crimes from drugs and narcotics This focus was as a result 
of the global money laundering awareness in the 1980’s, arising from the drug trade in South 
America, particularly Pablo Escobar’s notorious activity.67 Nations acted on the 
recommendation of the Vienna convention of 1988, and established their various AML 
regimes. Nigeria as a sovereign state, was not left out and established her AML regime with 
the enactment of the National Drug Law and Enforcement Agency Act in 1989.68 
 
Prior to 2004, the typology of the AML regime in Nigerian revolved around the proceeds 
of crime from drugs and narcotics. This created a gap in the regulation of other money 
laundering offences, particularly offences committed by PEP. The establishment of the 
AML regime in Nigeria was done with the intention to abide by the recommendations of 
the Vienna Convention, thereby omitting the typology of money laundering offences in 
Nigeria and making it almost impossible to categorise proceeds from political corruption 
as a money laundering offence. Hence, it is safe to state that the Nigerian AML regime got 
it wrong from the beginning by incorporating international conventions and 
recommendations without looking inwards to assess the uniqueness of the regime.69 
 
The MLPA 2004 was enacted due to pressure from the international community for a more 
effective AML regime in Nigeria. The MLPA 2004 was the parent legislation regulating money 
laundering and other related offences. However, like many other legislations, the MLPA 2004 
has some lapses which led to  its repeal and the enactment of the MLPA 2011.70 One of the 
major lapses of the MLPA 2004 was the ambiguity and lack of clarity in the definition of 
money laundering. The definition of money laundering was centred on the proceeds of drugs 
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successfully prosecute other typologies of money laundering offences, as seen in the FRN 
v James Ibori case. 71 
 
The enactment of the MLP 2011 broadens the scope of money laundering offences in 
Nigeria, including the introduction of DNFI and the classification of lawyers as DNFI.72 
 
The Nigerian government appeared to have been more interested in showing the world 
that it complied with international conventions and best practices than solving the real 
problem which is unique to the country. The uniqueness of the problem of Nigeria’s AML 
regime has always been in its typology and enacting an AML regime based on 
international best practice at the time without consultation locally was clearly a 
mistake.73 The symptoms of corruption continues to be prevalent because there was no 
effective mechanism at that time to prosecute money laundering offenders who had 
political privilege.74 
 
Abuse of office, misappropriation of public funds, contract inflation, stealing public funds 
are not linked to drugs and narcotics. Nigeria is not a high consumer of narcotics neither is 
it a traffic destination or route, hence it made no sense having a regime centred only on 
drugs and narcotics. Maybe if Nigeria had a wider AML regime as early as in the 1980’s, 
the regime would have been more effective than it is today. The problem of 
transplantation of laws without recourse to local norms, problems and characteristics has 
been one of the problems facing Nigeria’s development. The transplantation of laws 
without examining the peculiarity of the AML regime in Nigeria prior to 2004 appears to 
have laid the weak foundation of the AML regime.75 These are some of the problems of 
the AML regime this research addressees further in the AML chapter. 
 
Another problem confronting the AML regime is the weak measurement and metrics of 
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money laundering Act thereby creating an AML regime, might not necessary translate into 
adhering with international best practices. The FATF appears to be more concerned with 
nations like Nigeria having an AML regime rather than ensuring that the AML regime is 
effective and regulates the prevalent typology of PEP.76 The evaluation and measurement of 
the effectiveness of an AML regime should be in the number of cases that have been 
successfully prosecuted with regards to the prevalent typology in the jurisdiction. Hence, 
international organisations might have a role in ensuring that the nations do not only have an 
AML regime, but also have the political will to ensure that the AML regime is effective. The 
current metric is focused on prosecutions and not convictions of AML offences by PEP. 
 
We may argue that no amount of pressure mounted on a nation from international 
organisations can metamorphose into political will. Despite enormous pressure mounted by 
the international community on Nigeria, the achievements of the AML regime is subject to 
the local leadership.77 The will to effect change in the society has to emanate from within, 
which includes a conscious decision by the leaders of the nation to do what is considered 
right, in accordance to international best practices, to enhance the AML regime. These are 
also some of the problems of transplantation of laws and regulations. Nations due to pressure 
from international organisations and the world order, might decide to setup an AML regime 
with the intent to merely please these influential organisations. 78 
 
The intent in setting up the AML regime within the jurisdiction might not be to combat the 
prevalent typology but to please these organisations and defend any prospect of criticism. 
There is no reciprocity on the part of the nation in implementing an effective AML regime that 
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need to integrate some of Fullers principles in the AML regime. This reciprocity is a 
fundamental element of Fullers principle of law.79 There must be some element of 
reciprocity in the application of laws. The guideline on money laundering offences in 
Nigeria and the Prosecution of these offences is an adoption of FATF regulation. 
 
The FATF regulations were basically transplanted to the Nigerian AML regime. When 
certain laws are transplanted without taking into consideration other local factors in the 
absence of political will, it might not be as effective as it should be. There could also be 
some disparity between local criminal jurisprudence and the international 
recommendations like the FATF guideline. There has to be a meeting point or 
understanding or reciprocity as Fuller puts it between the AML regime in Nigeria and 
FATF. If issues of transplanting are not well managed, there may not be a willingness on 
the part of the law enforcement in Nigeria to reciprocate international recommendations. 
 
The absence of mutual understanding and a beneficial relationship might be one of the 
factors combatting an effective AML regime in Nigeria, thereby creating room for the 
misapplication of prosecutorial discretion in the AML regime. These are some of the 
issues that would be examined in the AML chapter.80 
 
1.9 Prosecutorial Discretion 
 
The importance of prosecutorial discretion in the AML regime in Nigeria cannot be 
overemphasised. Prosecutors play a crucial role in the administration of the criminal justice 
system of any nation. Prosecutors exercise discretion, deciding who to charge with a crime, 
what charges to file, when to drop the charges, whether to accept a plea bargain, and how to 
allocate prosecutorial resources.81 The decision to charge and what to charge with can be 
more effective than it is, currently in Nigeria. As a reflection of a major political trend globally, 
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powers of prosecutors.82 This is because, when persons are given powers without 
adequate checks and balances, there is a tendency to abuse such powers. There is a 
possibility of prosecutors arrogating themselves more powers than that which has been 
associated in the regulatory framework.83 The independence and the discretion of 
prosecutors is important for the development of the justice system, particularly for the 
AML regime. The focal concern of charging is the primary responsibility of the prosecutor. 
The extent to which the prosecutor uses such powers, particularly with the influential in 
the society, would determine how justiciable and transparent the administration of the 
criminal justice system is. 
 
The independence of the prosecutor and the extent to which prosecutors can act without 
recourse to external and superior factors, are one of the issues which will be analysed.84 
The lack of independence of a prosecutor, and undue interference with the prosecution 
can obstruct the course of justice. If there is an obstruction of justice, then the concept of 
the rule of law is undermined. The AG prosecutes on behalf of the government, and all 
discretionary powers lies in the office of the AG. Other prosecutorial agencies prosecute 
by executive fiat on behalf of the AG. Executive fiat can be defined as a formal 
authorisation, directing someone or an office to carry out certain functions on behalf of a 
superior or a government. In Nigeria, S174 of the Nigerian Constitution 1999, has vested 
in the AG of the federation powers to prosecute and discontinue all criminal cases.85 
 
The problems with an individual wielding such discretionary powers are enormous. This could 
raise issues of abuse office of discretionary powers. The problems of corruption, and the 
tendency to compromise the office of a prosecutor, are not unconnected with the sole 
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could be attributed as one of the probable causes of unsuccessful prosecution of PEPS in 
the AML regime in Nigeria. 
 
A scenario where an AG is appointed from the same political party forming the government 
and is an appointee of the President may create an avenue for inappropriate compromise.86 
The integrity of the AG is very important if prosecutorial discretion is to be applied 
appropriately. The application of prosecutorial discretion in prosecuting money laundering 
offences could determine how successful a charge will be. It is the prosecutor’s responsibility 
to draft a charge that would be in accordance with the legislation. 87 
 
Prosecutorial discretion should not be one sided. Prosecuting on a less weighty charge, or 
outright discontinuance of a case, should not be at the sole discretion of the AG and at 
the sole benefit of a PEP who has been alleged to have committed the offence of money 
laundering.88 
 
The generality in the application of laws is a prerequisite in the acceptability of laws.89 If 
laws are accepted by the people, laws would be obeyed. There is a linkage between the 
generality, acceptability and obedience of laws. Fuller asserts that Laws must be 
General.90 For the enshrinement of the rule of law in a society, the generality of the law 
should be sacrosanct. The application of laid down rules and regulations should not be for 
the common citizens at the exclusion of the rich and influential. The centre of a nation’s 
justice system is the rule of law, how successful the justice system is could be determined 
by generality and the application of the laws. 
 
Fuller asserts that there must be a congruence between written laws and how officials 
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enforce these AML laws do enforce them regardless of whom is involved. The application 
of prosecutorial discretion in deciding whether or not to prosecute an alleged money 
laundering offender, shouldn’t be an exclusive benefit of a PEP. For the acceptance of 
these regulations in the AML regime, officials must enforce and be seen to enforce the 
laid down rules and regulations governing the regime. A PEP should be subject to the 
rigours of the law as a drug dealer or any other money laundering offender would be. 
 
These issues are critically analysed, and its intricacies discussed in the prosecutorial 
discretion chapter 
 
1.10 The collision Course Between the Gatekeeper Approach in the AML legislation and 
Legal Ethics of Professionals 
 
Central to any legal system are lawyers, whose professional ethics support the public interest. 
Any AML regime must earn the cooperation of lawyers if it is to succeed. In Nigeria there are 
problems with the integration of the AML regime with both the legal ethics of confidentiality, 
and the ethical exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Lawyers must not place themselves in a 
position of compromise or appear to get conviction by any means.92 
 
The centrality of legal ethics to the rule of law and the AML regime means we need to 
consider how best to approach legal ethics in Nigeria.93 The role of deontological ethics 
and its stereotype approach in regulating the code of conduct of lawyers might not be the 
best ethical approach. The adherence to strict rules could create a gap, particularly in 
scenarios where there is conflict of rules or where the rule is silent on an issue. The factor 
which should inspire or encourage lawyers to do what is right should not only be rules or 
regulations, but the inner will to do what is right. This inner will which motivates a person 
from separating right from wrong is virtue.94 Virtue ethics appears not to play a 
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these strict rules has created some problems with regards to ensuring that lawyers as 
gatekeepers, play their role effectively in the AML regime. 
 
Adherence to strict rules than doing what is considered right has made the regulation of 
money laundering with regards to the typology of PEP more difficult than it should be. 
The problems arising from what to disclose and what not to disclose as lawyers is 
frustrating the AML regime and the successful prosecution of PEP. The rule which 
regulates the conduct of lawyers forbids lawyers from disclosing financial transactions 
made by their clients. One wonders if this rule also encourages lawyers to look the other 
way on the suspicion of money laundering by their client, on the guise of adherence to 
strict rules and regulations.95 
 
The problem arising from conflict between the duty of confidentiality which is sacrosanct 
in the ethics of lawyers, and the provisions of S3&5 MLPA 2011 which mandates lawyers 
to report suspicious activities are worthy of consideration. In the case of Nigerian Bar 
Association v FGN & CBN,96 it was held that lawyers could not contravene the provisions 
in the Rules of Professional Conduct 2007 [RPC] and the Legal Practitioners ACT 1975 by 
disregarding duty of confidentiality between a client and a lawyer. 
 
With this judgement, lawyers have declined to abide by the provision in S3&5 which 
mandates them to report. This could undermine the AML regime and can hinder an 
effective prosecution of money laundering offenders, particularly offenders that fall 
within the typology, which is prevalent in Nigeria, [PEP]. The practice in the AML regime, 
also appears to authenticate the superiority and importance of deontological ethics over 
Virtue ethics, which should not be the case. 
 
These are some of the problems this research discusses with intricacy, in the chapter on 
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INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS AND THE ANTI MONEY 





2.1 Pre- Colonisation: History of Criminal Prosecution in Nigeria’s Justice System 
 
Before colonisation in Africa, particularly Nigeria, there was a traditional system in place 
to resolve disputes that were considered to be criminal in nature. The traditional African 
society was an all-inclusive society. It was all-inclusive because those who took decisions 
on behalf of a community were representatives from all families. In most communities in 
Nigeria at the time, each family were to nominate two elderly males that would represent 
them as members of the Council of Elders.97 The Council of Elders was typical in almost 
every traditional society in Africa, particularly Nigeria. When issues arose, particularly 
cases that were criminal in nature, the Council of Elders would summon the person who 
has been accused of an offence. The accused person would answer certain questions 
asked by the Council of Elders. At that time, the Council of Elders had a dual function, it 
acted as the prosecutorial authority and the jury in the land. 98 
 
The traditional African society happened to have understood the tendencies and dangers 
of abuse of power; hence, the Council of Elders was like the typical Jury system. Members 
of the council of elders were to vote to determine whether or not the accused person 
should be found guilty.99 However, the decision of the jury was not a binding decision as 
the Kings had the final decision on the proclamation of guilt on a person. 
 
The decision of the council of elders was highly persuasive, as the King was guided by the 
decisions of the members of the Council. The King acted as Judge in the traditional society 
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while the council acted as both prosecutor and jury. The accused/defendant would 
represent himself before the Council, as the concept of legal representation was alien to 
the traditional African society.100 The traditional Nigerian community prior to colonialism 
had no clear rules. There was no codification of laws, that determined what a crime was, 
or what was acceptable within the society. In fact, there was no Nigeria Prior to 1914. The 
amalgamation of communities by Lord Lugard, the naming of these amalgamated 
communities, was done in 1914 and was named Nigeria.101 It is important to note that 
each of these communities had an independent a traditional system of justice. Despite 
the absence of any form of codification of laws, there was an understanding of an 
established prosecutorial system in these communities.102 The Council of Elders had the 
discretionary powers on whom and what offence to prosecute. Minor offences in 
traditional African communities might attract a fine without a need to appear before the 
Council of elders. An offence like murder, stealing or rape, the defendant would have to 
appear before the council of elders and defend himself. The prosecutors who were the 
elders had the discretion on the punishment. This discretion was to recommend to the 
king, who had the powers to give the final judgement.103 
 
It is important to note that the criminal justice system prior to the colonial era of the 
British, was based on customary law, particularly in the southern region of Nigeria.104 The 
prosecutorial system, where the Council of Elders decided who to prosecute and the 
offence to prosecute, was in accordance to the norms and customs of the people at that 
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community. This is because each community within the southern region of Nigeria, had a 
monarchical system of government, and the monarch’s at the time were in charge of both 
the executive, legislature and the judiciary.105 The monarchs had an enormous influence 
on the Council of Elders, and this influence guided the decisions the prosecutorial 
establishments (Council of Elders) made at the time. 
 
Despite the autonomy of each of these communities and a little variation in their 
customary laws and justice system in the southern part of Nigeria, the prosecutorial 
system was almost the same. Most communities had a decision-making body made up of 
the elders in the community and a king, who makes a final decision based on the decision 
of the Council of Elders.106 This was the predominant practice in southern Nigeria prior to 
the colonial rule. 
 
In the northern part of Nigeria, the written Muslim law of the Maliki school was what 
guided the prosecutorial system at the time. The justice system in northern Nigeria was 
based on Islamic law. Islamic scholars at that time, were the only ones authorised to 
interpret the Koran. Their interpretation of the Koran in accordance to criminal offences 
was a system of justice on its own. This is because prior to the colonisation of the British, 
the Trans -Sahara trade brought Islamic scholars to the Northern region of Nigeria from 
Futa Jallon (now Guinea). This made Islam the predominant religion in the northern part 
of Nigeria.107 
 
The practice of Islam took over the culture and traditional institutions in northern Nigeria, 
even before colonialism in Northern Nigeria. Hence, the culture and religion in northern 
Nigeria appears to be inter-linked. The culture in northern Nigeria (Islamic culture) happened 
to be the centre of their justice system pre colonialism. The prosecutorial system in northern 















The Islamic scholars at the time oversaw the prosecutorial system.109 The Islamic scholars 
acted as both prosecutor and judge over cases that were referred to them. This was because 
the justice system at that time, which was based on Islam, prohibited members of the society 
who were not Islamic scholars from interpreting the Koran. The Islamic scholars were 
believed to be “knowledgeable” which validated their mandate in the Northern-Nigerian 
society to interpret the Koran and apply it to the cases that were refer to them.110 
 
The prosecutorial system in pre- colonial northern Nigeria appeared to be effective at the 
time, as there were no bureaucratic processes before justice could be dispensed. It was easy 
for justice to be dispensed as the king would simply assemble the Alkali to preside over a 
case.111 The Alkali’s are revered Islamic teachers and are common in Islamic societies. The 
criminal justice system was less complicated than it is currently; however, it had its own 
disadvantages. Some of the disadvantages of the criminal justice system was the 
centralisation of prosecutorial powers and dual role of the Alkali. The Alkali determined the 
offences to prosecute and gave judgement on cases subject to the king’s approval. This was 
the norm in Northern Nigeria at the time, which gave room for dictatorial tendencies by the 
monarch and Alkalis.112 The centralisation of prosecutorial powers in pre- colonial Nigeria 
could be interpreted as an abuse of prosecutorial discretion in its own form. 
 
However, it is worthy of note that societies in pre-colonial Africa had her own systems, which 
includes the criminal justice system. The application of prosecutorial discretion in the criminal 
justice system in Nigeria had been existing before the colonisation by the British and before 
Nigeria as a nation had any formal criminal procedure. Even if there was no clear guide to 
determine the application of prosecutorial discretion in the pre-colonial era, the discretionary 
powers the Alkalis in Northern Nigeria had and the Council of elders 
 
 




110 Audu Jacob ‘Pre Colonial Political Administration in the North Central Nigeria: A Study of the 




 Ogechi E. Anyanwu ‘Crime and Justice in Postcolonial Nigeria: The Justifications and Challenges of 




in southern Nigeria, was prosecutorial discretion in its own form.113 Of course, it was not 
a perfect system as there are no perfect systems, the traditional prosecutorial system pre 
- colonial era, which had its own flaws, contributes richly to the history of the criminal 
justice system in Nigeria. 
 
2.2 Colonisation: History of Criminal Prosecution in Nigeria’s Justice System 
 
Upon the arrival of the colonial rulers in Nigeria, the colonialist had to liaise with the local 
traditional leaders particularly in the southern part of Nigeria to establish their consular 
services. The colonialist first point of call was Lagos and Bonny Kingdom. This was because 
these areas in the southern part of Nigeria, are on the coast and the predominant means of 
transportation was by sea.114 By 1861, the British had succeeded in convincing the traditional 
leaders in Lagos that it was best for the traditional leaders to allow them take charge of their 
consular services, in exchange for European protection. The treaty that proclaimed Lagos as a 
colony was signed in 1861, which gave room for a gradual and systematic introduction of the 
European norms and culture in Lagos and indeed the southern part of Nigeria, as Lagos was a 
major converging point because of the sea port.115 
 
Soon after, the traditional leaders within Lagos colony saw that the British appeared to have 
wanted more than just consular services. The imposition of the way of life and administration 
of the running of the society, became the colonialist primary interest. This brought about a 
resistance from the locals, some of which became bloody. In other for the British to control 
the Lagos market and their commercial interest, they established the police which was 
controlled by the British. At the initial time, they had only British recruits in the police. This 
was done to ensure that there were no locals in the police, and when they eventually 
recruited the locals, the colonialist ensures that the locals in the police bore no arms.116 The 
British police at that time, domiciled in Lagos, ensured orderliness amongst the locals and 
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consular service and police, spread across the southern region, which necessitated the 
establishment of unwritten laws and courts by 1871. 
 
By 1872 the British established they Consular courts and the courts of equity across Nigeria. 
These courts had jurisdiction to entertain trade disputes. However, Lagos being the first point 
of call of the colonial leaders, was ahead of other regions. On 4th of March 1863, Lagos was 
subject to English law and a supreme court was established by the supreme court Ordinance 
of 1863. This court had jurisdiction to hear both criminal and civil matters arising from 
persons residing within the Jurisdiction. Soon after, the powers of the courts spread across 
other regions in Nigeria. The new law set out precise punishments for specific crimes. 
Punishments were assessed by individual wealth, title and peculiar circumstances of the 
offender.117 It is important to note that the customary law was not totally set aside with the 
advent of English law. The English law and customary law were operating side by side in the 
criminal justice system of Nigeria. In most cases, the English law was applied to fit into the 
norms and customs of the particular village, in which it was applied. There was a meeting 
ground in the application of both laws, however if there was a conflict of laws which was 
considered not to be to the advantage of the colonial leaders, the English law prevailed over 
the criminal justice system.118 
 
By 1900, there was the native court proclamation. The native courts were of two categories, 
the minor court which handled disputes with fines not exceeding 25 pounds, which had a 
district commissioner who acted as the president of the court. The native council was also 
established, which served as the court of appeal for the minor court. At that time, the courts 
would summon offenders for both criminal and civil offences and appoint a district officer to 
stand in as attorney, prosecuting the defendant.119 A district officer acted as a prosecutor 
and determined the charges that the offender would be prosecuted with. The Supreme Court 
Ordinance of 1863 and the native court proclamation of 1900 were enabling laws that 
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era. Hence, there was a need to establish the prison system, which was done in 1863. The 
concept of correctional facilities had not existed in the country before then, the 
sentencing of offenders was based on the supreme court ordinance of 1863 and the type 
of offence that had been committed.120 
 
The colonialist brought some level of orderliness to the criminal justice system in Nigeria 
and laid the foundation for a more effective prosecutorial system in Nigeria. 
 
2.3 Post Colonisation: History of Criminal Prosecution in Nigeria’s Justice System. 
 
Immediately after Nigeria gained independence from United Kingdom in 1960, the 
Nigerian police force had the primary responsibility of prosecuting criminal cases. Part of 
the responsibility of the police, was to investigate and prosecute suspects who had been 
accused of committing crimes against the state. The Nigerian police had the discretionary 
powers at that time to prosecute all offences on behalf of the government.121 However in 
the modern system, S 23 Nigerian Police Act gives powers to the police to prosecute 
pursuant to provisions of S174 of the Nigerian constitution. S23 of the police act states: 
Conduct of prosecutions 
 
“Subject to the provisions of sections 174 and 211 of the Constitution 
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (which relate to the power of 
the Attorney-General of the Federation and of a State to institute and 
undertake, take over and continue or discontinue criminal proceedings 
against any person before any court of law in Nigeria), any police 
officer may conduct in person all prosecutions before any court, 
whether or not the information or complaint is laid in his name.” 122 
 
It can be argued that, the introduction of prosecutorial discretion in the Nigerian criminal 
justice system post colonisation was through the Nigerian police force, which prosecuted 
on behalf of the government. However, even as at the time of the enactment of the Police 
Act, the Nigerian police could not have prosecuted without the interference of the 
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Attorney general[AG], if he so wished.123 The Nigerian police, had multiple prosecutorial 
functions at the time its formal enactment. These multiple prosecutorial functions arose 
from the fact that there were no agencies created at the time with the primary 
responsibility of prosecuting specific offences. 
 
For example, the National Drug Law and Enforcement Agency [NDLEA] was formed in 1989 , 
with specific duties of prosecuting offences relating to drugs and narcotics. 124 Prior to the 
enactment of the NDLEA Act, the Nigerian Police prosecuted all drug and related offences. 
The Nigerian customs had been established in 1945 by the colonial administration, with no 
prosecutorial powers attached to the agency. The Nigerian Customs had its prosecutorial 
powers attached to it in 1992, prior to that the Nigerian police prosecuted on behalf of the 
Nigerian customs. The Nigeria police prosecuted on behalf of all government agencies prior to 
when these government agencies obtaining their establishment Act, which eventually 
empowers these agencies to prosecute. It is important to note that despite having an 
enabling act, which empowered most government agencies to prosecute offences relating to 
their specific duties, these agencies do not possess the absolute discretion to prosecute. For 
any government agency to prosecute, it has to be through an executive fiat issued by the 
Attorney -General [AG], to prosecute on behalf of the government. 
 
This process known as “executive fiat” has been an object of criticism by legal scholars 
and advocates for the rule of law. Garrison Author criticises the use of executive fiat and 
the possibilities of the abuse of this executive privilege, particularly as it undermines the 
rule of law.125 This is because, there is a tendency particularly in developing nations, that 
the administrator of executive fiat could abuse such powers. With regards to the criminal 
justice system particularly in Nigeria, the administrator of executive fiat is the AG, who 
issues this order to agencies to prosecute on behalf of the government, in accordance to 
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government agencies with prosecutorial powers would not be quick to prosecuting a 
suspect upon the conclusion of their investigation. The bureaucracy of seeking an 
approval from the office of the AG before prosecuting could delay the course of justice, or 
even tamper with the outcome of the investigation. These are some of the challenges the 
existing criminal justice system in Nigeria faces.126 
 
It is important to note that private persons can institute criminal proceedings on behalf of 
the government, however the law gives a certain condition for private persons to 
prosecute. The criminal justice system allows for private prosecution of criminal cases, 
subject to the discretion and approval of the AG. Private persons can institute criminal 
proceedings on the condition that a fiat is obtained from the office of the AG. There is 
legal and judicial backing for this in the Nigerian criminal justice system, approved by the 
Supreme Court. In the case of Fawehinmi v Akilu, the supreme court held that all criminal 
cases are instituted by the AG, however in the case where a private individual intends to 
prosecute a criminal case, the person could do so by obtaining a fiat from the AG.127 
 
Despite this judgement by the supreme court, the practicability of a private individual to 
institute criminal proceedings is almost impossible. The office of the AG still takes 
responsibility for the prosecution of criminal cases and may never grant a fiat to private 
persons to prosecute on behalf of the state. In other jurisdictions particularly in the USA, it is 
common to find private persons prosecute on behalf of the government.128 Private 
prosecutors do not need permission from government prosecutors to institute criminal 
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suspect if there is a need to do so. This has helped to reduce the workload on 
government prosecutors and could aid a quick dispensation of justice.129 
 
The prosecution of criminal cases by private persons has its advantages. One of it is that it 
circumvents the bureaucratic nature of the office of the AG, and other government 
agencies empowered to prosecute criminal cases. This makes the dispensation of justice 
faster.130 However, it could be that influential individuals in the criminal justice system in 
Nigeria [AG], do not want the “unnecessary” privatisation of the criminal justice system 
by issuing fiats to private persons to prosecute and represent the state, as if it were a civil 
case. Some persons have theorised that government should privatise the criminal justice 
arena to reduce the burden on the office of the AG and government prosecutors, while 
some have opposed this on the basis that the functionality of the criminal justice system 
of a nation is the primary responsibility of the government.131 
 
It is important to also note that there is a difference between the briefing of private 
lawyers to prosecute on behalf of the state and private persons prosecuting criminal 
offences. The difference between both is that, when private persons are briefed to 
prosecute on behalf of the state, the person is only acting as a legal representation for the 
state. The person is being briefed as any other lawyer would be briefed to represent a 
client. In this case the government [AG] is the client of the prosecutor and the prosecutor 
takes instructions from the client [AG], on whether or not to prosecute. 
 
While in the latter, private person prosecuting on behalf of the state means that any 
individual who is desirous of institution of a criminal charge against a person, could do so 
in the person’s personal capacity as if the person is the aggrieved party or the litigant. It 
could be argued that this goes against the fundamental principle of the doctrine of the 
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go by way of this fundamental principle, then we could argue that the advocates for the 
privatisation of the criminal justice system, who are arguing against the bureaucracy of 
the office of the AG and for the speedy dispensation of justice, may lose the fundamental 
element of criminal law. If crimes are committed against the state then, the state or its 
representative should be responsible for the prosecution of criminal cases. 
 
Whether or not legal scholars continue to argue on the privatisation of prosecution, the 
applicability of it in the criminal justice system of Nigeria is almost impossible, despite it 
been settled law as far back as 1987. It is almost impossible for private persons to 
prosecute criminal offences, as the bureaucracy of obtaining a fiat from the AG makes it 
almost impossible.133 More so, it could be argued that in a developing nation like Nigeria, 
the AG may not want the devolution of prosecutorial powers, which could serve as a 
check and balance on the occupant of the office. 
 
The prosecutorial duties of government agencies like Nigerian Customs, Immigration 
Service, National Drug Law and Enforcement Agency, National Food and Drug 
Administration Agency and all other prosecutorial agencies including the Economic and 
Financial Crimes Commission [EFCC], which is directly responsible for prosecuting money 
laundering related offences, are subject to the approval of the Attorney General. This 
clearly means that prosecutorial discretion has a major role to play in the criminal justice 
system of Nigeria and the office AG has oversight and ultimate responsibility for the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Hence, the need to examine the role of prosecutorial 
discretion in the AML regime in Nigeria. 
 
2.4 The Definition of Corruption Within the Nigerian Context. 
 
For an elaborate discussion on the issue of PEP related money laundering offences, it is 
important that there is a conceptualization of the definition of corruption. This is because 
of the role corruption plays in the application of prosecutorial discretion in the AML 
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What is Corruption? Corruption can be found everywhere. It can be found in the private 
sector, media, business, civil society and public sector. From health to education, sports and 
infrastructure, corruption can be found. When people hear the word corruption, there is a 
general presumption that it is government related corruption or misappropriation of public 
funds by some government official. In as much as this is a type of corruption, the problem of 
corruption is also visible in the private sector.134 According to the UN “The analysis so far has 
pertained specifically to the experience and perceptions of bribery in relation to public sector 
officials. However, the issue of corruption and, more specifically, of bribe-paying also extends 
to the private sector. In addition to public officials, both the 2016 and 2019 surveys inquired 
about respondents' experiences with six types of private sector employee: doctors in private 
hospitals, nurses in private hospitals, teachers in private schools, employees in private banks, 
employees in private insurance companies, and other employees in private business. In 2019, 
28 per cent of citizens reported having had a contact with one such private sector employee 
in the 12 months prior to the survey, some 3 percentage points more than the 25 per cent in 
the 2016 survey”135 
 
According to the Webster dictionary, corruption can be defined as a departure from the 
original or from what is considered pure. If we are to expatiate further on this definition, 
it means that any interference, infiltration, dilution, or deviation from “what it ought to 
be” can be defined as corruption. It can be further enumerated to mean that deliberate 
actions with intent to deviate from the original plan or sequence, to the unjust advantage 
of persons deviating from such original plan, can be defined as corruption. 
 
This further means that when senior executives in the private sector, divert shareholders' 
funds without their consent due to insider dealings, it is an example of corruption. When a 
doctor who works in a busy hospital, gives his friends kids a priority treatment and ignoring 
other patients who have been on the line waiting to see a doctor, that is corruption. When 
undue advantage is given to a person in an interview panel amongst other candidates. Hence, 
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abused the oath of office or unjustly enriched himself. Hence, there are several 
definitions of corruption. However, for purpose of this discussion, emphasis will be placed 
on institutional corruption. 
 
The OECD, the United Nations and the Council of Europe has no clear definition of 
corruption, however, they establish offences of a range of corrupt behavior, for example, 
bribery, abuse of office etc. Hence, the OECD convention makes provision for the 
establishment of bribery as a corrupt practice by foreign public officials, the Council of 
Europe makes provision for the offences such as trading in influence and bribing domestic 
and foreign public officials. In addition to these types of conduct, the mandatory 
provisions of the UN Convention also include embezzlement, misappropriation or other 
diversion of property by a public official and obstruction of justice. at is corruption. 
 
These conventions define international standards on the criminalization of corruption by 
prescribing specific offences, rather than through a generic definition or offence of 
corruption. 
 
Article 15-20 of the UN Convention on Convention Against Corruption 2003 clearly makes 
provision for the criminalization of corruption. 
 
Article 15 :“Each State Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be 
necessary to establish as criminal offences, when committed intentionally: (a) The 
promise, offering or giving, to a public official, directly or indirectly, of an undue 
advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or entity, in order that the 
official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties; (b) The 
solicitation or acceptance by a public official, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage, 
for the official himself or herself or another person or entity, in order that the official act 















Each State Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to 
establish as criminal offences, when committed intentionally, the embezzlement, 
misappropriation or other diversion by a public official for his or her benefit or for the benefit 
of another person or entity, of any property, public or private funds or securities or any other 




Article 20: “Illicit enrichment Subject to its constitution and the fundamental principles of its 
legal system, each State Party shall consider adopting such legislative and other measures as 
may be necessary to establish as a criminal offence, when committed intentionally, illicit 
enrichment, that is, a significant increase in the assets of a public official that he or she cannot 
reasonably explain in relation to his or her lawful income.”138 
 
Furthermore, the Council of Europe Convention Against Corruption 2002 makes provision 
for the criminalization of corruption by public officials. 
 
Article 3:” Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary 
to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when committed intentionally, 
the request or receipt by any of its public officials, directly or indirectly, of any undue 
advantage, for himself or herself or for anyone else, or the acceptance of an offer or a 
promise of such an advantage, to act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her 
functions.”139 
 
Furthermore, the UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED 
CRIME, Palermo 2000, mandates states to criminalize proceeds of serious crimes. It also 
mandates member states to confiscate these proceeds. Article 6 sates: 
 
“1. Each State Party shall adopt, in accordance with fundamental 
 
principles of its domestic law, such legislative and other measures as may 
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 (i) The conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such 
property is the proceeds of crime, for the purpose of concealing or 
disguising the illicit origin of the property or of helping any person 
who is involved in the commission of the predicate offence to evade 
the legal consequences of his or her action; 
 
 The concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, 
location, disposition, movement or ownership of or rights with 
respect to property, knowing that such property is the proceeds of 
crime; 
 
 Subject to the basic concepts of its legal system: 
 
 The acquisition, possession or use of property, knowing, at the 
time of receipt, that such property is the proceeds of crime; 
 
 Participation in, association with or conspiracy to commit, 
attempts to commit and aiding, abetting, facilitating and counselling 
 




Furthoremore, article 8 and 9 of the Palermo convention mandates member nations to 
criminalize corruption. It states: 
 
“Each State Party shall adopt such legislative and other 
 










 The promise, offering or giving to a public official, directly or indirectly, 
of an undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person 
or entity, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise 
of his or her official duties; 
 
 The solicitation or acceptance by a public official, directly or 
 
indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or 
another person or entity, in order that the official act or refrain from acting 
in the exercise of his or her official duties. 
 
 Each State Party shall consider adopting such legislative and other 
measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences conduct 
referred to in paragraph 1 of this article involving a foreign public official 
or international civil servant. Likewise, each State Party shall consider 
establishing as criminal offences other forms of corruption. 
 
 Each State Party shall also adopt such measures as may be 
 
necessary to establish as a criminal offence participation as an accomplice 
in an offence established in accordance with this article. 
 
4. For the purposes of paragraph 1 of this article and article 9 of 
 
this Convention, “public official” shall mean a public official or a person 
 
who provides a public service as defined in the domestic law and as applied 
 
in the criminal law of the State Party in which the person in question 
 









1. In addition to the measures set forth in article 8 of this 
 
Convention, each State Party shall, to the extent appropriate and consistent 
 
with its legal system, adopt legislative, administrative or other effective 
 
measures to promote integrity and to prevent, detect and punish the 
 
corruption of public officials. 
 
 Each State Party shall take measures to ensure effective action by 
its authorities in the prevention, detection and punishment of the 
corruption of public officials, including providing such authorities with 
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From the above discussions, it is quite clear that there are international instruments that 
have defined and criminalized corruption, particularly by public officials. It is important to 
also note that Article 21 and 22 of the UN Convention against corruption makes 
provisions for the criminalization of corruption in the private sector. The Palermo 
Convention on serious Crime makes provision for the criminalization of corruption in both 
private and public sectors. However, our discussion focuses on money laundering by PEP, 
which is an integral type of corruption by public officials. 
 
Within the Nigerian context, the definition of corruption is the abuse of office by public 
officials who are representing the people. The context of corruption within the Nigerian state 
is taking advantage of an office or position to unjustly enrich oneself. According to the UN 
office on Drugs and Crime, the problem of corruption in Nigeria appears to be institutional. 
The PEP that occupy these institutions have corrupted the system consciously or 
subconsciously, that the problem might have grown more than the corrupt individual or PEP 
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which is the systemic corruption in Nigeria is the Constitution.143 This is because the 
criminal justice system of Nigeria is centered around the office of the AG by virtue of S174 
of the Constitution.144 
 
The over concentration of powers in the office of the AG has made it difficult to successfully 
prosecute PEP for corruption related offences. Hence, the refusal to prosecute or the 
discontinuance of corruption cases has made the fight against corruption not is effective as it 
should be, despite having laws regulating anti-corruption and money laundering. 
 
An AG who refuses to accept a bribe but refuses to approve the prosecution of PEP or 
discontinues the prosecution of the PEP, is as corrupt as who has received a bribe. Hence, 
definition of corruption within the Nigerian context goes beyond receiving bribe or 
converting public funds for private use, but miss-use and abuse of office. 
 
2.5 Brief History of the Development of Anti Money Laundering Regimes Before 
Financial Action Task Force 
 
The global awareness and measures on the fight against money laundering and related 
offences began around the 1980’s led by the European Council. It promoted the “know 
your customer” principles in banking. The reason for this, was for the names on bank 
accounts to reflect the true beneficial owner.145 Despite these efforts, nations were not 
interested in forming domestic AML policies. Nations had not criminalized money 
laundering prior to 1986. The United States was among the first nations to criminalize 
money laundering and enact an AML framework to tackle this crime and its related 
offences domestically.146 
 
In the 1980’s, the proceeds from the sale of drugs and narcotics particularly from nations 
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This was because, the typology of money laundering related offences at the time was 
from drugs and narcotics. In Northern Ireland, the drug cartels almost caused some 
instability. These respective nations at the time recorded a significant increase in the use 
of LSD, cannabis, cocaine and ecstasy. These factors led to the formation of a new 
Government policy in Northern Island, with clear priorities for action on education, 
treatment, enforcement, research and evaluation.148 
 
The height of the drug trade was between the 1980’s and early 1990’s, during the reign of 
the drug baron Pablo Escobar. His cartel at that time, was able to launder over $70m 
(seventy million dollars) a day, at the peak of his career. Part of these funds were used to 
destabilise the Colombian government which led to mass killing within the Latin 
America.149 There was a need for concerted efforts by the international community to 
check the illicit flow of funds from drug cartels. 
 
The foundation of the global fight against money laundering began at the November 25 
1988 Vienna Convention. It was agreed at the United Nations [UN] conference, for the 
need to adopt a convention against illicit traffic in Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances.150 The Vienna Convention brought the harmonisation of a global AML 
regime. Nations decided to implement the recommendation from the Vienna convention 
and develop a framework to combat AML within their respective jurisdictions. The Vienna 
Convention can be rightly argued to be the beginning of a global AML regime. The clear 
focus of Article 3 was on the proceeds from the sale of drugs and narcotics, human 
trafficking, illegal sale of arms and other offences with the exclusion of white-collar 
offences and PEPS. These recommendations are stated in article 3 of the Vienna 
convention. 
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(a) “Each Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to establish as 
criminal offences under its domestic law, when committed intentionally: 
 
 The production, manufacture, extraction; preparation, offering, offering for 
sale, distribution, sale, delivery on any terms whatsoever, brokerage, dispatch, 
dispatch in transit, transport, importation or exportation of any narcotic drug 
or any psychotropic substance contrary to the provisions of the 1961 




The conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is derived 
from any offence or offences established in accordance with subparagraph a) of 
this paragraph, or from an act of participation in such offence or offences, for the 
purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property or of assisting 
any person who is involved in the commission of such an offence or offences to 
evade the legal consequences of his actions; ii) The concealment or disguise of the 
true nature, source, location, disposition, movement, rights with respect to, or 
ownership of property, knowing that such property is derived from an offence or 
offences established in accordance with subparagraph a) of this paragraph or from 




 Subject to its constitutional principles and the basic concepts of its legal 
system: i) The acquisition, possession or use of property, knowing, at the time 
of receipt, that such property was derived from an offence or offences 
established in accordance with subparagraph a) of this paragraph or from an 
act of participation in such offence or offences; 
 
The Parties shall endeavour to ensure that any discretionary legal powers 
under their domestic law relating to the prosecution of persons for offences 
established in accordance with this article are exercised to maximize the 
effectiveness of law enforcement measures in respect of those offences, and 







 Nothing contained in this article shall affect the principle that the 
description of the offences to which it refers and of legal defences thereto is 
reserved to the domestic law of a Party and that such offence shall be 
 
prosecuted and punished in conformity with that law.”151 
 
If we agree that the Vienna convention of 1988, set the parameters for AML globally, then 
there was mistake from the beginning. This is because nations went ahead to create an 
AML framework, integrating and internalising the recommendation from the Vienna 
convention of 1988, without taking cognisance of how unique each nation is and the type 
of problem each nation faces.152 That is, if the nation faces a money laundering problem 
at all. The problem with the internalisation of the articles of the Vienna convention was in 
the typology. There should have been a comprehensive overview and definition of what 
money laundering is from the start [Vienna]. This would have enabled nations to have a 
more comprehensive approach in establishing an AML regulatory framework in their 
respective jurisdictions. 
 
Could it be the absence of foresight? Or a total disregard for weaker nations by “superior” 
powers at the UN, influencing these younger nations to implement an AML regime that is 
focusing on a typology which is not prevalent in their jurisdiction? For the harmonisation 
of laws and integration of policies, consultation is important, and it plays a crucial role if 
the vision for having these policies, recommendations or laws must succeed. Nations 
should have been carried along from the beginning at Vienna, to express themselves and 
make input on the typology of money laundering offence that is most prevalent in their 
respective jurisdictions.153 
 
These nations particularly developing nations were not carried along maybe due to the 
lack of genuine interest on the part of the leaders of these nations. There was no basis for 
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customs, prevalent crimes and vices in the nation. This was indeed the beginning of the 
problem of the AML regime in Nigeria. 
 
2.6 Internalization of International Recommendations before Financial Action Task 
Force, [FATF] in the AML Regime of Nigeria. 
 
Nigeria, following the blueprint of Article 3 established an AML regime focusing on drugs 
and narcotics, with the exclusion of other money laundering related offences particularly 
offences by PEPS. The internalization of the Vienna Convention 1988, in the AML regime 
in Nigeria created a gap in the typology of money laundering offences between 1989-
1999. This gap in typology in the AML regime of Nigeria, was as a result of the 
implementation of Article 3 of the Vienna convention locally, by establishing the National 
Drug Law Enforcement Agency [NDLEA]. The NDLEA focused on money laundering 
offences from the proceeds of the sale of drugs and narcotics, which has never been the 
typology of money laundering offence that Nigeria has been facing.154 
 
The creation of the NDLEA was the first step by the Nigerian government to set up an 
AML regime and internalize international recommendations of the Vienna Convention. 
The AML regime was already deficient from the start as it did not focus on the typology of 
money laundering offences that Nigeria faces, which is corruption and abuse of office by 
PEP. Developing nations in Africa, particularly Nigeria, are concerned about the typology 
of money laundering offence that is predominant, which is corruption and abuse of office 
by PEP.155 
 
When analyzing the context in which the NDLEA was established, it is visible that there 
was no intention in focusing on other money laundering typologies. 
 
S3 of the NDLEA clearly states its functions.156 It states: 
 
“Subject to this Act and in addition to any other functions expressly 
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 adoption of measures to identify, trace, freeze, confiscate or seize 
proceeds derived from drug-related offences or property whose value 
corresponds to such proceeds; 
 
 The movement of proceeds or property derived from the 
commission of such offences; (iii) the movement of narcotic drugs and 
psychotropic substances specified in the Second Schedule to this Act, 
and instrumentalities used or intended for use in the commission of 




 The establishment and maintenance of a system for monitoring international 
dealings in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances in order to identify 
 
suspicious transactions and persons engaged in them.” 
 
The creation of an AML regime in Nigeria, with a clear focus on a typology that is not 
predominant in the region, shows clearly the problems of integrating international 
recommendations, without recourse to domestic problems, typologies and consultation.157 
The NDLEA was set up due to the international growing pressure at the time, particularly from 
the United Nations. This made nations have an AML framework that would combat money 
laundering and curtail the illicit flow of the proceeds from the sale of drugs and narcotics.158 
Developing nations like Nigeria at the time, should not have been in a haste to transplant laws 
and domesticate them. The domestication of international recommendations should be in 
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The focus on a typology of money laundering, which is totally different from what is 
predominant in Nigeria, made the NDLEA ineffective from the point of enactment. The 
peculiarities of money laundering activities in the Nigerian state should have been put 
into consideration before the internalisation of article 3 of the Vienna convention. This 
posed a major challenge because the provisions of the legislation did not cover other 
money laundering offences like human trafficking, terrorist financing and offences 
committed by PEP. The typology of human trafficking and terrorist financing are prevalent 
in developing nations however in Nigeria in as much as we have these problems, . The 
problems arising from corruption and the effects of corruption on the development of 
Nigeria, makes the typology of PEP more worrisome. Hence, the transplantation of 
recommendations from the Vienna convention should have been done in such a way that 
it suits local norms and problems.160 
 
Nigeria may have many problems, however the problem of corruption by PEP is a primary 
challenge. The money laundering related typology that Nigeria faces as a nation, are 
issues of corruption and abuse of office by PEPs.161 
 
2.7 The Integration of International Recommendations Post Financial Action Task Force 
[FATF] and the Problem of Nigeria’s Typology 
 
The problem of money laundering has had a significant but negative effect in the 
development of Nigeria. This criminality has disrupted economic growth and financial stability 
in the country.162 The typology of money laundering Nigeria is dealing with, is the problem of 
corruption and abuse of office by PEP. Nigeria, an oil rich nation is the 6th largest producer of 
oil and the 9th producer of liquefied natural gas.163 Despite the nation’s natural resources 
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line.164 Money laundering and corruption particularly by politically exposed persons 
[PEPS] can be attributed as one of the reasons for the slow pace of development in the 
country. The collective wealth of her citizens has been misappropriated by a privileged 
few who have been entrusted into public office and the proceeds have been laundered 
within and outside the country. 165 
 
The FATF appears to understand the problem of typology in the AML regime in Nigeria. 
The pressure mounted by international organisations, particularly the FATF on Nigeria 
necessitated for a review of the AML framework in Nigeria. The FATF since its formation 
has recorded some progress however, the integration and implementation of its policies 
in developing nations particularly Nigeria has not been as successful as it should have 
been. The integration of FATF recommendations, and the effort made by the Nigerian 
government to have a comprehensive AML regime is not enough.166 
 
The FATF gave its original recommendations in 1990 and has been consistently revised to 
suit the evolving nature of money laundering. The inclusion of terrorist financing as part 
of its mandate was done in 2001 and PEP in 2012. Recommendation 1 of the FATF 
reccomendations in 2012 states: 
 
“1. Assessing risks and applying a risk-based approach * 
 
Countries should identify, assess, and understand the money laundering and terrorist 
financing risks for the country, and should take action, including designating an authority or 
mechanism to coordinate actions to assess risks, and apply resources, aimed at ensuring the 
risks are mitigated effectively. Based on that assessment, countries should apply a risk-based 
approach (RBA) to ensure that measures to prevent or mitigate money laundering and 
terrorist financing are commensurate with the risks identified. This approach should be an 
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laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regime and the 
implementation of risk-based measures throughout the FATF Recommendations. Where 
countries identify higher risks, they should ensure that their AML/CFT regime adequately 
addresses such risks. Where countries identify lower risks, they may decide to allow simplified 






From FATF recommendation 1 of 2012, nations like Nigeria has made attempts internalize 
these recommendations. As discussed earlier, Nigeria had an AML regime focusing on 
drugs and narcotics by virtue of the NDLEA ACT.168 The Nigerian AML regime also evolved 
and internalized these international recommendations. Hence, the introduction of the 
EFCC ACT and the MLPA 2004 was an attempt by the Nigerian state to address these 
issues.169 
 
FATF Recommendation 3 of 2012, States: 
 
“Money laundering offence *Countries should criminalize money laundering on the basis 
of the Vienna Convention and the Palermo Convention. Countries should apply the crime 







FATF Recommendation 3 of 2012 gives the mandate to nations to explore all possibilities 
of criminalizing any potential typology. What this means is that nations like Nigeria have 
been given the mandate to review their AML laws from time to time to include evolving 
typologies within the jurisdiction. For example, the problem of the definition of money 
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proceeds from drugs and narcotics.171 This was the primary problem of the MLPA 2004 
which the FATF recommendation 3atempts to address. 
 




 “Politically exposed persons * Financial institutions should be required, in relation to 
foreign politically exposed persons (PEPs) (whether as customer or beneficial owner), in 
addition to performing normal customer due diligence measures, to: 
 
 have appropriate risk-management systems to determine whether the customer or 
the beneficial owner is a politically exposed person; 
 
 obtain senior management approval for establishing (or continuing, for existing 
customers) such business relationships; 
 
 take reasonable measures to establish the source of wealth and source of funds; and 
 
 conduct enhanced ongoing monitoring of the business relationship. Financial 
institutions should be required to take reasonable measures to determine whether a 
customer or beneficial owner is a domestic PEP or a person who is or has been entrusted 
with a prominent function by an international organization. In cases of a higher risk 
business relationship with such persons, financial institutions should be required to apply 
the measures referred to in paragraphs (b), (c) and (d). The requirements for all types of 
PEP should also apply to family members or close associates of such PEPs.”172 
 
This provision gives nations the mandate to regulate the activities of PEP particularly as it 
deals with the principles of due diligence by financial institutions. In Nigeria, the introduction 
of DNFI in the S 3 and 5 of the MLPA 2011 is an attempt to integrate these FATF 
recommendations.173 The regulation of bankers and other professionals with regards to 
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corruption and money laundering. This is because there is a possibility that these 
gatekeepers who are professionals can be used to launder funds for PEP.174 
 
FATF appears to have what it takes to ensure that the AML regimes in nations like Nigeria 
are very effective, with regards to the prevalent typology for PEP in Nigeria. FATF appears 
to be making the mistake in their assessment and measurement of what a successful and 
effective AML regime should be, by assessing it based on the laws and prosecution of 
persons involved in money laundering.175 This is a wrong assessment. The correct 
assessment by international organisations like the FATF should be done by taking a look at 
the number of successful prosecutions of the prevalent typology, with respect to the 
jurisdiction. With Nigeria, the right assessment should be based on the number of 
successful prosecution of PEP and recovery of assets. The right questions should be out 
across to the regulators of the AML regime in Nigeria. These questions should be: 
 
How many PEP have been successfully prosecuted and jailed? 
 
How many assets have been recovered from the proceeds of political corruption? 
 
Any assessment which does not fall within these boundaries, might just be a false 
assessment and these are some of the problems the AML regime in Nigeria faces. The 
intent of these international recommendations which is for nations to have effective AML 
regimes focusing on prevalent typologies in their jurisdiction, might have been eroded. 
The applicability and enforcement of these international recommendations that have 
been domesticated seems to be the problem currently facing the AML regime in Nigeria. 
 
The problem of corruption by PEPS and the unsuccessful prosecution of PEPS, has 
undermined international recommendations of the FATF, that have been integrated in the 
AML regime in Nigeria. This is because there is a difference between having existing laws 
and the enforcement of these existing laws. The mere integration of international 
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The absence of executive powers of the FATF to ensure that member states implement 
and enforce its recommendations could be some of the challenges the FATF faces.177 In 
order for Nigeria to be perceived by the international community that Nigeria has an 
effective AML regime, these recommendations of the FATF have to be integrated into 
Nigeria’s AML regime. However, the enforcement of laws that regulate the AML regime 
cannot be checked by the FATF. It is not within the powers of the FATF to enforce laws 
that have been domesticated by member nations. If there is a high rate of unsuccessful 
prosecution of money laundering by PEP, or any other typology of money laundering 
offence, would the FATF sanction the member state for not enforcing an existing law or 
not prosecuting diligently?178 
 
It could be argued that the international recommendations have been integrated and 
domesticated by the affected nations. AML regulators in Nigeria could argue that there is 
an existing framework regulating the regime and indeed the typology prevalent in the 
country. They could also argue that they have been prosecuting PEP, even if the records 
of conviction are low. These are some of the problems associated with transplanting laws. 
There needs to be sincerity and political will with the leadership of the recipient nation. 
There must be an element of reciprocity in carrying out core mandates from international 
organisations like the FATF. Without reciprocity, there can’t be an effective internalisation 
any recommendation. 
 
It would be difficult for the FATF to ensure that Nigeria enforces the prosecution of PEP, 
despite having integrated FATF policies and international recommendations in her AML 
regime. For the successful regulation of this typology in the Nigerian AML regime, it must 
come from within. There must be genuine commitment by regulatory authorities and the 
prosecutorial agencies to enforce these international recommendations, by consistently 
and successfully prosecuting PEP. Integration of international recommendation is not 
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genuine interest by regulators of the AML regime might see to the successful prosecution 
of PEP. 
 
An effective AML regime would discourage people from engaging in the illegal acquisition 
of wealth, which is the primary rationale of most nation’s AML regime.179 The dangers of 
injecting proceeds of crime into the financial system of a country is enormous, hence the 





Nigeria, an oil rich nation is the 6th largest producer of oil and the 9th producer of 
liquefied natural gas.180 Despite the nation’s natural resources and wealth, a significant 
percentage of her population lives below the poverty line.181 Money laundering and 
corruption particularly by politically exposed persons [PEPS] can be attributed as one of 
the reasons for the slow pace of development in the country. The collective wealth of her 
citizens has been misappropriated by a privileged few who have been entrusted into 
public office and the proceeds have been laundered within and outside the country. 182 
 
The FATF appears to understand the problem of typology in the AML regime in Nigeria. The 
pressure mounted by international organisations, particularly the FATF on Nigeria 
necessitated for a review of the AML framework in Nigeria. The FATF since its formation has 
recorded some progress however, the integration and implementation of its policies in 
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The integration of FATF recommendations, and the effort made by the Nigerian 
government to have a comprehensive AML regime is not enough.183 
 
FATF appears to have what it takes to ensure that the AML regimes in nations like Nigeria 
are very effective, with regards to the prevalent typology for PEP in Nigeria. FATF appears 
to be making the mistake in their assessment and measurement of what a successful and 
effective AML regime should be, by assessing it based on the laws and prosecution of 
persons involved in money laundering.184 This is a wrong assessment. The correct 
assessment by international organisations like the FATF should be done by taking a look at 
the number of successful prosecutions of the prevalent typology, with respect to the 
jurisdiction. With Nigeria, the right assessment should be based on the number of 
successful prosecution of PEP and recovery of assets. The right questions should be out 
across to the regulators of the AML regime in Nigeria. These questions should be: 
 
How many PEP have been successfully prosecuted and jailed? 
 
How many assets have been recovered from the proceeds of political corruption? 
 
Any assessment which does not fall within these boundaries, might just be a false 
assessment and these are some of the problems the AML regime in Nigeria faces. The 
intent of these international recommendations which is for nations to have effective AML 
regimes focusing on prevalent typologies in their jurisdiction, might have been eroded. 
The applicability and enforcement of these international recommendations that have 
been domesticated seems to be the problem currently facing the AML regime in Nigeria. 
 
The problem of corruption by PEPS and the unsuccessful prosecution of PEPS, has 
undermined international recommendations of the FATF, that have been integrated in the 
AML regime in Nigeria. This is because there is a difference between having existing laws 
and the enforcement of these existing laws. The mere integration of international 





 Ibid, Aluko, 454.  





The absence of executive powers of the FATF to ensure that member states implement 
and enforce its recommendations could be some of the challenges the FATF faces.186 In 
order for Nigeria to be perceived by the international community that Nigeria has an 
effective AML regime, these recommendations of the FATF have to be integrated into 
Nigeria’s AML regime. However, the enforcement of laws that regulate the AML regime 
cannot be checked by the FATF. It is not within the powers of the FATF to enforce laws 
that have been domesticated by member nations. If there is a high rate of unsuccessful 
prosecution of money laundering by PEP, or any other typology of money laundering 
offence, would the FATF sanction the member state for not enforcing an existing law or 
not prosecuting diligently?187 
 
It could be argued that the international recommendations have been integrated and 
domesticated by the affected nations. AML regulators in Nigeria could argue that there is 
an existing framework regulating the regime and indeed the typology prevalent in the 
country. They could also argue that they have been prosecuting PEP, even if the records 
of conviction are low. These are some of the problems associated with transplanting laws. 
There needs to be sincerity and political will with the leadership of the recipient nation. 
There must be an element of reciprocity in carrying out core mandates from international 
organisations like the FATF. Without reciprocity, there can’t be an effective internalisation 
any recommendation. 
 
It would be difficult for the FATF to ensure that Nigeria enforces the prosecution of PEP, 
despite having integrated FATF policies and international recommendations in her AML 
regime. For the successful regulation of this typology in the Nigerian AML regime, it must 
come from within. There must be genuine commitment by regulatory authorities and the 
prosecutorial agencies to enforce these international recommendations, by consistently 
and successfully prosecuting PEP. Integration of international recommendation is not 






186 JC Sharman, The Money Laundry: Regulating Criminal Finance in the Global Economy (1 edn, Cornell 
University Press 2011) 68-71. 
 




genuine interest by regulators of the AML regime might see to the successful prosecution 
of PEP. 
 
It is important to also note that there are several international legal instruments that 
influence the AML regime in Nigeria. One of which is the Palermo Convention 2000 which 
criminalizes money laundering from serious offences, the Corruption Convention 2003 
and the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime 2004. For example, Article 
6 of the UN Convention of Against Transnational Crime recommends member states to 
criminalize the proceeds of crime and the confiscation of assets. it states: 
 
“Criminalization of the laundering of proceeds of crime 1. Each State Party 
shall adopt, in accordance with fundamental principles of its domestic law, 
such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as 
criminal offences, when committed intentionally: (a) (i) The conversion or 
transfer of property, knowing that such property is the proceeds of crime, 
for the purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property 
or of helping any person who is involved in the commission of the predicate 
offence to evade the legal consequences of his or her action; (ii) The 
concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition, 
movement or ownership of or rights with respect to property, knowing that 
such property is the proceeds of crime; 
 
 Subject to the basic concepts of its legal system: (i) The acquisition, 
possession or use of property, knowing, at the time of receipt, that such 
property is the proceeds of crime; (ii) Participation in, association with 
or conspiracy to commit, attempts to commit and aiding, abetting, 
facilitating and counselling the commission of any of the offences 
established in accordance with this article.”188 
 
The internalization of the international legal instruments in the regulation of money 
laundering by PEP could assist in the development of Nigeria. If the proceeds from corruption 










6 of the UN convention organized crime. Hence, there is a link between the internalization of 
international legal instruments against corruption and development in Nigeria.189 
 
An effective AML regime will discourage people in the illegal acquisition of wealth, which 
is the primary rationale of most nation’s AML regime.190 The dangers of injecting 
proceeds of crime into the financial system of a country is enormous, hence the need for 
a continuous resistance and an effective prosecutorial system. 
 
2.8 The Influence of the Abacha Administration on the AML regime in Nigeria 
 
In recent years, the government of Nigeria has made efforts to recoup stolen funds, 
particularly funds in offshore accounts, most of which was stolen by a former military 
dictator, General Sani Abacha. It is reported that the Abacha regime stole about $5 billion 
from the nation’s treasury and laundered the funds through offshore accounts.191 Gen. 
Sani Abacha was the head of state scale, theft and money laundering.192 The stealing of 
public funds and laundering of the proceeds has had a negative effect on the economy. 
The absence of an AML regime which could cover the prevalent typology of PEP created 
an enabling environment where corruption could thrive. In other jurisdictions, politicians 
have argued for the justification of a strong AML legislation to be in place, to tackle the 
negative economic effects this acquisitive crime could have in the economy.193 Prior to 
the return of democracy in 1999, Nigeria was governed by several military dictatorships. 
The military dictatorships, particularly officials that served in these governments looted 
the nation’s treasury and laundered their proceeds. There was misappropriation of public 
funds, stealing and money laundering by various military dictatorships and PEP. There was 
no internal mechanism to cross-examine activities of PEP and potential corruption in 
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government. There was no legislature to check the activities of the executive, as the 
parliament was suspended under the various military regimes. 194 
 
There was an existing judiciary however, the judiciary couldn’t exercise their powers by 
ensuring that PEP were prosecuted. This was partly because of corruption and the crude 
display of power by several military dictatorships.195 Successive military regimes have 
always sought to regulate the powers of the judiciary and limit their activities.196 There 
was no prosecution of PEP for money laundering and related offences for fear of arrest, 
intimidation or outright removal. The military regimes created an enabling environment 
for impunity and corruption in government. The revelations of the funds stolen and 
laundered by the Abacha regime is a clear indication of the level of corruption and abuse 
of office that military regimes are synonymous with. 
 
The military regimes succeeded in intimidating judges, which led to a lack of an effective 
justice system. Prosecutorial agencies were weakened, and the agencies like the police were 
stripped of their discretionary powers to prosecute PEPs. Most PEPS that served under the 
military regimes in Nigeria were senior military officers, which made it impossible for the 
office of the Attorney General to institute criminal proceeding against corrupt officials, as it 
was not within the powers of the Attorney General to prosecute serving military officers.197 
Public funds stolen by serving military officers in the past regimes, were funds meant to build 
schools, hospitals, roads and infrastructure.198 It has been estimated that, Nigeria since 
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billion dollars) between 1960- 1999.199 It is important to note that most of the money 
stolen is because of corruption by PEP. PEP in Africa, particularly in Nigeria, command a 
lot of power and influence. The tendency to abuse political office and misappropriate 
public funds is high, due to cultural and societal factors. This has a resulting effect on the 
economy, as funds that are appropriated for healthcare, schools and other infrastructure 
are misappropriated by PEP.200 The large-scale corruption in the military regimes made 
the international community particularly the United States and the IMF blacklist Nigeria. 
Nigeria had economic sanctions because of the corruption and the lack of will to 
prosecute corrupt officials, who had stolen and laundered funds in the past military 
regimes. These sanctions were due to the money laundering activities by PEP particularly 
in the Abacha’s government.201 
 
Post Abacha regime, the Nigeria government decided to take a comprehensive approach in 
the establishment of an AML regime. This was necessitated due to the recommendations 
from the Financial Action Task Force [FATF] and continuous pressure mounted on the 
government of Nigeria to have an effective AML regime, which could regulate the typology of 
PEP. This was because after the Abacha regime it was becoming obvious to the international 
community on the uniqueness of the typology of money laundering offences prevalent in 
Nigeria. The FATF being the international body with the responsibility of ensuring that nations 
have money laundering regimes, needed to be sure that Nigeria was in line with the core 
mandate of the FATF and mounted continuous pressure on Nigeria. It is important to note 











199 Ayittey, ‘Nigeria’s struggle with corruption’, Testimony Before the Committee on International 
Relations Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights and International Operations, US House 
of Representatives, Washington DC, G. B. N. [2006], 18 May. 
 
200 Mugarura, N, “The effect of corruption factor in harnessing global anti-money laundering regimes”, 
 
[2010] 13 Journal of Money Laundering Control 274. 
 





strength of member states to persuade and influence AML policies in non-member 
states.202 
 
With its non-executive powers, the organisation is at best persuasive. The 40 
Recommendations by the FATF was to create an institutional framework for AML regimes 
in member countries and other independent states. This was the rationale behind the 
creation of the FATF. The FATF a creation of the G7 which were its founding members, 
now has over 37 members and associate membership of key financial institutions over the 
world. 203 
 
These recommendations made provisions for the freezing and confiscation of assets that 
could be traced to the proceeds of crime and establishes a regulatory framework for 
banks and other financial institutions. In 2001 following the September 11 attack, the 40 
recommendations were supplemented by the 8 special recommendations on terrorist 
financing.204 Prior to the 9/11 event, priority by regulatory authorities was on the 
proceeds from trade in drugs and narcotics. The international institutions at that time 
paid less attention to terrorist financing. The focus gradually expanded from proceeds of 
crime to terrorist financing and human trafficking, politically exposed persons and a 
change in emphasis to focus on counter terrorist financing [CTF]. The property and 
financial markets were also areas that needed adequate AML regulation. The FATF 
guidelines on the regulation of property markets and CTF, have assisted nations in 
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Despite the international criticisms of the Abacha regime, corruption and money 
laundering by PEP in Nigeria is still a major source for concern as of today. This is an 
essential reason for the implementation of a strong AML regime in Nigeria, hence the 
need for an effective regulatory framework that governs the regime.206 
 
2.9 Regulation of Proceeds of Crime and Asset Recovery from PEP- Post Abacha 
 
One of the problems the AML regime in Nigeria faced prior to the enactment of the money 
laundering prohibition Act 2004&2011, which is still a challenge to the regime, is the recovery 
of assets. There was little or no focus on the regulation of the proceeds of crime from PEP, 
corruption, stealing and misappropriation of public funds. Prior to 1999, money laundering 
offences were perceived to be related with proceeds of crime from drugs and narcotics in 
Nigeria. This is a problem, because the rationale behind unjust enrichment and stealing is 
that, those who have stolen from the public treasury want to enjoy some level of affluence 
with these dirty monies that have been acquired. Hence, the successful prosecution of PEP is 
not enough for an effective AML regime that regulates this typology. 
 
Any PEP who has been convicted must be deprived from enjoying the proceeds of crime. 
For instance, the government of Nigeria has made efforts in recovering looted funds by 
Abacha, from the Abacha family. However, post Abacha regime, little success has been 
recorded with regards to asset recovery particularly from PEP. Only recently the 
government made efforts by issuing an executive order on recovery of assets. On the 6th 
of July 2018, the President of Nigeria signed an executive Order 6 on the preservation of 
assets connected with serious corruption and other related offences.207 This is to enable 
AML regulatory agencies like the EFCC and the ICPC recover proceeds of crime, 
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However, one of the potential problems the AML regime could face with regards to asset 
recovery is proper accountability and abuse of powers by AML regulatory agencies. This is 
because the AML regulatory agencies are directly under the executive and the executive 
could use “asset recovery” through the application of executive order 6 as a political 
witch-hunt against perceived political enemies, even before a conviction by a court of 
competent jurisdiction. 
 
Another potential problem is the use of asset recovery as a prosecutorial discretion 
technique. This brings a scenario where a PEP who has unjustly enriched himself with 
state funds would return some asset in return for a notice of discontinuance otherwise 
known as a Nole Prosequi. An example can be seen in a recent case of FRN v Abdullahi 
Inde Dikko, the defendant a former chief executive of the Nigerian Customs Service was 
prosecuted by the EFCC for stealing from the service and money laundering. The 
defendant got into a plea agreement with the AG to return some cash and assets, without 
the knowledge of the EFCC prosecutors. The judge held as follows: 
 
“There is a need for government to speak with one voice and not in 
different tunes that appear to be discordant, AG is the chief law officer 
of the Federation and the Constitution in Section 174 has already 
accorded wide powers of discretionary nature, of a very wide 
character in matters of criminal prosecution to him.” 
 
“In my view, such discretions include the entry into a non-prosecution 
or a deferred prosecution agreement with criminal suspects, and 
which agreements shall be binding on all prosecutorial agencies 
including the 3rd and 4th defendants (EFCC and its Chairman).”208 
 
This is an example of abuse of prosecutorial powers, using asset recovery as a shield to 
undermine the AML regime and the EFCC. If there is no accountability with regards to asset 
recovery and a clear parameter on how asset recovery should influence prosecutorial 











regards to PEP. The implications of the decision in this case along with similar cases is 
critically discussed in the prosecutorial discretion chapter.209 
 
2.10 The Influence of Law in the Development of Nigeria 
 
It is hard to conceptualize the concept of development. However, for there to be 
development, the must be laws. The enhancement of living conditions must clearly be an 
essential- if not the essential-object of the entire economic exercise and that enhancement is 
an integral part of the concept of development.210 Societies are governed by laws and these 
laws are enacted to create an environment for peaceful cohabitation amongst members of 
the society. It is also important that these laws put in place are enforced irrespective of the 
status if persons in that society.211 For there to be development in any society, the rule of 
law must be institutionalized. Hence, there is a strong link between law and development. 212 
Given the importance of law to successful development the potential mischief of political 
corruption can be perceived. Corruption by PEP undermine law, and thereby trust and 
economic and social and political development. In this thesis we examine this problem 
through the concept of the rule of law.213 For a society to be developed, law can serve as an 
instrument. It can be argued theta these developments economy, infrastructure, education, 
GDP can be anchored on law reforms. It is important to note that there are some divergent 
views on how law can promote development.214 
 
According to the UN office on drugs and crime, “Out of all Nigerian citizens who had at least 
one contact with a public official in the 12 months prior to the 2019 survey, 30.2 per cent paid 
a bribe to, or were asked to pay a bribe by, a public official. This means that, although still 
relatively high, the prevalence of bribery in Nigeria has undergone a moderate, yet 
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One of the schools of thought argues that, there is a need for the role of state to 
encourage development. This school of thought argues that the state enacts laws that 
creates an enabling environment for development. Significant state intervention on 
economy, national industries and heavy regulation of multinational corporations can be 
employed in driving development.216 in developmental state, law can be used as an 
instrument for state intervention in driving economic development.217 
 
Law is needed to create the formal structure of macroeconomic control. Legislation can 
translate policy goals into action by challenging economic behavior in accordance with 
national plans. law is needed to create the framework for an efficient governmental 
bureaucracy and the governance of public sector corporations. Legal rules are needed to 
manage complex exchange controls and import regulations.218 This school of thought 
could be called “law in the developmental state”. 
 
If law is an instrument for development, then it can be argued that the laws that regulate the 
AML regime in Nigeria, particularly as it relates with corruption by PEP, can serve as a catalyst 
for development in many sectors of the Nigerian economy. If the laws that regulate the AML 
regime are adequately enforced, irrespective of the class of the offender, then it can be 
argued that the rule of law has been entrenched deep into administration of justice. Hence, 
we can argue further that there is a strong link between the rule of law, the regulation of the 
AML regime in Nigeria and the development of the Nigerian state. The development of key 
sectors in the Nigerian state can be possible if when and if stakeholders of the AML regime, 
meticulously carry out their duties by ensuring that those who have stolen funds for meant 
for the development of the nation are brought to justice. 
 
In a nation where the rule of law is adhered to irrespective of the class or status of persons, 
there is higher public confidence on the economy and foreign direct investments [FDI] than 
nations where the rule of law is not enriched. Nations with advanced regulatory framework 
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are more likely to attract investments in these sectors than nations with no regulatory 
framework or an ineffective framework.219 
 
Hence it can be argued that, if the AML regime and the discretionary technique applied 
by prosecutors in Nigeria is more effective, there would be higher chance of securing a 
conviction against those who have abused their office. When this happens, PEP would not 
hastily steal public funds. Funds appropriated for the development of the respective 
sectors which the PEP oversees could be utilized judiciously. This is a clear indication of 
the of effect good laws and the application of these laws can have on the development of 
the Nigerian state. 
 
Furthermore, it is the duty of lawyers and stakeholders in the AML regime in Nigeria to 
act in a manner that can enhance the development of the nation. The actions and 
decisions they make as prosecutors can either encourage the development of the nation 
or hinder her growth. Lawyers as ministers in the temple of justice ought to ensure that 
rule of law is always upheld irrespective of the class and status of the offender.220 If this 
is done, investors from the international community might have more confidence in 
investing in Nigeria. Hence, it can be argued that there is a link between the role of 
stakeholders in the AML regime and the economic development of Nigeria. 
 
A lawyer lives for the direction of his people and the advancement of the cause of his 
country" – Christopher Alexander Sapara Williams (1855–1915), first indigenous Nigerian 
lawyer.221 From the above quote. If we should go by the words of Sapara Williams, it 
means that there is an ethical obligation on the part of lawyers in ensuring that in their 
application and interpretation of laws, it should lead to development of their nation. 
 
Hence, the application and interpretation of laws if properly done can lead to development 
of nations. Stakeholders in the AML regime particularly prosecutors should ensure that these 
laws for example MLPA 2011, EFCC ACT 2004, ICPC ACT 2000, Constitution of the Federal 
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enforced particularly when dealing with the issues of corruption by PEP. If this is done, 
funds meant for the development of various sectors of the nation can be properly utilized 
for the general good of the citizens. 
 
2.11 The Internal Mechanism Regulating the AML Legislation in Nigeria 
 
The AML regime in Nigeria is centered around the following legislation: Independent 
Corrupt Practices Commission [ICPC] Act 2000, the Economic and Financial Crimes 
Commission Act 2004, the Nigeria financial intelligence Unit 2018 [NFIU] Money 
Laundering Prohibition Act 2011 [MLPA], Criminal Code Act 2004 and most importantly 
the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. These legislations were enacted to 
prohibit and prosecute money laundering offences with a mandate to focus on PEP and 
other money laundering related offences. 
 
Currently, the AML regime in Nigeria is centred on the Money Laundering Prohibition Act 
2011 [MLPA]. The MLPA 2011 is the parent legislation regulating money-laundering 
offences in Nigeria. The MLPA 2011 repealed and replaced the MLPA 2004. The 
replacement of the 2004 Act was as a result of clear lapses relating to the typology of the 
AML offences in Nigeria. Money laundering being a criminal offence in nature, is 
supported by the entire criminal justice system of Nigeria, despite having the specific 
legislation regulating and prohibiting money laundering. 
 
The criminal justice system of Nigeria is regulated by the Administration of Criminal Justice 
Act 2015. [ACJA] 222 The aim of the legislation is to create an enabling framework for the 
prosecution of criminal cases in Nigeria. It is important to note that since money laundering is 
a criminal offence, there could be a potential overlap of the ACJA with regards to the 
administration of money laundering cases in Nigeria. The ACJA focuses on administrative 
issues such as bail conditions, and a general guide for the conduct of criminal cases in Nigeria. 
ACJA does not deal with the substantive and regulatory issues of money laundering. The 












deals with all regulatory issues of money laundering and remains the primary source of 
AML laws in Nigeria.223 
 
The growing pressure by the international community led Nigeria to revamp her AML 
regime. The fall of the Abacha regime had exposed the weakness of the AML regime in 
Nigeria before the international community as a problem of typology. There was a need 
for the Nigerian state to show to the international community that it was serious about 
prohibiting money laundering activities, focusing on the typology of PEP within the 
country. The 2003 FATF Recommendations 1 stated that countries should have an AML 
regime with a view of including a wider range of offences. This was necessary because, 
nations like Nigeria prior to the 2003 FATF Recommendations, had an AML regime 
focused on drugs and narcotics only. This was an effect of the integration of the 
recommendations of the Vienna Convention 1988. 
 
Prior to the enactment of the MLPA 2011, the MLPA 2004 was the parent legislation 
regulating AML in Nigeria. This MLPA 2004 was a positive development in the anti-money 
laundering regime. However, it had its deficiencies. It was a positive development 
because it was the first major step the government was taking to curb money laundering 
offences post Abacha regime. 
 
The problem of the MLPA 2004 was the absence of a comprehensive definition of money 
laundering. The result of the deficiency of this non-comprehensive approach, made it 
difficult for the successful prosecution of money laundering offences by PEP. From the 
definition of the MLPA 2004, the typology which the act expressly regulated was on the 
proceeds of crime from drugs and narcotics. This express definition did not make the act 
any different from the NDLEA 1989. The absence of a holistic definition of money 
laundering made the MLPA 2004 ineffective with regards to the typology (PEP) of money 
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S 13 MLPA 2004 defined money laundering as : 
 
“Any person who— Money Laundering (a) converts or transfers resources 
or properties derived directly or indirectly offences form illicit traffic in 
narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances or any other crimes or illegal 
act, with the aim of either concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the 
resources or property or aiding any person involved in the illicit traffic in 
narcotic drug or psychotropic substances or any other crime or illegal act 
to evade the illegal consequences of his action, or 
 
 collaborates in concealing or disguising the genuine nature, origin, 
location disposition movement or ownership of the resources property or 
right thereto derived directly or indirectly from illicit traffic in narcotic drugs 
or psychotropic substances or any other crime or illegal act commits an 
offence under this section and is liable on conviction to a term of not less 
than 2 years or more than 3 years”.225 
 
The definition of money laundering in the MLPA 2004 does not expressly caption the typology 
that is predominant in Nigeria. The above definition appears to be ambiguous and could not 
have effectively regulated the AML regime in Nigeria. The phrase “any other crime” is 
ambiguous and lacks clarity. Although, some may argue that the Act had a clear interpretation 
of money laundering, however the same legislation was specific with the proceeds of crime of 
a particular typology (drugs). The phrase “any other crime” could be interpreted to mean 
anything else relating to drugs.226 It could also mean any other criminal offence not relating 
to drugs and narcotics, which could include PEPS, human trafficking, regulation of financial 
institutions etc. There is a wide and ambiguous range of what the definition of money 
laundering could be and what it could not be with the above definition. 
 
There is also a possibility that legislators who enacted the legislation may not have had 
the clear intention of tackling political corruption, abuse of office and money laundering 










definition of money laundering in a parent legislation for the country. This possibility 
might be because the legislators fall within the typology of money laundering offenders 
which has been predominant in Nigeria and still is. 
 
It takes moral and ethical principles to enact good laws which may not be favorable to the 
person or persons who have enacted them. The application of virtue ethics, in the 
conduct of legislative duties by legislators could assist in enacting laws that could stand 
the test of time. Virtue looks at the motive necessitating the action rather than rules that 
govern the conduct of an individual or persons. Virtue is what distinguishes right from 
wrong, good from bad, and these distinguishing elements should be the motive behind 
the actions of participants and stakeholders in the AML regime of Nigeria. The intent and 
attitude that motivate your actions is the underlining element with this principle.227 
 
Whether or not legislators were ignorant of the implication of the definition of money 
laundering in the MLPA 2004, or it was a deliberate act to undermine the efficacy of the 
AML regime, neither of both possibilities are acceptable. 
 
The litmus test on the effectiveness of the MLPA 2004 in tackling the typology of money 
laundering offences by PEPS, was in the case of James Onanefe Ibori v. Federal Republic of 
Nigeria. The decision in the case is a clear indication that the Act had lapses in the 
definition of money laundering with regards to the typology of PEP. The courts held that 
the definition of money laundering in the MLPA 2004 was only applicable to money 
laundering offences relating to drugs and narcotics and not misappropriation and stealing. 
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The James Ibori’s case is open to a debate on some issues. One of these issues the case is 
opened to could be, whether or not there is an interpretation of a further definition of 
money laundering. If the definition according to S13 of the MLPA 2004 means proceeds of 
crime from drugs and narcotics, why is there an additional phrase in the last sentence 
“any other crime and illegal act?” There is a possibility that the definition of money 
laundering in the MLPA 2004 as applied in the Iboris case, could have been interpreted 
differently. The phrase “any other crime and illegal act” could have been interpreted to 
mean proceeds of crime from human trafficking, insider dealings in financial institutions, 
abuse of office, misappropriation of public funds by PEPS and not “any other crime and 
illegal act” with relation to drugs and narcotics. If the definition of money laundering was 
interpreted that way, the Judgement in the Iboris case would have been different. The 
application of the Ejusdem Generis Rule in the definition of money laundering in the Iboris 
case was clearly misapplied. The phrase “illicit traffic of narcotics drugs and psychotropic 
substances or any other crimes or illegal act” was interpreted as a list of two items, and 
the specific nature of the first item determined the nature and extent of the second item. 
 
A second issue that can be raised from the James Iboris judgement is the issue of 
enforcement of statute and discretion of judges. The primary reason for the existence of 
laws is to regulate human conduct and give justice. The primary duty of a judge is not just 
to adhere to the principles of law and laid down statutes, but also dispense justice. That is 
the rationale behind the discretion members of the judiciary, particularly judges have and 
this discretion should be used judiciously and justifiably. 
 
The interpretation of “any other crime and illegal act” in the definition of money laundering in 
the MLPA 2004 was solely at the discretion of the judge in the Iboris case. If the dispensation 
of justice is the reason why nations uphold the rule of law, then the test of a judge’s loyalty to 
the rule of law, is at a time where there is a conflict between laid down rules and equity, 
natural justice and good conscience. The thing to do in the interpretation 
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of money laundering in the Ibori’s case, was to convict the defendant based on the phrase 
“any other crime and illegal act”, and anchor the judgment based on the phrase instead of 
using that same phrase as an excuse to discharge and acquit the defendant. 
 
The judgment in the James Ibori case was a setback for the AML regime, particularly as it 
relates to the typology of money laundering offences, [PEP] predominant in Nigeria. 
 
It is important to note that an important legal instrument even though it’s not expressly 
created to regulate money laundering is the constitution. One of the challenges the AML 
regime faces is the impossibility of prosecuting certain categories of PEP while they are in 
office. This means that they can only be prosecuted after serving their term of office. S 
308 of the Nigerian constitution clearly makes provision for this. It states; 
 
 “Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Constitution, but 
subject to subsection (2) of this section - (a) no civil or criminal 
proceedings shall be instituted or continued against a person to whom 
this section applies during his period of office; (b) a person to whom this 
section applies shall not be arrested or imprisoned during that period 
either in pursuance of the process of any court or otherwise; and (c) no 
process of any court requiring or compelling the appearance of a person 
to whom this section applies, shall be applied for or issued: Provided that 
in ascertaining whether any period of limitation has expired for the 
purposes of any proceedings against a person to whom this section 
applies, no account shall be taken of his period of office. 
 
 The provisions of subsection (1) of this section shall not apply to civil 
proceedings against a person to whom this section applies in his official 
capacity or to civil or criminal proceedings in which such a person is only a 
nominal party. 
 
 This section applies to a person holding the office of President or Vice-










to "period of office" is a reference to the period during which the person 
holding such office is required to perform the functions of the office.”229 
 
The danger of this provision is that it gives these categories of PEP the opportunity to 
obstruct investigation since they have the instruments of power. 
 
A scenario where a governor or a deputy governor cannot be prosecuted for sealing public 
money until he leaves office is dangerous. These people wield some influence in the society 
and can mount pressure on the AML regulatory authorities to stop investigation. More so, 
evidence might not be as fresh if the person has spent about 8 years in office as stipulated by 
the constitution. It makes it more difficult to successfully prosecute. 
 
Out of the 36 states of the federation, the EFCC is currently prosecuting 16 former 
governors, out of which only 2 former governors have been convicted form money 
laundering and abuse of office since the inception of the EFCC.230 S308 of the 1999 
constitution clearly poses a problem with the prosecution of PEP for money laundering 
related offences and corruption. 
 
Furthermore, the Criminal Code Act makes provision for corrupt offences and the 
prosecution of these offences. S 98 of the Criminal Code Act states: 
 
“Any public official (as defined in section 98D) who‐ 
 
 corruptly asks for, receives or obtains any property or benefit of any 
kind for himself or any other person; or [1966 No. 84.] (b) corruptly agrees or 
attempts to receive or obtain any property or benefit of any kind for 
 
himself or any other person, on account of‐ (i) anything already done or 
omitted, or any favour or disfavour already shown to any person, by 
himself in the discharge of his official duties or in relation to any matter 
connected with the functions, affairs or business of a government 
department, public body or other organisation or institution in which he 
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 anything to be afterwards done or omitted, or any favour; or disfavour 
to be afterwards shown to any person, by himself in the discharge of his 
official duties or in relation to any such matter as aforesaid, is guilty of the 
felony of official corruption and is liable to imprisonment for seven years. 
 
 If in any proceedings for an offence under this section of this Code it is 
proved that any property or benefit of any kind, or any promise thereof, was 
received by a public official, or by some other person at the instance 
 
of a public official, from a person‐ 
 
 holding, or seeking to obtain, a contract, license or permit from a 
government department, public body or other organization or institution 
in which that public official is serving as such; or 
 
 concerned, or likely to be concerned, in any proceeding or business 
transacted, pending or likely to be transacted before or by that public official 
or a government department, public body or other organization or 
institution in which that public official is serving as such, or by or from any 
person acting on behalf of or related to such a person, the property, benefit 
 
or promise shall, unless the contrary is proved, be deemed to have been 
received corruptly on account of such a past or future act, omission, favour 
or disfavor as is mentioned in subsection (1) (i) or (ii) of this section.” 
 
If the criminal code makes provision for corrupt practices by public office holders, one 
wonders why the Ibori case was hinged on the MLPA 2004. Flexibility of charges is an 
important technique which prosecutors must apply if a conviction needs to be secured.231 
 




The rationale behind the enactment of the Money Laundering Prohibition Act 2004 was to 












one of the FATF recommendations in 2003.232 The concern was to have an AML regime 
that could focus on the typology of money laundering offences that is predominant in 
Nigeria. The Financial Action Task Force made very wide recommendation which was not 
applicable to Nigerian concerns. The wide recommendation by the FATF in 2003 appears 
to be an exception to the advantage, of Fullers principles of generality.233 Fuller argues 
that for the integration and the acceptance of law, it must be general. This is because 
laws must be applicable to everyone in a society, irrespective of class and status, for the 
benefit of the rule of law. 
 
However, it appears that the rationale behind Fuller’s generality of law is to integrate this 
principle with the application of laws and enforcement, and not the formation of laws.234 
At the point of enacting a law, it should be less general and more specific. The specific 
nature of a law is what adds credence to it and gives it a framework to be enforceable. 
Laws cannot be easily enforced if they are too wide. The generality of FATF 
recommendation, which Nigeria “followed” was too wide and unspecific, which failed to 
give recommendations that where related to the typology of money laundering offences 
in Nigeria [PEP]. 
 
The typology of money laundering offences in the Nigerian state which is political 
corruption and abuse of office by PEP, necessitated the enactment of the MLPA 2004. The 
intention behind the enactment of the MLPA 2004 was clearly eroded with the definition 
of the offence of money laundering. The lack of clarity of the definition of money 
laundering in the MLPA 2004 was the major deficiency of the legislation. 
 
The very essence for the administration of justice in a nation’s judicial system is the rule of 
law. For the rule law to be enshrined in a system, there must be a systemic process which 
includes the clarity of the law. In The Morality of Law, Fuller asserts that for a society to be 
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one of the systems in place in any nation’s justice system. It is important that laws are as 
clear as possible.235 The ambiguity of law can make the application of law complex and 
uncertain. Provisions of a law should be clearly spelt out and easy to understand.236 This 
was clearly lacking in the MLPA 2004. This could make the interpretation of these laws 
more straight forward and easy to understand. A complex law is no law. It is no law 
because it would be subjected to different interpretations and application. 
 
When and if laws are clear, citizens can take legal requirements and prohibition into 
consideration when deliberating on how to act over issues.237 This is essential for the 
very elements that bind a state or a society, which is law and order and the rule of law. 
S13 (1) MLPA 2004 could have been drafted with greater clarity and precision as to what 
the definition of money laundering is. It is also important that legislators while carrying 
out their primary responsibility, which is to make laws, the intention and reason for the 
legislation should be as clear as possible. This would limit the possibility of 
interpretations, which could be subjected to various personal reasons, believes, values, 
interest that are not in line with the rule of law. If all these were put into consideration, 
the judgment in the Ibori case may have turned out to be different. The Ibori case was a 
clear indication that Nigeria followed the FATF recommendations in the enactment of the 
MLPA 2004, without adjusting to Nigerian concerns and typology. 
 
Fuller also examines the congruence between what written laws declare and how officials 
enforce those statutes.238 The rule of law is pivotal to the development of any society.239 
The application of the rule of law also deals with how officials enforce laid down rules. 
These officials include judges and prosecutors. It is important that justice is seen to be 
done. The Nigerian judiciary failed to interpret the Act in light with its purpose. It is the 
duty of the judiciary to interpret laws in accordance to equity and justice, at least by the 
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upheld, despite the mistakes in drafting the law. The enforceability of the law is of more 
importance than enactment of the law. If officials fail to enforce the law in light with the 
rationale behind the enactment, then there is no rule of law. The essence of the 
application of the rule of law is to do what is justifiably, even when circumstances 
surrounding the case, or the law are not favourable.240 
 
It is important to note that what was in contention was whether or not the MLPA 2004 
made provisions for the proceeds from stealing and misappropriation of public funds. 
Even though the MLPA 2004 did not make express provision for proceeds of crime from 
abuse of office and stealing, the prosecutors could have prosecuted the defendant on 
other laws that prohibited stealing, conversion and abuse of office and not necessarily 
money laundering. If prosecutors had prosecuted Ibori on stealing and conversion rather 
than money laundering charges, the prosecution might have been successful. 
 
The problem of corruption could hinder the existence of the rule of law in any society. 
Officials must be willing to enforce the law and do justice. When the rule of law is realised 
the expectation of congruence will do justice. This would also encourage members of the 
society to obey the law. The attitude of the judges and the prosecutors in the AML regime 
in Nigeria would determine the level of success it would achieve. 
 
The MLPA 2004 failed to regulate the anti-money laundering regime in Nigeria with 
precision and efficacy. The legislative drafting of the definition of money laundering, the 
difficulty with the enforcement of the laws and need to charge offenders for other money 
laundering offences not relating to drugs and narcotics were clear indications of the need 
to repeal and replace the MLPA 2004. 
 
2.13 Application of the Money Laundering Prohibition Act 2011, in the Anti-money 
Laundering Regime in Nigeria 
 
The changes in the AML regime in Nigeria has been more substantive than procedural as 
evidenced by the repeal of the MLPA 2004. The MLPA 2011, which is the current legislation 
that oversees the AML regime in Nigeria intends to address the concerns, which were not 








laundering offences that are prevalent in Nigeria, an effective AML framework that can 
tackle this prevalent typology of PEP.241 
 
The reason for the enactment of the MLPA 2011 was to establish a comprehensive 
framework of the money laundering regime and expand the scope of money laundering 
offences. These are some of the issues the MLPA 2004 failed to address.242 The issue the 
MLPA 2011 hopes to address could be the ambiguity in the definition of the offence of 
money laundering and other related offences in the MLPA 2004. The ambiguity in the 
definition of the MLPA 2004 (repealed) made it difficult for the prosecution of money 
laundering related offences by PEP and other non-drugs and narcotics money laundering 
related offences.243 
 
With the lack of clarity in the definition of money laundering in the MLPA 2004, the repealed 
act was unable to address the money laundering offences peculiar to the Nigerian State, 
which centres on PEP. It is important to note that the AML regime in Nigeria is peculiar and 
the sustainability of an AML framework must be in line with the peculiarity of the money 
laundering offences most common in the jurisdiction. The peculiarity in the regime is that 
money laundering and related offences are more linked with corruption, abuse of office, 
misappropriation of funds and stealing than the proceeds from drugs and narcotics. This has 
always been the reality of the practice of money laundering in Nigeria. 
 
An AML legislation that neglects the regulation of money laundering by PEP and other money 
laundering related offences in Nigeria would most likely not be in line with the realities of 
Nigeria. There was a need for stringent legislation that could prohibit any kind of money 
laundering offence including offences by PEP. The legislation does not need to be too specific 
neither does it need to be very ambiguous. However, a holistic approach in the definition of 
money laundering in the MLPA 2011, introduces all money laundering offences that could be 
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The MLPA 2004 failed to address the issue of money laundering by PEPS and other non-
drug related money laundering offences due to its lack of clarity in its definition. However, 
the MLPA 2011 gives a more detailed definition of money laundering. S.15 of the MLPA 
2011 defines money laundering as follows: 
 
“15. (1) Any person who- (a) converts or transfers resources or 
properties derived directly from- (i) illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and 
psychotropic substances, or 
 
 participation in an organized criminal group and racketeering, 
terrorism, terrorist financing, trafficking in human beings and migrants 
smuggling, tax evasion, sexual exploitation, illicit arms trafficking in 
stolen and other goods, bribery and corruption, counterfeiting 
currency, counterfeiting and piracy of products, environmental crimes, 
murder, grievous bodily injury, kidnapping, illegal restraints and 
hostage taking, robbery or theft, smuggling, extortion, forgery, piracy, 
insider trading and market manipulation and any other criminal act 
specified in this Act or any other legislation in Nigeria relating to 
money laundering, illegal bunkering, illegal mining, with the aim of 
either concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the resources or 
property or aiding any person involved to evade the illegal 
consequences of his action; 
 
 collaborates in concealing or disguising the genuine nature, origin, 
location, disposition, movement or ownership of the resources, 
property or right thereto derived directly or indirectly from the acts 
specified in paragraph (a) of this subsection commits an offence under 
this section and is liable on conviction to imprisonment for a term not 
less than 5years but not more than 10 years.”244 
 
It is important to note that in most Nigerian cases, there are three typologies of money 









evasion and insider trading and market manipulation. These three offences are captured 
in the MLPA 2011. If we agree that most money laundering offences in Nigeria revolve 
around corruption by PEP, then the nations AML regime should have more focus on PEP 
than the proceeds from the sale of drugs and narcotics.245 
 
The problems of political corruption and abuse of office can be addressed if Nigeria has an 
effective AML regime that takes into consideration the problem of this typology. The 
perception by the international community is that Nigeria is one of the most corrupt 
countries in the world. According to Transparency International, Nigeria ranked as the 
148th least corrupt country in the world in 2017 as against 136th in 2016.246 This 
perception in the global scene is due to the large scale political corruption by PEP and the 
negative effect it has had on the citizens of the country. For the AML regime in Nigeria to 
be effective, the regulations and legislation that governs the regime has to be drafted 
according to the peculiarities of the regime. 
 
Furthermore, the punishment for money laundering and related offences under the 
repealed Act was perceived not to be strong enough. S 14 MLPA 2004 made provisions for 
penalties attached to offences of money laundering.247 The punishment under the 
repealed act was a minimum of 2 and a maximum of 3 years imprisonment. This was 
another issue that the MLPA 2011 addressed. S15 MLPA 2011 stipulates a maximum 
punishment of 10 years imprisonment and a minimum of 5 years respectively.248 The 
need to review the punishment attached to money laundering offences is essential to 
serve as deterrence on potential money laundering offenders. This is because if the 
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The MLPA 2011 has strengthened the AML regime in Nigeria particularly regulating and 
prohibiting money laundering offences by PEP. The broad approach in the definition of 
money laundering in the MLPA 2011 has assisted in addressing the issue of regulating 
money-laundering offences by PEP. The inclusion of bribery, corruption, tax evasion in the 
definition of money laundering in S15 of the MLPA 2011 strengthened the AML regime 
and gave the MLPA some form of force in the fight against money laundering in Nigeria. 
 
2.14 The role of Designated Non-Financial Institution in the Money Laundering 
Prohibition Act 2011 
 
Another issue which the MLPA 2011 introduced in the AML regime in Nigeria is the 
regularisation of the activities of financial institutions and “designated non-financial 
institution” [DNFI]. The role DNFI’s play, could be instrumental to the success and collapse 
of a nations AML regime, hence the need for the regulation of the activities of DNFI. The 
regulation of DNFI entails that professionals who have been classed in this category must 
report any suspicious transaction to regulatory authorities. These professionals who are 
also known as gatekeepers, are to ensure that the laws that regulate the AML regime are 
adhered to This is a positive development. Lawyers are supposed to be gatekeepers in the 
AML regime. Who are gatekeepers? Professionals such as lawyers, notaries, accountants, 
investment advisors, trust and company service providers who assist in transactions 
involving the movement of money, and are given a particular role in identifying, 
preventing and reporting money laundering. 
 
However, how many of these professionals classed as DNFI can withstand the pressure that 
could emanate from PEP? The regulatory bodies of these professionals must be totally 
insulated from the political establishment, for them to be able to withstand pressure from 
PEP and report to AML regulatory bodies on suspicion of fraudulent transactions. S 3 MLPA 
and S 5 MLPA clearly make provisions for the role DNFI must play in the course of dealings 
with their clients. This is because Nigeria had to be in line with international best practice and 
FATF guidelines with regards to DNFI.249 The FATF refers to lawyers, accountants and 
 
 
249 Forty Reccommendations” Financial Action Task Force [2012] > http://www.fatf- 
 







other sensitive professionals who would ordinarily have financial dealing with clients and 
hold entities in trust for them. The MLPA 2011 has attempted to regulate the activities of 
DFNI particularly with regards to customer due diligence and financial reporting. 
 
One of the challenges the AML regime faces is the effective regulation of DNFI. This is 
because there is a conflict between the S3 and 5 of the MLPA 2011 and the ethical 
considerations of these respective professionals, particularly law firms that have been 
classified as DNFI. This conflict is based on the contradiction of regulation between the 
substantive AML framework and Rules of Professional Conduct that regulate the ethics 
and conduct of lawyers within the jurisdiction. This has made the provision for reporting 
on suspicion of money laundering as stated in the MLPA 2011 practically unenforceable. 
 
Several issues could be raised when considering the issues of suspicion and reporting. The 
first issue is, who is responsible for reporting? The provisions of S3 and 5 MLPA 2011 
states that the DNFI should report to regulatory authorities on suspicion. It could mean 
that if the DNFI is a member of a profession where confidentiality is a major factor and 
adhered to stringently, then there could be some level of contradiction. 
 
The second issue is that suspicion is a subjective issue. At what point should suspicion be 
raised? In situations where the client is a high net worth individual or a PEP, who regularly 
deals in high volume transactions, the DNFI may not be inclined to suspect that money is 
being laundered. Furthermore, the overwhelming influence of high net worth individuals 
and PEP would also reduce the frequency of suspicion and reporting. A banker may not be 
in a haste to report a PEP to the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission [EFCC] for 
fear of victimisation. Ethics of these respective professions must be brought into 
consideration, for an effective application of the MLPA 2011. 
 
One of the issues which the MLPA 2011 has envisaged is the issue of smurfing. Smurfing 
can be defined as a process of breaking down funds to smaller amounts to avoid reaching 
the limit for the reporting threshold. The MLPA 2011 reduced the threshold for reporting 












smurfing. However, it may be difficult to identify when smurfing is done due to the small 
amounts of money laundered at a time.250 
 
In a situation where smurfing is done, the DNFI or a banker may not be aware that the 
funds are from the proceeds of crime. This is because, the monies have been broken 
down to lesser amounts which could fall below the minimum threshold. This is possible 
because, money laundering has become a systemic act. Human trafficking rings, drug 
cartels and terrorist financiers understand that moving money in substantial amounts 
could attract attention. These gangs prefer to move money in the smallest practicable 
units.251 This may take longer time in transferring the proceeds of crime. The same 
technique could also be adopted by PEP. Often PEP prefer to work with fronts to hide the 
proceeds of corruption and misappropriation of public funds. These fronts are usually 
established professionals in business, law and other key sectors in the country. Hence, the 
issue of beneficial interest could come into play when dealing with DNFI and PEP. 
 
The role of lawyers as gatekeepers and the enforcement of financial reporting on their 
clients may be difficult to attain in Nigeria. The confidentiality rules affecting legal 
practitioners in Nigeria are stringent. These rules are perceived to be sacrosanct, and 
there is a perception that there is a conflict between the AML regime and the practice of 
law in Nigeria. Lawyers have opposed the application of S3 and 5 of the MLPA to them, 
given the peculiarity of the rules that govern legal practice in Nigeria. Some lawyers who 
are supposed to be gatekeepers could use that to deliberately perpetuate money 
laundering. As key players in the industry, they could act as fronts for PEP and would not 
draw attention to themselves, hence a perfect channel for money laundering.252 
 
There is usually a reversionary interest being held by the PEP or whoever the funds are 
being fronted for. There could be a gradual reversionary interest or beneficial ownership 





 Money Laundering Prohibition Act 2011,S5. 
 
 Sarah N. Welling ‘ Smurfs, Money Laundering and the Federal Criminal Law: The Crime of Structuring 







of using professionals including lawyers as fronts, hence the provisions in S 3 and 5 MLPA 
2011 clearly regulate the activities of DNFI including scrutinising the customer or client. 
 
There is also an unfortunate possibility that legal practitioners could aid their clients with 
laundering the proceeds of crime. There is a possibility for lawyers to abuse the unique 
nature of their jobs during their service to a client. This is part of the unethical practice in 
the legal profession that could undermine the AML regime in Nigeria. The MLPA 2011 
envisaged a possibility of legal practitioners abusing their unique role, therefore S25 of 
the act clearly includes lawyers in the definition of DNFI. S 25 states: 
 
“DESIGNATED NON-FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS” means dealers in jewellery 
cars and luxury goods, chartered accountants, audit firms, clearing and 
settlement companies, hotels, tax consultants, legal practitioners, 
casinos, supermarkets and such other businesses as the federal ministry 
of commerce may from time to time designate”.253 
 
The existence of rules in a society is important especially for the development of the 
society. These rules must be applicable to all the members of the society. This is 
important for nation building and a strong justice system, where the rule of law isn’t 
negotiable or one-sided. In Fuller’s The Morality of Law, he asserts that there must be set 
rules which members of a society should follow.254 The set rules should be applicable to 
everybody without any exception, for justice, equity and the rule of law to prevail in the 
society. The essence of the rule of law is not just the existence of rules, but the 
application of existing rules without discrimination or exceptions for certain class of 
persons in the society. It is dangerous for set rules to be applicable to class of persons 
while certain persons are excluded from the enforcement of the set rules. Hence, the 
need for lawyers to be classified as DNFI. 
 
According to S25 of the MLPA 2011, lawyers have been classified as DFNI however, the 
rules and regulations that govern DFNI are not applicable to legal practitioners within the 
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reason for the inclusion of certain categories of persons as DNFI (including lawyers). It 
clearly means that legal practitioners within the Nigeria Jurisdiction ought to report to the 
appropriate authorities on suspicion of illegal sources of funds. 
 
This is not the case in Nigeria as this position has been challenged in court. In Nigerian Bar 
Association v FGN & CBN, it was held that lawyers could not contravene the provisions in 
the Rules of Professional Conduct 2007 [RPC] and the Legal Practitioners ACT 1975 by 
disregarding duty of confidentiality between a client and a lawyer. A quotation from the 
judgement goes as follows:255 
 
“By the various provisions of the Legal Practitioners Act, the Rules of 
Professional Conduct for Legal Practitioners 2007 and the Rules of 
Discipline for Legal Practitioners. 
 
 There are in existence even before the enactment of the Money 
Laundering (Prohibition) Act 2011, Regulatory bodies known to law 
such as the Chief Justice of Nigeria, the Bar Council, Appeal Committee 
of the Body of Benchers and the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary 
Committee which bodies exercise wide range of supervision duties on 
legal practice and legal practitioners in Nigeria. 
 
 These bodies mentioned in (b) above are juristic bodies known to law 
unlike SCUML, a department of Federal Ministry of Commerce both of 
which are not juristic persons by virtue of the Court of Appeal decision 
in Agboola & others Vs Saibu & others (1991) 2NWLR PT (175) – 566 
 
 The supervisory and regulatory powers or duties of the bodies 
mentioned in (b) above were in existence before the enactment of the 
Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act 2011 and as such the Legislature 
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powers and duties in the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act, a later 
legislation in point of time. 
 
 The supervisory measures granted the bodies that superintendent 
over legal practice and legal practitioners in Nigeria are very 
comprehensive under the existing laws and there is nothing new in the 
Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act to add. 
 
 By virtue of section 192 of the Evidence Act 2011, communications 
between legal practitioners and clients are privileged and cannot be 
disclosed to a third party; therefore, legal practitioners cannot be made to 
disclose cash transactions between them and their clients to SCUML. 
 
 Legal practitioners are not part of the “mischief” the Money 
 
Laundering (Prohibition) Act 2011 seeks to address and as such the law 
cannot be targeted at them. 
 
 Section 192 of the Evidence Act contains enough safeguard to cover 
cases where communications are in furtherance of a criminal offence. 
Such communications are not privileged, and they are exempted by the 
law, legal practitioners have no privileges in such cases. 
 
 Section 192 of the Evidence Act are provisions specifically made to 
address legal practice in Nigeria, therefore, the provisions of the 
Evidence Act should be preferred and read as overriding the provisions 
of the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act 2011. 
 
 The primary subjects and interests of the Money Laundering Act and 
the Evidence Act are different. 
 
 Practice of law “can hardly qualify as one of the kindred trades such 
 
as car dealership, estate agency, dealers in jewelleries, precious stones, 
supermarket, casinos etc., as to readily come under focus and be 







 None of the Trades mentioned in section 25 of the Money Laundering 
Act 2011 has provisions similar to section 192 of the Evidence Act in 
 
terms of privileged communications they have with their customers.” 
 
m) Legal practitioners deal with clients and not customers.” 
 
In this judgment, it shows the distinction in the AML regime from other common law 
jurisdictions where lawyers as DNFI are required to report suspicious transactions of their 
clients. The regulation of lawyers within the Nigerian jurisdiction cannot be overshadowed by 
recommendations and regulations in the AML regime. With this judgment, it means the 
classification of lawyers as DFNI and the enforceability of S3 and S5 of the MLPA may not be a 
reality. The sustainability of an effective AML regime lies in the hands of professionals who 
are supposed to be gatekeepers. If there is an exclusion of a class of professionals (lawyers) 
from reporting suspicious transactions by virtue of their ethical regulations, then it makes a 
mockery of the entire rationale of a “gatekeeper” and DNFI. 
 
With the current system in place which exempts lawyers, (despite been classified as DNFI) 
from reporting transactions, clearly means that the application of S 3 & 5 of MLPA 2011 is 
one sided. If this provision regulates the activities of all categories of persons regarded as 
DNFI but lawyers, it could frustrate and undermine the AML regime in Nigeria. This could 
also negate the FATF 40 recommendations, as the “gatekeeper” initiative would fail. 
Hence, Fuller’s rule on generality with the application of laws. 
 
This could be the reason why Fuller asserts that, for the rule of law to be enshrined in any 
society and for an effective justice system, the applicability of set rules must be seen to be 
applicable to everyone in the society.256 In this context the “society” referred to is class 
of persons called DNFI. This major issue has undermined the provisions of the MLPA and 
the AML regime in Nigeria. 
 
Furthermore, the internalisation of international recommendations without recourse to local 
laws could jeopardise the principles of reciprocity in the rule of law. Fidelity is a fundamental 
element in Fullers rule of law. There must be some element of fidelity for the enhancement of 








in Nigeria and the Prosecution of these offences is an adoption of FATF regulation. The 
FATF, which is responsible for the recommendation of anti-money laundering laws 
internationally, mounted pressure on Nigeria to transplant the recommendation her anti-
money laundering regime.257 This may be one of the reason anti-money laundering 
regime in Nigeria is not as effective as it should be. The provisions n S3 &5 of the MLPA 
2011 clearly shows that Nigeria was in a hurry to classify legal practitioners as Designated 
Non-Financial Institutions [DNFI] without recourse to the reflection upon the possible 
integration with local laws and regulation that guide the conduct of these professionals. 
 
When there is no consultation with stakeholders and relevant authorities before 
transplanting, there is every possibility there would not be fidelity on the part of those 
who are supposed to be enforcers of the law. Lawyers within the Nigerian jurisdiction do 
not see a reason why the provisions in S 5 MLPA 2011 should be adhered to. There is no 
willingness to reciprocate the enforcement of financial reporting by lawyers as it is done 
in other jurisdictions. There is a disparity between local criminal jurisprudence and the 
FATF guideline. There must be a meeting point or understanding or fidelity as Fuller puts 
it between the anti-money laundering regime in Nigeria and FATF. If issues of 
transplanting are not well managed, there may not be a willingness on the part of the law 
enforcement in Nigeria to implement FATF recommendations. It is important that there is 
fidelity and understanding between both parties agreeing to establish a framework on the 




Despite Nigeria’s effort in fighting corruption and creating an AML regime which 
integrates PEP, the problems persist. Could it be that this typology of money laundering 
persists as a result of the deontological nature of the AML regime? 
 
When laws are put in place to regulate the conduct of persons or class of persons in a 
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258The fact that regulations are in place to govern the conduct of a class of persons, 
means that the problems or potential problems in that society have been identified and 
codified by way of enactments. The creation of a statute to address an issue is a 
deontological approach by way of identifying what the problem is and if possible, 
criminalising what the behaviour. 
 
It is important to note that mere criminalising a behaviour, creating a legislation to tackle a 
problem does not guarantee solutions to the problem without virtue. The “virtue system” 
 
entails the enforcement of the legislation that have been identified in the money 
laundering legislation that has been created to prohibit a crime.259 
 
The MLPA 2011 and the AML regime will be more effective if attention is paid to the 
successful prosecution of money laundering offences, particularly with this typology 
which is more common in Nigeria. If the procedure is effective and there are successful 
convictions of money laundering offences by PEPS, it would give credence to the 
substantive issues which have been laid down in the MLAP 2011. 
 
Furthermore, the application of prosecutorial discretion and the rule of law in the AML 
regime in Nigeria falls within the scope of deontological issues which would provide 
support to a “virtuous system” as laid down in the AML framework.260 The deontological 
approach cannot make an AML regime effective. Despite the comprehensive provision 
which captures the typology of PEP in the MLPA 2011, the AML regime in its totality, has 
not been as effective as it should be. Focus should be on how money laundering cases are 
handled, rather than the legislation itself. When convictions of offenders are secured, the 
citizens would be convinced that an effective AML regime is in place, and not a piece of 
legislation no matter how comprehensive it is. 
 
The next chapter discusses the role of legal ethics in prosecutorial discretion in the AML 
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3.0 HISTORY AND CONCEPT OF ETHICS 
 
Ethics are grounded in the notion of responsibility as free moral agents where individuals 
and organisations should be held accountable for their actions. Taking responsibility for 
actions or omissions as individuals or organisations with an expected consequence of 
their actions, can be viewed as ethics261 
 
Ethics can also be viewed as a prescribed standard or pattern of right and wrong of what 
humans ought to do either in omission or in commission. This pattern is to serve as a 
guide in the daily activities of human behaviour. There is a clear distinction between 
legality and ethics. Asking whether an action is legal and whether it is ethical are two 
different questions.262 
 
An action may be ethical or unethical but not a legal requirement. This distinction has 
evolved over time in the application of ethics to the daily lives of humans and our society 
in general. An example is the unethical behaviour of lying. One may argue that lying is 
bad, and not an ideal behaviour of any “good” person. However, if there is no contractual 
obligation to say the truth, is lying an illegality? Not all unethical behaviour is an illegal act 
and not all legal actions are ethical. If I lie to my father about certain domestic issues, we 
could argue that I do not owe my father a contractual obligation to tell him the truth 
always.263 However, it is morally wrong or unethical for me to lie to my father whether or 
not I have a formal contract with him. It can be argued that the same principles apply to 
professional ethics. 
 
Professional ethics are norms, culture or best practices that have been put together as rules 
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profession. Since the focus is on legal ethics, emphasis would be on evaluating ethical 
conduct of lawyers and the role society plays in forming legal ethics. 
 
Norms form a major part of ethical consideration. These norms are ideals and values by a 
group or class of persons, which at times could reflect on the society. Durkekeim argues 
that complex societies could accommodate a range of different normative systems 
parallel to that of the wider society.264 This is because some societies may have several 
classes of persons with diverse cultural orientation and background, which could 
influence their daily lives. These norms would metamorphose into ethical guides for 
members of the society. It is even possible for each group or class of persons who are 
members of a complex society, to have norms and cultures that are distinctive from other 
groups in the same society. These norms, culture and values can be viewed as ethics.265 
 
Bayle s explored four possibilities in the relationship between social norms and 
professional norms.266 Bayle argues that professional norms are the same as ordinary 
norms of behaviour, the second is that they specify how professionals must relate with 
ordinary norms, the third is that they consider the role of professionals in applying 
ordinary norms and the fourth is that they are completely independent from ordinary 
norms. Professional ethics should not be formed without recourse to the norms and 
values of that society. As these norms and values change, so should professional ethics 
change. This is because professional norms emanate from norms of behaviour. 
 
The norms form the regulatory framework that professionals irrespective of their 
profession abide by. Some of these norms could have a deontological approach while 
some could be virtue based.267 Whichever ethical approach is applied in the legal 
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For this purpose, Fullers work would be used as a reference point to evaluate various 
forms of ethics and ascertain which is best applicable for lawyers, and indeed regulators 
of the AML regime in Nigeria. 
 
Fuller’s account of the two moralities of duty and aspiration, clearly indicates that man has a 
role to play for the greater good of the society without recourse to laying down rules, laws or 
regulation. Fuller’s Morality of aspiration is founded upon the needs and desire of an 
individual, which would ultimately serve in man’s interest and in the best interest of the 
society.269 Humans can bring out the finest traits in themselves without the aid or recourse 
to laid down legislation or rules. An Act of Parliament or a Rule of Professional Conduct, 
should not be the only basis for humans to aspire in behaving correctly. The natural traits in 
humans which makes us distinguish between good and bad, should be the guide of human 
behaviour. Humans could aspire to do good and make the society more orderly and “perfect”. 
If there is anything like a perfect society. Hence, the fact that it is not a criminal or civil 
offence to lie to a spouse does not necessarily make it a good thing to lie. There are certain 
responsibilities we must take to consciously create a good and just society. Every component 
that forms a society has a moral duty to play. The moral obligation in a society does not 
necessarily have to be rule based or tagged with a title “professional conduct” or “code of 
conduct”. In a family, it is expected that father owes a moral duty to provide for his child, 
particularly when he can afford it. There may not be any criminalisation or even a breach of a 
civil duty if a father is unable to provide for his child particularly if he cannot afford it. 
However, a father owes a moral duty to provide for his child. This moral duty could be a guide 
in differentiating what is “good” from what is legal or illegal. 
 
It could be argued that ethics are rules and these rules help in forming and molding human 
behaviour, which in turn could have a resulting effect in the society.270 This could be one-cut 
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certain disadvantages as it institutionally based. This does not emanate from within and 
achieving justice may not necessarily be the goal of a deontological approach to ethics. 
 
Ethics could be described as rules that govern the conduct of a class, group of persons or 
a private individual. If we agree that ethics governs the conduct of a class of persons, then 
it could be right to argued that, ethics in the legal profession can be referred to the action 
of members of the Bar and how they conduct themselves in the course of their duties. 
 
The members of the Bar also have a social role and responsibility to uphold the rule of law 
and act with integrity, with or without any codified rules that regulate the conduct of 
lawyers. Due to the role lawyers play in the society, it is expected that they owe members 
of the public a duty to protect the society by upholding to the rule of law. If Fuller argues 
that morality of duty should be attached to social values and responsibility, and not 
necessarily rules, then we may be right to argue that the rules of professional conduct for 
lawyers should not be the only yardstick of measuring an unethical conduct. The ability to 
differentiate between right and wrong and understand that lawyers owe the society in 
general a duty to uphold to the rule of law, is of more priority than whatever the rules of 




The pivotal issue with this ethical theory centres on consequences that surrounds an 
action. The action could be considered right if the consequences of the action is good.272 
Consequentialism deals with the total consequences of an action. It deals with the result 
of an action. Consequentialists argue that what is most important should be the 
consequences of one’s action rather than the focus on the dictates of the rules. 
Consequentialists appear to focus on the results or products of their actions rather than 
what the process followed in taking these actions. 
 
Consequentialism seems to be controversial. Proponents of this theory believe that the 
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possible. There are considered two types of consequentialism. Rule consequentialism and 
act consequentialism. 
 
For rule consequentialism, an action is considered morally right, so long as it does not 
violate the general set of rules that is acceptable in a society.273 For this type of 
consequentialism, an action is not right or wrong because of its own consequences, rather 
because it does violate or does not violate a good set of rules that guide human behaviour 
in a particular community. The pivotal issue on consequentialism is that proponents of 
this theory must consider what is termed as “the most good”. This could be problematic, 
as most people do not control the most good in every given situation. The term “the most 
good” in this regard appears to be subjective and critically arguable. 
 
Who determines what the most good is? For example, an 8-year-old boy’s father is shot 
and killed by his best friend, in the presence of the boy. The prosecution takes the boy as 
a witness to give evidence of the murder of his father. For certain reasons, the evidence 
given by the 8-year-old boy is inadmissible and the defendant is discharged and acquitted 
for murder. The boy as an 8-year-old witnessed the poor handling of the prosecution of 
his father best friend and bore a grudge. He plans a revenge. Upon attaining the age of 18 
he joins a gang with the sole aim of killing his father’s friend, who killed his father. He 
eventually carries out the assassination and kills his father’s best friend. 
 
From the above scenario, “the most good” can be subjective or objective. Subjectively, we 
could argue that the rationale behind the assassination of the boys father’s friend is to do 
justice, since the courts have refused to do justice due to ineffective prosecution. Why 
should a killer be free? Why a should a killer not be murdered in cold blood? These are 
purely subjective arguments, which could be interpreted as the consequences of a 
person’s action being the most good. Objectively, we could argue that two wrong actions 
cannot/ should not be interpreted as “the most good”. Why kill a murderer when you 
have committed the same crime just as he has? Has the killer of the murderer produced 












The Oxford dictionary defines subjective as “based on or influenced by personal feelings, 
tastes, or opinions.” Hence, going by this definition, if persons take actions because of the 
most good, then it means the “most good” is subject to the personal feeling and opinions 
of the person, which might not be beneficial to the larger society. These are some of the 
problems with consequentialism. 
 
In consequentialism, the omission or indifference of a person from carrying out an action is as 
good or as bad as the person who has carried out an action. The consequences of one’s 
actions by way of either omission or commission is a determinant, and not just by 
commission. Failure of a person to act when he should have acted could affect the “most 
good” outcome.274 The consequences of inaction of a police officer to arrest a traffic 
offender, who drove recklessly, could cause more harm to the society. The potential danger 
of the person killing commuters as a result of the police officer’s inaction, is a consequence 
and has not served the “most good”, which is to enforce laws to prevent accidents. 
 
In the practice of law, the dangers of this theory are that if practitioners apply 
consequentialism and rationalise their actions under the cover of “most good”, they could 
engage in acts of illegality to achieve that “most good”. For instance, the role of lawyers in 
the AML regime in most jurisdictions is to report suspicious transactions of their clients to 
AML authorities. In many jurisdictions, including Nigeria, the AML laws require lawyers to 
report suspicious transactions. 275 A lawyer could choose not to report suspicious 
transactions of a client. The lawyer could argue that it is the “most good” for him not to 
break the client confidentiality principle by exposing his client. The lawyer has not carried 
out an action but has refused to act. The consequences of his inaction to an objective 
mind could be that, his inaction could undermine the AML regime. As far as the lawyer is 
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which is to protect his client’s interest, which is also a rationale behind act 
consequentialism. 
 
In the application of consequentialism, it is important to note the following: The 
consequences of an action do not always justify the means. The “most good” can be 
subjective therefore, we must be rationally weighing our actions when attempting to 




The deontological approach seems to be quite different from consequentialism. 
Proponents of this principle believe there should be adherence to moral rules/duties, no 
matter the consequences of the action that is taken. Immanuel Kant the 18th century 
philosopher is the leading proponent of this approach. 
 
In Hannah Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem, an analysis is given on the strict adherence to 
rules by Adolf Eichmann. Eichmann claimed to have followed strict instructions as his 
adherence to laws was as a result of his personal conviction to Kantian principles.276 Here, 
Eichmann followed the law and did so blindly without recourse to common sense and moral 
inclination. Eichmann believed “superior orders” were orders that were to be obeyed even if 
these orders were considered bad or had an element of criminality and banditry. Eichmann 
believed that state laws must be obeyed irrespective of your personal conviction. He did so as 
he clearly mis-interpreted Kantians categorical imperative.277 Eichmann claimed to be a 
fervent believer in Kant’s principles hence. Hence, whatever Kant’s role played in the 
decisions Eichmann made, there is no slightest doubt that Eichmann followed the precepts of 
Kant: a law was law, there could be no exceptions.278 The strict adherence to rules is the 
focal point of deontology ethics which is centred on Kantian principles. 
 
Kant is of the view that all humans are entitled to respect and dignity and for humans to 
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These rules should determine behavioural pattern of humans and would dictate the 
universal rational duties to one another.279 
 
Proponents of this theory believe that the results we get from our actions, which could be 
interpreted as consequences of our actions, should be because we have kept a duty. This 
duty is to follow laid down rules and procedure no matter the circumstances at hand. 
Kant is of the view that to be morally good, you must be motivated by a duty. It could 
possibly imply that if there is no duty then there is no reason to be morally good. It is 
important to note that an action is not “morally good” because it is backed up by a duty. 
It is morally good because it is good in itself. The danger of this theory is that, it gives a 
systematic pattern on how human behaviour should be checked. Humans are not robots, 
therefore if a rule or a law is enacted, there must be circumstances where that rule or law 
should not be applicable.280 
 
More so, the intuition of humanity had been existing before rules/laws came to regulate 
the behaviour of man. This intuition has served and still serves as a moral compass to 
distinguish between right and wrong/ good and bad. A person’s action should not be 
considered as good only because the action is line with what the rules dictate. What is 
good is good and what is bad is bad. A “moral action” should not be motivated by a duty 
or a rule.281 A person should not be inclined to do what is right because the rules/law 
clearly states that it can be done. What if there is no rule/law that supports a 
“moral/good” action? Would deontologist then argue that a person should not carry out a 
“good” act because there is no law to back that action? 
 
The contrast between deontology and consequentialism can be seen through Kant’s 
example. Kant argues that if an axed man/killer asked him where his brother was hiding, 
he would surely tell killer the truth, as he believes telling the truth in the circumstance is 















that circumstance is to save his brother irrespective of whether or not you have to lie to 
do that. Kant might have tried to make a point, which is that rules are sacred and must be 
obeyed irrespective of the situation you find yourself. However, I think Kant took it too 
far. Law was made for man and not otherwise. The essence of law is to regulate the 
conduct of mankind and to make life easier for mankind. If man becomes a slave to 
law/rules, then it defeats the rationale behind having the laws in the first instance.282 
 
It would be most unfair to humanity if the rigidity of rules to determines the consequences of 
our actions. Critics of this theory would ask whether rules or principles must be adhered to. 
Consequentialist have argued that situations may occur where these rules may not be 
adhered to because of the importance of the “better good”. Critics believe there must not be 
any strict adherence to rules and there should be room for some flexibility.283 
 
However, there must be rules. If they are no rules and humanity is left to act based on their 
intuition to determine what should be morally good, it could be dangerous. This could bring 
several subjective ideas and opinion as to what is “morally good”. Then people would kill, 
rape and commit all sorts of atrocities and justify it as morally good, since they are been 
guided by their intuition. There should be a meeting point between deontological philosophy 
and proponents of “morally good” (virtue) for a legal system to be more effective. If there is 
an amalgamation of deontology and virtue ethics in society, lawmakers who draft laws would 
consider societal values, norms and what is “right” before drafting these laws. When this is 
done, we could argue that “morality” has been included in the laws that regulate the actions 
of members of a society. Only then, deontologist can argue that adherence to rules no matter 
the consequences of the action must be obeyed. 
 
The deontological approach seems to be more applicable in the legal profession in Nigeria. 
The legal profession in Nigeria is centred on the Rules of Professional Conduct 2007 and the 
Legal Practitioners Act 1975. The conduct of legal practitioners in Nigeria seems to be more 
focused on rules. Therefore, like deontologist, lawyers place more weight on rules and duties. 
Legal practitioners have duties to their clients and duties to the court. The duty 
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a lawyer owes a client, or the court is to speak the truth always and represent his client 
within the ambits of the law. It is immaterial whether it is stated as a duty or a rule for 
lawyers to always speak the truth to the court, because it is “morally good” in itself to 
speak the truth without the backing of a “duty” or a “rule”. 
 
3.3 Virtue Ethics: 
 
Virtue ethics can be traced back to Socrates and Aristotle. Virtue ethics emphasises on 
what is the morally correct thing to do. It does assess the consequences of your action 
however, through the motive and the rationale behind the action itself.284 This theory is 
unlike deontology which focuses on the adherence to rules no matter the consequences 
of one’s action, virtue focuses on the motive behind the action of a person. 
 
What is virtue? Virtue are positive traits, which direct the attitude and behavioural 
pattern of man. Virtue focuses on the attitude motivating an action. Unlike deontology, 
which is anchored on rules virtue attempts to give humans more free will. Proponents of 
this ethical ideology believe that, humans should be granted the opportunity to make 
their decisions based on what is morally right, rather than what the rule/law states. That 
freewill or discretion is anchored on the assumption that the human nature is inclined to 
do what is considered morally right.285 Therefore, the general motive behind the action 
of humans is to do what is morally right. It could be further argued that, virtue looks at 
the intent and not the rule. If the intent of an action is right, even when it opposes what 
the law/rule states, then its virtuous. 
 
Virtue looks at the moral nature of the action that has been taken and whether the action is 
good or bad. Virtue ethics in my opinion is more inclined to natural principles e.g. wrong and 
right, good and bad. There is no necessary adherence to rules or principles so long as the 
motive behind the action is right. Virtue ethics is centred on justice and fairness and not rules 
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argued the administration of justice system is centred on technicalities of law 
(procedural) rather than justice.286 
 
Some legal practitioners appear in court with the intention of using the law to technically 
obstruct justice. It is a possibility that lawyers within the jurisdiction are encouraged to 
use legal technicalities to deprive litigants of justice because the system allows and 
promotes legal technicalities rather than justice.287 
 
Hence, both judges’ and lawyers forget that the court is not only court of law but also a 
court of justice. A litigant is in court for justice to be served and not for the law to be 
upheld (yet the law must be upheld). If an action of a litigant is right or wrong, justice 
should be served on its merit and not on technicalities of law. The Nigerian justice system 
appears to be more inclined to the deontological approach, which is a direct opposite of 
what proponents of virtue argue for.288 
 
In the legal profession, rules of professional conduct are meant to be followed and strictly 
obeyed. Lawyers could argue that once rules are complied with, it is immaterial whether 
their action is morally wrong or right. We could argue that once rules have been complied 
with, we can sacrifice equity justice and fairness. This is a scenario, which proponents of 
virtue ethics have continuously criticised. A lawyer’s adherence to rules, irrespective of 
whether or not it is the right thing to do is principally challenged by proponents of virtue 
ethics. This is quite understandable, as it can be argued that legality is not morality.289 An 
action is legal when there are laws that permit such action or there are no existing laws 
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the action? Is the motive behind the action “right”? These are questions that create 
conflict between proponents of virtue and deontological ethics in the legal profession. 
 
A lawyer’s duty is beyond knowing the law. A lawyer’s priority is to advocate for justice 
and do what is considered right and equitable in accordance to the Rules of Professional 
Conduct.290 However, what happens when sections of the rules of professional conduct 
which a lawyer should adhere to, does not seem to promote what is “right”? Is a lawyer 
meant to ignore the provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct (deontology) and 
follow his conscience (virtue) or obey the strict rules? This could pose a problem for the 
integration of virtue ethics in the conduct of lawyers in Nigeria. The “discretion” to 
determine what is right or wrong, which is associated with virtue can be abused by some 
lawyers.291 It is arguable that right or wrong is subjective. Therefore, everyone could 
have a different interpretation of what is right. A person could flagrantly disobey a law or 
carry out an action which a law clearly prohibits, under the guise of it been the “right” 
thing to do. This could cause a breakdown of law and order, if we totally disregard rules 
and focus on motive or intent. However, the motive/intention cannot be overlooked. 
 
Aristotle states that, it is the inner qualities of a person that makes the action made by a 
person right.292 If applicable to the legal profession, it is the inner qualities of lawyers 
that matter and not the outcome of the result. The inner qualities of lawyers form their 
character; their character could determine how they apply the Rules of Professional 
Conduct. This is because a lawyer could intentionally do what is considered morally wrong 





















In legal practice, it is important for lawyers to be honest. Honesty is a virtue, which should 
be expected of lawyers. Honesty has plays a role in the ethical consideration of lawyers. 
Honesty and trust are major factors in the legal profession and no number of rules or 
code of conduct can guarantee honesty from a lawyer. A lawyer must be virtuous. A 
virtuous lawyer would not convert a client’s money to personal use. 
 
A virtuous lawyer would not reveal a client’s secret, knowing fully well that such information 
was given to him in trust. Virtue ethics are moral principles that emanate from within an 
individual. The conscience should be the guide rather than codes or rules.294 
 
The importance of personal morality in ethics cannot be overemphasised. The moral 
values of person form the character. If the character of a person is questionable, then 
certainly the person cannot be virtuous. It is very possible for there to be a conflict 
between the strict application of rules and morality. One would argue that, where there is 
a conflict between the Rules of Professional Conduct and morality, morality should 
overtake the rules. This may be purely academic and difficult to integrate in reality due to 
the subjectivity of morality. However, morality is important in the context of virtue.295 A 
scenario where a lawyer, who has a wealthy client, opens a trust account for the client 
with huge sums of money and the same lawyer has a poor client who is barely struggling 
to put a roof over his head and feed his family. The bank is about to foreclose on the poor 
client’s home to evict him and his family. The lawyer could decide to withdraw from the 
rich client’s trust account and help settle the debt of the poor client (without the 
knowledge of the client) and returns the money as soon as the poor client pays back, but 
he does not. Instead, he gives the client money from his personal savings to solve his 
housing problems, violating the rules of conduct in the jurisdiction he practices, which 
prohibits personal relationships with clients. The lawyer might have disobeyed certain 
provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct but has helped to save a family from 
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Critics of virtue ethics have argued that, in each situation there is no clear guide on what 
to do, leaving maximum discretion in the hands of the person carrying out the action. This 
could lead to ambiguity, unlike deontology which focuses on what the rule states and the 
adherence to the rule. Despite the problems of ambiguity and subjectivity, it is one of the 
most practicable and acceptable theories.296 
 
Conflict of ethical principle is another factor that influences the integration of virtue 
ethics. There is an increasing number of conflicts of ethical principles these days 
particularly by lawyers who work for companies and state.297 Career driven lawyers who 
work for companies or organisations might be caught between implementing company 
policies and doing what is considered “right”. This is because some organisations may 
have goals or a mode of operation, which may not be morally acceptable. Lawyers who 
work for such establishments may run into problems with the establishment, if they do 
not implement company policies because it contradicts their ethical principles.298 Conflict 
of interest between broader public interest and the interest of a client is a primary issue. 
Lawyers often make this mistake by prioritising the interest of the client above the 
interest of the public. This should not be. The lawyer owes the public or the society a duty 
first, before the client. Hence there should be a priority of interest. In this case the 
broader public interest should be priority. Proponents of virtue would argue that where 
core duties conflict, public interest must take precedence.299 
 
Lawyers play a significant role in the society. The significant role played by lawyers reflect 
on the justice system. If lawyers are ministers in the temple of justice, then it is important 
for lawyers to conduct themselves with virtue with the aim of delivering justice for the 
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3.4 Ethics of Lawyers in Nigeria 
 
As it is in most jurisdictions, the practice of law is regulated in Nigeria. The rationale behind 
the regulation of legal practice in Nigeria is to prescribe guidelines and code of conduct for 
lawyers, which could be interpreted as ethics. The history of legal practice in Nigeria could be 
dated back to the colonial era. At that time, there was no clear regulation or rule that guided 
the conduct of lawyers in and out of court. Prior to 1888, the absence of a definite regulatory 
guide made lawyers in the jurisdiction to act within their discretion.300 The problem that 
arose as a result of their discretion was that, lawyers could not be held to account for their 
conduct. They could not be held to account because there were no rules that permitted or 
prohibited what lawyers could or couldn’t do. 
 
The Nigerian Bar Association (NBA) was founded in 1888. At the time of it being founded, 
it had only three members. This was because there were very few persons had the 
opportunity of travelling to the United Kingdom to study law.301 Prior to that, and 
decades after the formation of the NBA, there was no guideline or rule that regulated the 
conduct of lawyers in Nigeria. At that time, the courts asserted control on the conduct of 
lawyers, in and out of the court room. Over time, the regulation of the conduct of lawyers 
was developed by the courts before the formation of regulatory authorities.302 
 
The formation of regulatory authorities brought some formal developmental framework to 
the legal profession. This has created a formal consciousness for lawyers on their behavioural 
pattern in the line of work. Without any regulatory authority, there could have been a 
possibility that lawyers would abuse their office and functions, particularly with the fiduciary 
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regulatory bodies to enforce certain behavioural patterns on lawyers within their 
jurisdiction. 
 
Generally, the courts have a duty to supervise the conduct of lawyers and punish lawyers 
for misconduct. In the case of Myers v Ellman304, Lord Wright observed, “the underlying 
principle is that the court has a right and a duty to supervise the conduct of its solicitors 
and visit with penalties any conduct of such nature as to tend to defeat justice in the very 
cause in which he is engaged professionally.” 
 
The courts have a duty to monitor and supervise the conduct of lawyers beyond the rules 
of professional conduct. If lawyers are regarded as priest in the temple of justice, then we 
could argue that the temple has a right to monitor the conduct of priests that appear 
before it, to avoid desecration. The courts have the powers to punish erring lawyers to 
serve as a lesson for others to learn. 
 
In Nigeria, the General Council of the Bar, which derives its powers from the Legal 
Practitioners Act[LPA] 1975, regulates the conduct of lawyers. S1(1) of the LPA 1975 
states the functions of the General Council of the Bar, which sits once a year to review 
complaints about lawyers and review the guidelines for the code of conduct of lawyers. 
 
S 1 (1) of the LPA states: 
 
“There shall be a body to be known as the General Council of the Bar 
(hereinafter in this Act referred to as "the Bar Council") which shall be 
charged with the general management of the affairs of the Nigerian Bar 
Association (subject to any limitations for the time being provided by 
the constitution of the association) and with any functions conferred 
on the council by this Act or that constitution.”305 
 
To further strengthen the regulation of lawyers in Nigeria, the Rules of Professional 
Conduct 2007 [RPC] was formed by the Bar Council. The RPC was enacted to give in detail 
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Recommendations of the RPC, which clearly states the functions of a lawyer particularly 
concerning the attorney-client relationship. The RPC 2007 and the LPA 1975 have an 
important role in the regulation of the practice of law and the ethics of lawyers in Nigeria. 
 
In Nigeria, the practice of law is unitary. Legal practitioners are qualified to practice as 
solicitors and barristers. The Nigerian legal system inherited the British legal system, 
which makes both similar. Nigeria is a common law jurisdiction and most of her laws have 
their origin in the United Kingdom. Hence, the style of practice with regards to procedural 
law is similar with the UK. However, in the UK the role of a legal practitioner is separated. 
One is either a solicitor or a barrister.306 Some legal scholars have argued that the current 
system which Nigeria practices, where the job of a lawyer is unitary, could create an 
enabling environment for misconduct while discharging their duties as lawyers.307 It has 
been argued that the job of a lawyer should be divided between a barrister and a 
solicitor. Proponents of this argument believe that it would reduce the ambiguity of the 
role of a lawyer and make their duties more specific and this could reduce misconduct.308 
 
This may not be very true. The professional role a person plays does not determine the 
content of the character of a person. Traits are inherently personal. It does not also make 
the person virtuous or honourable. These character traits are inherent personal qualities, 
and lawyers who lack the element of morality will not do the right thing even if their roles 
are separated. The argument for the separation roles of legal practitioners is merely 
deontological, as this may not have any serious influence on the conduct of lawyers 
within the jurisdiction.309 This is because there are limits to the extent to which rules or 
laws can influence the character of a person. If roles are separated, as it is in jurisdictions 
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Aristotle argues that what is bad is bad and what is good is good and rules do not 
influence what is good because good is good in itself.310 Then, it could be argued that 
whether or not there are rules that govern the practice of law, or whether or not the is a 
separation of the role of lawyers in the jurisdiction, it cannot determine the content of 
the character of lawyers. Such rules are only an element required for the regulation of the 
conduct of lawyers. 
 
3.5 Fiduciary Duty of Lawyers in Nigeria 
 
Fiduciary duty is a primary obligation a lawyer owes a client.311 It is the duty of a lawyer 
to diligently represent the client and the interest of the client. However, a lawyer also 
owes the court a duty. Part of the duty of a lawyer to the court is to represent a client 
within the limits of the law, speak the truth to the court and should not mislead the court 
with the intention of obstructing the course of justice. While representing a client, there 
could be a possibility of lawyers engaging in unethical practices with the aim of satisfying 
their clients.312 
 
In some circumstances, lawyers within the Nigerian jurisdiction have intentionally attempted 
to obstruct the course of justice, by either filing frivolous applications in court to delay trial or 
engaging in outright corruption by attempting to bribe court officials to file their cases in 
courts, where “friendly” judges are presiding over.313 This is a dangerous trend by lawyers 
who are supposed to be seen to uphold justice and the rule of law. Obstruction of justice by 
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factor that has undermined the AML regime in Nigeria.314 It can be argued that the 
unsuccessful prosecution of PEP and high net worth individuals in Nigeria, has been 
combination of both incompetence and corruption (where competent) on the part of 
prosecution and defence lawyers. Despite the strict rules of professional conduct in 
Nigeria, this reliance upon rules and assumption of a deontological response form lawyers 
has not addressed the primary issues of character of a lawyer. 
 
The ability of the actors to resist temptation from their clients and remain ethical during 
their duty is crucial. This may not be a systemic thing but rather a personal and moral 
issue. It may not be systemic because there is a limit to how systems can control human 
behavior. A good person is someone who lives virtuously and is not controlled by rules or 
regulations.315 
 
If we argue that there must be a systemic mechanism in place to ensure that lawyers 
behave right and are resistant to temptation in the line of their duty, then the system 
must be perfect to monitor the lawyers step all the way. This is practically impossible as 
there is no perfect system. A lawyer must act in good faith. 
 
This was emphasized in the case of Dryburgh v Scott’s Media Tax. 
 
The court described the duty as, “act in good faith in the interests of (the principal), to act 
for a proper purpose, and not to allow… personal interests to conflict with those of (the 
principal)’. The concept is based on notions of trust, confidence and good faith. All very 
well in a utopian society, but for those operating in the hard knocks world of modern 
commerce, perhaps less familiar. Parties generally operate in accordance with what the 
contract says, whether good, bad or indifferent for the other party – indeed, wresting the 
best financial result is likely to be critical. Attempts to introduce a general duty of good 
faith into contracts have proved unpopular because of the level of uncertainty it brings. In 















fiduciary must not place himself in a position where his interests  and his duties may 
possibly conflict”.316 
 
Furthermore, in the case of Bristol and West Building Society v Mothew, the courts stated 
that: 
 
“A fiduciary is someone who has undertaken to act for or on behalf of 
another in a particular matter in circumstances which give rise to a 
relationship of trust and confidence. The distinguishing obligation of a 
fiduciary is the obligation of loyalty. The principal is entitled to the 
single-minded loyalty of his fiduciary. This core liability has several 
facets. A fiduciary must act in good faith; he must not make a profit out 
of his trust; he must not place himself in a position where his duty and 
his interest may conflict; he may not act for his own benefit or the 
benefit of a third person without the informed consent of his principal. 
This is not intended to be an exhaustive list, but it is sufficient to 
indicate the nature of fiduciary obligations. They are the defining 
characteristics of the fiduciary.”317 
 
An essential element that guides lawyers is the duty to the client. A lawyer must handle a 
client’s business with utmost care and skill. 
 
“It is the duty of a lawyer to devote his attention, energy and expertise 
to the service of his client and subject to any rule of law, to act in 
manner consistent with the best interest of the client.” 318 
 
A lawyer must handle a client’s business in the most professional manner. The manner 
must be within the ambits of the rule of law and the rules of professional conduct. His 
expertise could mean sound counsel on issues and proper representation in court when 
and if the need arises. This must be done in accordance to the rule of law. For instance, a 
dubious client may pressurise his lawyer to engage in unethical practices and the lawyer 
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unwittingly may want to satisfy the client by breaching certain laws or provision. This is 





“ (2) In his representation of his client, a lawyer shall- 
 
 keep strictly within the law notwithstanding any contrary 
instruction by his client, and if the client insists on a breach of the law, 
the lawyer shall withdraw his service; 
 
 use his best endeavours to restrain and prevent his client from 
committing misconduct or breach of the law with particular reference to 
judicial officers, witnesses and litigants and if the client persists in his 
action or conduct, the lawyer shall terminate their relations.”319 
 
A lawyer should not consciously break the law during his service to his client. Even if the 
lawyer has not broken any law, or the rules are unclear on whether or not an action is 
prohibited, the conscience should serve as a compass in guiding the action of a lawyer. This 
 
is the primary advantage virtue would have over deontology. Rule 15(1) of the RPC 2007 
appears to create a gap for “bad” lawyers to capitalise on. 
 
Rule 15 RPC states: 
 
“(1) In his representation of a client, a lawyer may refuse to aid or 
participate in conduct that he believes to be unlawful even though 
there is some support for an argument that the conduct is legal.”320 
 
The word “may” is used in the provision of Rule 15 RPC 2007. This could be very dangerous 
because it could be deliberately misinterpreted. A lawyer who does not want to do what is 
right and be virtuous could consciously, intentionally and pretentiously, claim ignorance of 













“may” gives an option with regards to believing or accepting that what a client is doing or 
is about to do is unlawful. 
 
For avoidance of such mischief, laws must be clear. Clarity of laws is very essential for the 
integration of the rule of law in a nation’s justice system. Fuller argues that for a law to be 
valid, it must be clear.321 Fuller further argues that the fidelity of law is an essential 
ingredient for the rule of law. Lawyers should strive to uphold the fidelity of law. The 
application of this law is as important as the enactment. Lawyers must not deliberately 
attempt to misinterpret the law or mislead a judge to please a client. Legal practitioners more 
than anyone else need to be part of the collective effort to uphold the rule of law. For the 
legal profession to develop it depends on the usefulness of law to clients and the integrity of 
the law. For the viability of the system, lawyers must support the profession and ensure that 
the fidelity of the law is upheld. Despite the clarity of rules or law, there is a limitation on how 
much it can influence that character of lawyers. If lawyers act with virtue, the AML regime 
would be more efficient. Defence lawyers would not go out of their way in committing crimes 
or obstructing the course of justice in order to satisfy a client. 
 
If it is proven that, a lawyer has engaged in an unethical practice, the Legal Practitioners 
Disciplinary Committee [LPDC] has the responsibility of disciplining lawyers. This body 
derives its powers from s10 of the LPA 1975322. Members of the legal practitioner’s 
disciplinary committee are; the Attorney General of the Federation, Attorney Generals of 
States, and 12 Legal Practitioners who have distinguished themselves in practice and have 
proven to be of good character and conduct. They are selected from different areas of 
practice and academia with a minimum of 10 years of post-call experience. It is important 
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3.6 Ethical Consideration of Prosecutors in Nigeria in the AML Regime 
 
In criminal prosecution, it is the duty of the prosecution to weigh the evidence before 
going to court. Prosecutorial discretion is essential when weighing the evidence at the 
point of investigation. Prosecutors must be thorough to avoid an abuse of court 
process.323 Prosecutorial discretion can play a role in guiding a prosecutor. This would 
ensure that ethics in the profession are regulated particularly with criminal prosecution in 
Nigeria. An intelligent prosecutor, having weighed the evidence and gone through the 
facts of the case, should be able to envisage or forecast where the court may head.324 
 
Prosecutors must consider ethical implications before filing charges. Part of which is to 
evaluate the available evidence of the offence and apply discretion on whether or not to 
prosecute. If a prosecutor applies prosecutorial discretion by amending charges against the 
accused/defendant, in accordance with the available evidence, there may be a less probability 
of an abuse of court process. The independence of a prosecutor must not be abused by 
overcharging or attempting to secure a conviction by any possible means. In most cases, a 
prosecutor primarily is a lawyer.325 Despite the fiduciary duty of a lawyer which is to satisfy 
the client (the state in the case of a prosecutor), a lawyer owes a duty to the court to 
diligently carry on his case. The prosecutor also owes a duty to uphold the rule of law and not 
abuse his esteemed office. Overcharging or an attempt to get a conviction by any means can 
be interpreted as persecution. A prosecutor should prosecute and not persecute defendants 
by filing unsubstantiated charges before the courts.326 It is in line with virtue ethics that a 
prosecutor does not abuse the discretion attached to the office, by punishing perceived 
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prosecutor to charge defendants in accordance with the evidence that is available. Any 
action short of that could be unethical and not in good faith. 
 
The common law approach was for the prosecutor to present evidence before the court 
and determine whether the evidence is sufficient for a conviction. The judgment of Rand 
JF the Supreme Court of Canada held in, Boucher v The Queen327 : 
 
 
“It cannot be over-emphasised that the purpose of a criminal 
prosecution is not to obtain a conviction; it is to lay before a jury what 
the Crown considers to be credible evidence relevant to what is 
alleged to be a crime. Counsel have a duty to see that all available legal 
proof of the facts is presented: it should be done firmly and pressed to 
its legitimate strength, but it must also be done fairly. The role of the 
prosecutor excludes any notion of winning or losing; his function is a 
matter of public duty than which in civil life there can be none charged 
with greater personal responsibility. It is to be efficiently performed 
with an ingrained sense of the dignity, the seriousness and the justness 
of judicial proceedings.” 
 
From the judgement in the above case, it is important to note that, an abuse of court 
process does occur when lawyers file frivolous applications before the court. This is 
clearly a procedural issue however; some discretion needs to be applied on the part of 
the prosecutors when filing criminal processes in court. A lawyer could fall short of ethics 
when prosecutorial discretion is not applied before going to court. This unethical practice 
of filing frivolous charges has affected the AML regime in Nigeria.328 
 
The improper application of prosecutorial discretion in the AML regime in Nigeria could 
also be responsible for the high number of money laundering cases in our courts by PEP 
with very few convictions. The AML regulatory agencies that are empowered to prosecute 
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prosecutorial discretion. This could make charges too cumbersome, ultimately difficult to 
diligently prosecute and secure a conviction. 
 
The AML regime in Nigeria has suffered some setbacks due to the high handedness of 
prosecutors. When frivolous charges are attached to money laundering charges, it 
undermines the rationale behind the prosecution of the defendant. The public might think 
there is a political persecution on the defendant, which could in return undermine the AML 
regime in the court of public opinion. For the success of the AML regime in Nigeria, the public 
has to be convinced with the way and manner AML regulatory bodies prosecute money 
laundering cases.329 If prosecutors abuse their office by overcharging or are seen to appear 
to get a conviction by any means, the support the AML regime would need from the public 
will not be there. This, can undermine the AML regime in Nigeria. 
 
Prosecutors could exercise great responsibility to the society. Prosecutors play a key role 
in the administration of the criminal justice system, whether as individual prosecutors or 
prosecution agencies. A prosecutor is supposed to act with fairness and detachment. 
Professionalism should be displayed in the way he carries out his duties. Prosecutors must 
be conscious of the fact that the accused is a member of the society and he owes the 
larger society a duty of care. Prosecutors must not be desperate to secure a conviction by 
any possible means. Fairness cannot be overemphasised as a duty of a prosecutor. 
 
The Australian High Court in Whitehorn v The Queen 330 Deane J stated: 
 
“Prosecuting counsel in a criminal trial represents the State. The 
accused, the court and the community are entitled to expect that, in 
performing his function of presenting the case against an accused, he 
will act with fairness and detachment and always with the objectives of 
establishing the whole truth in accordance with the procedures and 
standards which the law requires to be observed and of helping to 
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Exercising fairness could be one of the core advantages of prosecutorial discretion. For 
example, a first offender for a misdemeanour ordinarily should not be charged to court, 
particularly if it might not be in the interest of the public to do so. More so, since the 
person if a first offender, and has shown remorse, the prosecutor should be able to 
decide if it is essential for the person go be tried by a court. A prosecutor should be able 
to exercise that discretion on a minor issue like this and allow the person go. A 
fundamental principle of the rule of law is fairness. Fairness to the accused with respect 
to the evidence at hand could influence prosecutorial discretion. 
 
Public interest is a major factor considered by prosecutors on suspicion of a criminal 
offence. The prosecutor must consider if it is in the interest of the public for an offender 
to be prosecuted. This is because the prosecutor’s primary responsibility should be to the 
public and not the agencies responsible for prosecution. 
 
Could it be that the criminal justice system in Nigeria focuses on securing a conviction as 
against public interest? Prosecutors should not be in a hurry to take all manner of cases to 
the courts without considering available evidence and applying prosecutorial discretion. 
The National Bureau of Statistics has stated that prosecutors are responsible for the high 
number of inmates in Nigerian prisons awaiting trial.331 Some of these offences are 
offences that could be misdemeanour; if prosecutorial discretion is applied there would 
not be backlog of persons awaiting trial. It is very shocking and embarrassing to note that 
about 70% of inmates in Nigerian prisons are awaiting trial.332 This is quite unfortunate. 
There is a clear disparity between the application of prosecutorial discretion for PEP and 
other citizens. It seems there are different standards with the application of prosecutorial 
discretion in Nigeria. One standard is used for the poor or ordinary citizen who is 
hurriedly locked up in prison without trial, while another standard is used to prosecute 
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stealing and money laundering charges. Again, it goes against Fullers principles of 
generality. 
 
The improper application of prosecutorial discretion in the AML regime in Nigeria could 
also be responsible for the high number of money laundering cases in our courts by PEP’s 
with very few convictions.333 The anti AML agencies that are empowered to prosecute on 
behalf of the Attorney General have not lived up to expectation. If ethics were considered 
before proffering a charge, there might not have been too many delays in trial. 
 
Overcharging also makes the process of trial too cumbersome and ultimately might not 
secure a conviction. The resulting effect is on the members of the public whose resources 
have been looted by PEP. It is important that prosecutorial discretion be enforced as a 
part of ethical guide for prosecution in the Nigerian criminal justice system and the AML 
regime in particular. 
 
3.7 The role of Confidentiality in Ethics 
 
A fundamental ethical duty imposed on lawyers is the duty of confidentiality. The 
obligation not to disclose details of transactions or information about a client is a priority 
rule amongst legal practitioners all over the world. This is a fundamental rule that lawyers 
in most jurisdictions are obliged to follow. Most other professions adopt this rule 
however, it is more pronounced with lawyers.334 
 
This ethical duty of confidentiality has been a part of the legal heritage since the practice of 
law. A combination of public perception and the discipline has been part of the traditional 
heritage, that is associated with the practice of law and lawyers in general.335 The perception 
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lawyers are conservative with words, forms a major part of public confidence that is 
bestowed upon lawyers. This duty has been a part of legal practice and it has been a 
sacrosanct duty until recent times.336 The history of client confidentiality suggest that 
lawyers must obey the law, rules and regulation that govern the society except when the 
law treads on client confidentiality. This had been the old common law practice where 
lawyers would go to any extent in protecting the information given to them by their 
client, no matter what offence has been committed. 
 
There are two effects of compliance with AML laws and regulations. The first is that 
compliance would have beneficial effect that justifies eroding confidentiality, even though 
confidentiality itself has its own beneficial effect. The second issue is that compliance can 
prevent a possible misuse of confidentiality. 
 
As the society evolved the practice of law also evolved. The changes and the demand from 
the society naturally influences the decision we make as humans. This influence is not 
restricted to individuals but also professional bodies, which includes the legal profession. The 
societal demand, which most affects confidentiality, are compliance regulation. These 
regulations could generate a conflict between compliance and confidentiality.337 The 
rationale behind the confidentiality between an attorney and a client, is to provide an 
enabling atmosphere and an assurance of privacy. This “assurance” is currently being eroded 
with enforcement of compliance law s[AML] on legal practitioners. However, it could be 
argued that these compliance laws are necessary to act as a check on legal practitioners who 
may intend to abuse the duty of confidentiality and perpetuate criminality. Hence, the need 
to enforce certain compliance laws on legal practitioners.338 This is debatable. Confidentiality 
plays a crucial role in a nation’s justice system. This is because for there to be access to 
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who in turn would pass through the legal system. For litigants to be encouraged to access 
justice through the legal system, they must be confident that they would get adequate 
representation by any legal practitioner of their choice.339 A litigant may not be 
encouraged to access justice through the legal system, if he feels details of his 
communication with the person who supposedly is to represent him, has divulged 
information to either anybody else or his adversary.340 It is important to note that in 
some cases, the “adversary” could be the government, who is investigating a person on 
suspicion of money laundering or any other offence and the lawyer who is supposed to be 
representing him gives him out on the altar of compliance. These are some of the issues 
between the compliance with AML regulations and confidentiality. 
 
The importance of duty of confidentiality between an attorney and client is a fundamental 
part of legal ethics. It could be argued that ethics in the legal profession are compliance laws 
on their own. The rule of professional conduct, which governs legal practitioners in respective 
jurisdictions is a compliance regulation on its own. Lawyers are bound to comply with their 
code of conduct, which is the primary compliance law that is applicable to legal practitioners. 
Whether or not there are conflicting compliance laws between (money laundering, real 
estate, insolvency, financial regulation, oil and gas and other areas of legal practice) and the 
duty of confidentiality, one of these compliance laws must prevail. This begs the question, 
when there is a conflict between compliance laws set by legislation or policy document and 
confidentiality which is stated in the code of conduct of lawyers (another compliance law) 
which should prevail? At what point should a lawyer draw the boundary between 
confidentiality and complying with other regulations? The courts have stated the importance 
of confidentiality between lawyer and client in several cases. 
 
In the case of Edwardian Group Ltd and another v Singh and ors, it was stated that Legal 
















not confined to telling the client the law. The context must, however, reasonably require 
the lawyer’s legal skills and confidentiality to be deployed in the service to the client.341 
 
In the case of Property Alliance Ltd v Royal Bank of Scotland plc, it was stated that factual 
information communicated by a lawyer to his client to enable the client to take a fully 
informed decision as to what to do and what further advice to obtain, was considered 
privileged. It was also stated however, that this protection would not extend to factual 
material prepared by a third party that is simply sent by a lawyer to his or her client.342 
 
Furthermore, In the case of Prince Jefiri Bolkiah v KPMG, Lord Millett stated that: 
 
“it is of overriding importance for the proper administration of justice 
that a client should be able to have complete confidence that what he 
tells his lawyer will remain secret. This is a matter of perception as well 
as substance. It is of the highest interest to the administration of 
justice, the importance that a solicitor or other person in possession of 
privilege and confidential information should not act in a way that may 
appear to put the information at risk of coming into the hands of 
someone with an adverse interest”.343 
 
Lord Millett must have envisaged that there could be a time when confidentiality between 
attorney and client would be eroded.344 It appears we live in such times. However, before we 
criticise the proponents of lawyers complying with regulations which would enable them to 
report suspicious transactions of their clients, we should examine the society and the times 
we live in. Law is not static. The evolution of law comes with the evolution of the society. As 
norms and practices of the society changes, so should law change.345 This is important in 
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The evolution of criminal jurisprudence is done in accordance with the changes in the 
society. These changes could also include the historical rules and values that have guided 
the legal profession such as the duty of confidentiality. 
 
For a criminal justice system to be developed, there must have been a need to place less 
emphasis on the confidentiality rule in other to achieve a greater good for the society. 
This “greater good” can be interpreted to mean having a society where justice is 
implemented, with less regard to rules or norms of certain professions. It could be further 
argued that, in order for justice to be implemented, these professionals should obey 
certain compliance laws, which may be conflicting with professional norms or rules. This 
could be the rationale behind the classification of legal practitioners as Designated Non-
Financial Institutions [DNFI] and mandating these professionals to report suspicious 
transactions of their clients. It could be further argued that for an effective AML regime 
and if the goal is justice (successful prosecution of PEP), it does not matter whose ethics 
or norms are broken. This should not be the case. There should be a balance between the 
implementation of compliance rules and Code of Conduct of legal practitioners, of which 
client confidentiality forms major part. 
 
3.8 The Conflict Between Virtue and Deontological Ethics: An Examination of the role of 
Confidentiality in the Anti-money Laundering Regime in Nigeria, with a Focus on Lawyers as 
Designated Non-Financial Institutions 
 
As society evolved, typology of money laundering also evolved. The way money laundering 
offences have been carried out in some cases, shows that certain professionals who are 
supposed to be gatekeepers can be placed in a position of compromise and aid money 
laundering activities. Over the years, the values of the legal profession have been eroded by 
elements within the profession, who sacrificed their virtue over client satisfaction or personal 
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Some lawyers have taken advantage of the principles of confidentiality, which in some 
jurisdictions like Nigeria and Canada is sacrosanct. 
 
The AML regime in Nigeria, which is anchored on the Money Laundering Prohibition Act 
[MLPA] 2011, makes clear provisions for professionals to report suspicious transactions of 
their clients. These professionals have been classified as a Designated Non- Financial 
Institutions [DNFI.] This is seen in S 3, 5 and 25 of the MLPA 2011. S 25 expressly includes 




S 3 of the MLPA 2011 states: 
 
 (1) A Financial Institution and a Designated Non-Financial Institution 
shall 
 




 before opening an account for, issuing a passbook to, entering into 
fiduciary transaction with, renting a safe deposit box to or establishing 
any other business relationship with the customer, and (ii) during the 
course of the relationship with the customer; 
 
 scrutinize  all on-going transactions undertaken  throughout  the 
 
duration of the relationship in order to ensure that the customer’s 
transaction is consistent with the business and risk profile. 
 
 An individual shall be required to provide proof of his 
 
 identity, by presenting to the Financial Institution or Designated Non-
Financial Institution a valid original copy of an official document bearing 
his names and photograph or any other identification documents as the 
relevant regulators may from time to time approve; 
 
 address, by presenting to the Financial Institution or Designated Non-






months by public utilities or any other documents as the relevant 
regulatory authorities may from time to time approve; 
 
 A body corporate shall be required to provide proof of its identity by 
presenting its certificate of incorporation and other valid official 
documents attesting to the existence of the body corporate. 
 
 The Manager, employee or assignee delegated by a body corporate to 
open an account shall be required to produce not only the documents 
specified in subsection (2) of this section, but also proof of the power of 
attorney granted to him in that behalf. 
 
 A casual customer shall comply with the provisions of subsection (2) of 
this section for any number or manner of transactions including wire 
transfer involving a sum exceeding US$1,000 or its equivalent if the total 
amount is known at the commencement of the transaction or as soon as 
it is known to exceed the sum of US$1,000 or its equivalent. 
 
 Where a Financial Institution or Designated Non-Financial Institution 
suspects or has reasonable grounds to suspect that the amount involved 
in a transaction is the proceeds of a crime or an illegal act it shall require 
identification of the customer notwithstanding that the amount involved 
in the transaction is less than US$1,000 or its equivalent. 
 
 If it appears that a customers may not be acting on his own account, 
the Financial Institution or Designated Non-Financial Institution shall seek 
from the customer by all reasonable means, information as to the true 
identity of the principal and where the customer is a body corporate, the 
Financial Institution or Designated Non-Financial Institution shall 
 
 take reasonable measures to understand the ownership and control 
structure of the customer; and 
 









 Where the customer is a Public Officer, the Financial Institution or 
Designated Non-Financial Institution shall in addition to the requirements 
of subsection (1) and (2) of this Section – 
 
 Put in place, appropriate risk management systems; and 
 
(b) Obtain senior management approval before establishing and during 
any business relationship with the Public Officer.”347 
 
The inclusion of lawyers as DNFI’S in the AML regime of Nigeria, implies that lawyers ought to 
report suspicious transactions. Emphasis on ought to. However, the implication of S 3, 5 and 
25 of the MLPA appears that the character of legal practitioners within the Nigerian 
jurisdiction is put to question. It is expected that as a legal practitioner, you have passed a 
certain test in character. The expectation generally is that a lawyer is worthy to be trusted in 
the soundness of mind and in the content of character. The content of character of a lawyer 
includes honesty and morality. These two contents are/have been essential qualities of legal 
practitioners for decades. If we agree that honesty and morality are essential qualities of 
lawyers, then we could argue further that virtue ethics plays an essential role in the conduct 
of lawyers. We could argue further that, if lawyers are virtuous and the profession is noble, is 
there a need to subject lawyers to compliance regulations in the AML regime? If our 
argument is that there is a need for lawyers to report financial transactions of their clients, is 
the government and society beginning to suspect lawyers? Is the society of the opinion that 
lawyers are no longer as noble as they claim to be? 
 
Subjecting lawyers to report suspicious transactions by virtue of compliance laws as seen in S 
3, 5 and 25 of the MLPA 2011, appears to be a deontological approach for the role of lawyers 
in the AML regime. The rationale behind following laid down rules and regulations, no matter 
the motive and consequences of one’s action is Immanuel Kant’s believe. Kant is of the 
opinion that actions should be motivated by a duty.348 These duties could be interpreted to 
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to mean that, whether or not a lawyer’s motive for carrying out an action is morally good, 
the lawyer must follow laid down rules and procedure. However, it is important to note 
that the definition of suspicion is highly subjective. Suspicion may differ according to the 
individual, as a mere unease cannot be justifiable suspicion. 
 
In the case of R v Da Silva, the court had to consider the meaning of the word suspect. 
The case arose under the Criminal Justice Act 1988 [UK] and the Proceeds of Crimes Act 
[POCA]. It was clearly stated that a feeling of unease is not enough to convict someone for 
been a beneficiary of the proceeds of crime. It stated that a mere possibility Is more of 
wishful thinking.349 
 
If we go by the Da Silva’s case, it means that lawyers cannot be reporting transactions of a 
client on mere suspicion of money laundering. If a lawyer must report a client at all, the 
facts must be clear and undisputed to the lawyer. Hence, suspicion is subjective. 
 
Also, in R v Saik, the court held that mere suspicion is not enough to claim that a person 
is benefiting from the proceeds of crime. The facts must be very clear and convincing.350 
 
The rules on deontology, appears to oppose virtue, as virtue ethics would look at the 
motive behind the lawyer’s action and moral value attached to it. If a lawyer refuses to 
report the transactions of his clients by virtue of S3 and S5 of the MLPA 2011, he could 
justify his actions by the immorality of breach of trust. A client is expected to trust his 
lawyer and a lawyer is expected not to divulge any information given to him in the course 
of him representing that client. This is the basic principle which confidentiality represents. 
 
 A lawyer who is not disclosing the details of transactions of a client may be going against the rules 
that classifies him as a DNFI and mandates financial reporting. It is important that 
 
laid down rules particularly compliance laws are obeyed. This would help to check the 
possibility of lawyers abusing or taking advantage of their office to aid money laundering. 
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including lawyers is understandable. However, there should be a meeting point between 
the rule based ethics and morality. The amalgamation of virtue and deontological ethics 
could be more effective when considering the role of lawyers in the AML regime.352 
 
The conflict between deontology and virtue ethics as to “what is morally good” should be 
backed up by rules, and what is “morally good” is good on its own, because “good is 
good”. This can be applied to the role of lawyer and ethics in the AML regime in Nigeria. 
The application of deontological and virtue ethics at the same time could be more 
effective than having only a deontological approach in the ethics of lawyers. The essence 
of virtue is to give a guide as to what morality is and what is should be. The essence of 
rules is to guide the conduct of man, and people of a society. Conflict could arise when 
laws are enacted without taking into consideration the basic moral principles of those 
who the laws were made for. 
 
If confidentiality is a seen as a moral principle in the practice of law, which could be 
interpreted as “virtue”, the compliance rules as stated in S3, S5 AND 25 of the MLPA 2011 
can be interpreted as a deontological approach in the AML regime. This is because these 
compliance laws are rules to guide the conduct of DNFI, which “must” be obeyed. 
Whatever ethical approach is adopted, an effective AML regime that would not 
undermine ethics of the legal profession should be the aim. Legal practitioners within 
Nigeria are of the opinion that the compliance laws in the AML regime, is an affront on 
the legal profession and undermines the virtues that lawyers are known for. The duty of 
confidentiality, which is embedded in the legal system, has its roots in Legal Practitioners 
Act [LPA]1975, the Rules of Professional Conduct 2007 [[RPC] and the Evidence Act 2011. 
However, this contradicts provisions in S3 and 5 of the MLPA 2011. 
 
S21 (2) of the LPA states as follows: 
 
“A bank shall not, in connection with any transaction in respect of an 
account of a legal practitioner kept for clients' moneys, with that or with 





 The failure to resolve this issue on a principled basis was recounted above in Chapter 2, where the courts imposed an 




specified beneficiary) incur any liability, or be under any obligation to 
make any inquiry, or be deemed to have any knowledge of any right of 
any person to any money paid or credited to the account, which it 
would not incur or be deemed to have in the case of an account kept 
by a person entitled absolutely to all the money paid or credited to the 
account.”353 
 
This provision in the above section appears to be clear and free from ambiguity. The 
provision implies that lawyers are not under any obligation, to a bank to disclose 
transactions that pass through their client accounts. From the interpretation of the 
section, it also means that lawyers do not owe their banks an explanation as to the source 
of funds, so long as it is credited through their client accounts. This could be one of the 
reasons why lawyers do not feel obliged to report disclose “suspicious” transactions to 
the EFCC. It is important to note that the LPA is the parent legislation that governs the 
legal profession in its entirety in Nigeria. 
 
The confidentiality principle is reinforced in Rule 19 of the Rules of Professional Conduct 
2007 [RPC]. It states as follows: 
 
“19 (1) Except as provided under sub-rule (3) of this rule, all oral or 
written communications made by a client to his lawyer in the normal 
course of professional employment are privileged. 
 
 Except as provided in sub-rule (3) of this rule, a lawyer shall not 
knowingly – 
 
 Reveal a confidence or secret of his client; 
 

















(c) Use a confidence or secret of his client for the advantage of himself 
or of a third person unless the client consents after full disclosure.”354 
 
R 19 of the RPC 2007 appears to be drafted with the intent to preserve to the virtues of 
the legal profession, which deals with keeping clients secret safe at all times. This is 
understandably so, as it can be argued that the patronage of the justice system, is 
dependent on the confidence of the litigant in lawyers who represent them. 
 
If there is no confidence of litigants or defendants in the lawyers of a particular justice 
system or jurisdiction, there may be a breakdown of law and order. Defendants and 
litigants may resort to self-help if they are not sure of effective representation by their 
lawyers, or their “secrets” are been made public. Why would a defendant, litigant, or 
client want to brief a lawyer when he/she is aware that information given to the lawyer 
would end up in the hands of the “opponents” or potential prosecutor [government/ 
regulatory authorities]? A client having confidence in a lawyer, knowing that details of his 
transactions will not be revealed to anybody including regulatory authorities is a virtue, 
which is based on trust. 
 
If for regulatory purpose of AML, the virtue of trust (confidentiality) is eroded, it could 
pose a real threat to the criminal justice system. If there is no meeting point between 
compliance rules in the AML regime and ethical practices among lawyers within the 
Nigerian Jurisdiction, neither the AML regime, the justice system nor the legal profession 
will be as effective as it should be. 
 
S192 of the Evidence ACT states as follows: 
 
“Professional communication between lawyer and client 
 
(1) No legal practitioner shall at any time be permitted, unless with his 
client’s express consent, to disclose any communication made to him 
in the course and for the purpose of his employment as such legal 
practitioner by or on behalf of his client, or to state the contents or 
condition of any document with which he has become acquainted in 










disclose any advice given by him to his client in the course and for the 
purpose of such employment: 
 
Provided that nothing in this section shall protect from disclosure – 
 
 
 Any such communication made in furtherance of any illegal 
purpose; 
 
 Any fact observed by any legal practitioner in the course of his 
employment as such showing that any crime or fraud has been 
 
committed since the commencement of his employment. 
 
 
(2)  It is immaterial whether the attention of such legal practitioner was 
 
or was not directed to such fact by or on behalf of his client. 
 
 The  obligation  stated  in  this  section  continues  after  the 
 
employment has ceased.”355 
 
 
The above provision is one of the reasons why lawyers in Nigeria have refused to obey 
compliance laws as stated in S3, and 5 of the MLPA 2011. Although, S 192 of the EA 2011 
prohibits lawyers from disclosing details and transactions of their clients. It can be argued 
further that the provisions in S 192 of the EA is a deontological approach to the conduct 
and ethics of lawyers. The provisions of the EA 2011 also strengthen the argument of 
contradiction of legislation, which should assist the AML regime in Nigeria. The EA 2011 is 
not a primary legislation regulating the AML regime. However, prosecutors cannot 
successfully prosecute anyone most especially lawyers for aiding money laundering 
without recourse to the EA 2011. This contradiction between the EA and the MLPA makes 
the job of a prosecutor much more difficult than it should have been. The application of 
this section of the EA could frustrate the AML regime from effectively regulating and 
prosecuting the core typology prevalent in Nigeria. 
 
If we argue that deontological ethics are centred on rules which must be obeyed, then we 









If lawyers believe that the reason why they should not disclose suspicious transactions of 
their clients to AML regulatory bodies, is based on the fundamental rule which is 
considered “sacrosanct”, then maybe confidentiality is another deontological approach. 
 
The dangerous implication of this is that some legal practitioners may not support the 
AML regime for their own selfish interest. Some bad elements within the legal profession 
can take advantage of the confidentiality provision as a standing rule and aid their clients 
in money laundering. Some lawyers may fall into the temptation of aiding PEP and high 
net worth individuals to launder funds that have been stolen. Lawyers who lack virtue 
could capitalise on the rules, which mandates confidentiality, and continually aid some 
PEP to impoverish the Nigerian state. PEP that commit money laundering offences may 
most likely engage the services of high-profile law firms. These firms would have accounts 
domiciled abroad and as gatekeepers, could fall into the temptation of assisting their 
clients in laundering funds outside the country. 
 
When there is an absence of virtue in a lawyer, it could be implied that the lawyer does 
not have a conscience. A conscience serves as a moral compass differentiating good from 
bad. This “conscience” or “morality” or “virtue” is very essential when following laid down 
rules and regulations. Hence the importance of an amalgamation between virtue and 
household deontology ethics when considering the role of lawyers in the AML regime. 
 
In certain jurisdictions like the British Colombia in Canada, lawyers are not obliged to 
report suspicious transactions of their clients. Lawyers are exempted from reporting 
requirements in their AML regime. 356 
 
In the case of the Law Society of B.C v A.G Canada, it was held that any financial reporting by 
lawyers amounts to an “unprecedented intrusion into the solicitor-client relationship”357 The 
Canadian position of confidentiality seems to be similar with that of Nigeria. 
 
Nigerian Bar Association v FGN & CBN, it was held that lawyers are not bound to obey S3 
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Professional conduct and the Legal Practitioners act. The reason the judge gave is that 
stringent regulatory measure are attached to the practice of law in Nigeria, and the 
admittance of lawyers into the bar in Nigeria is based on character and conduct.358 The 
interpretation of this judgement could mean that subjecting lawyers to report suspicious 
transactions of their clients based on the provisions in S3 and S5 of the MLPA 2011, might 
undermine the nobility of the profession and put the virtue of lawyers to test and possible 
ridicule. This judgement has caused a setback in integrating the role lawyers in the AML 
regime of Nigeria. 
 
If we agree that an effective AML regime is the ultimate goal, and we agree that lawyers 
are stakeholders in the AML regime, at what point should lawyers report transactions to 
regulatory bodies? At what point can lawyers be prosecuted for not disclosing suspicious 
transaction of their clients? Or at what point should the balance between the two values 
be made? 
 
These questions are pertinent to establish the role of lawyers in the AML regime in Nigeria. 
The conflict between the AML regime and the rules of confidentiality can be resolved if there 
is a confluence. This confluence would determine the extent to which the RPC 2007, LPA 1975 
and the EA 2011 can be applied, as against the provisions in S3 of the MLPA 2011. If 
regulatory authorities and prosecutors can establish “intent”, it is possible for lawyers to be 
successfully prosecuted on money laundering charges. Intent plays a pivotal role in addressing 
the confluence. This is because, if confidentiality is sacrosanct in the Nigerian justice system 
(as it is presently), would a lawyer knowingly aid and albeit his client in committing money 
laundering and hide under the defence of confidentiality? If a lawyer is aware that a client is 
about to commit money laundering, and proceeds to transact on behalf of the client, that 
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action, which can be argued that a lawyer owes a duty to prevent a client from carrying 
out money laundering offences by reporting the intended transaction. 
 
That duty to report should be mainly discretionary upon suspicion, that a client is about to 
engage in money laundering. It could be further argued that duty to report, “intended 
suspicious transactions” is a virtue. The lawyer may be reporting to prevent “bad things” 
from happening to the society, despite the strict professional rules attached to the 
profession. It is important to note that S192 of the EA is silent with regards to lawyers 
reporting future crimes of their clients. In this scenario common sense and virtue dictates 
that a lawyer should report “futuristic” suspicious activities. 
 
It could be further argued that the limitation to this is if a client has already committed an 
offence of money laundering, without the knowledge of the lawyer or before the client had 
briefed the lawyer. A scenario where the proceeds of crime has already been laundered 
before accepting brief of a client, the lawyer should be bound by confidentiality rules. At this 
point it would be unreasonable for a lawyer to report the offence of his client, even if it has 
just been discovered. Whether or not it is against the virtues or principles of the lawyer to be 
affiliated with or represent a money launderer, is immaterial at this point. 
 
However, there should a limit with regards to the application of confidentiality between 
lawyer and client. This limit can be applicable with future crimes or an intended crime. An 
intended crime means a crime that has not been committed at the time of briefing a 
lawyer but has been committed after briefing a lawyer, and the lawyer is aware that the 
client has committed a crime. At this point, a lawyer cannot fail to report such transaction 
because it has been brought to his attention that his client has committed the crime of 
money laundering. Hence, the application of the strict rule of confidentiality cannot be 
applicable at this point. A lawyer must act virtuously by reporting future money 
laundering offences carried out by his client. That in itself is virtue. 
 
There must be a limit and a meeting point (amalgamation/confluence) in the application 
of virtue and deontological ethics when examining the role of lawyers in the AML regime 
of Nigeria. A rigid approach on what lawyers should or should not do may not be the best 
for the AML regime. If there is no confluence of these ethical principles, the AML regime 





3.9 An Evaluation of Fuller’s Morality of Law and the Duty of Confidentiality in the Anti-
Money Laundering Regime in Nigeria. 
 
Fuller’s principles in Morality of Law deals with the fundamental elements and 
characteristics of valid laws. The effectiveness of a legal system is dependent on the rule 
of law and the applicability of principles that centre on the rule of law. For purpose of this 
evaluation, focus is on contradiction of laws. 
 
Fuller asserts that laws should not be contradictory.359 This is because a law cannot 
prohibit what another law requires. The contradiction of laws could be detrimental to 
Nigeria’s AML regime. The client confidentiality principle has made the Nigerian AML 
regime not as effective as it should be. This may be a contributing factor to the 
unsuccessful prosecution of PEP for money laundering offences, as the gathering of 
evidence may be more difficult. In some jurisdictions like the UK and the USA, the client-
attorney confidentiality has been eroded to accommodate their AML regime. In Nigeria, 
the confidentiality rule appears to have more acceptance from lawyers than the 
provisions in the MLPA 2011. The contradiction between S3 of the MLPA 2011 and S192 
of the EA 2011, S 19 RPC 2007 and S 21 LPA 1975 appears to be a problem facing the AML 
regime in Nigeria. This contradiction of laws has undermined the role of lawyers as DNFI 
in the AML regime. The rationale behind the inclusion of lawyers as DNFI is to aid 
investigation and possible prosecution of offenders in the AML regime.360 
 
The motive behind S3 of the MLPA 2011 is defeated if lawyers who are supposed to be 
gatekeepers, refuse to disclose suspicious transactions of their clients to regulatory 
authorities because of confidentiality laws. Some elements within the profession could back 
their argument, that they are requisite laws which prohibit them from disclosing the details of 
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non-disclosure is “bad”, there are contradictory laws that mandates the lawyer to 
disclose and otherwise. 
 
Fuller asserts once there is contradiction of laws, citizens would have to become selective 
on what law to obey and what law to disobey. The contradiction of laws in the AML 
regime in Nigeria, could incline lawyers to obey laws they want to obey and disobey laws 
they want to disobey. The problem this poses would be an allegiance to laws based on 
convenience or discretion. If it is not convenient for a lawyer to obey a law, then the law 
is disobeyed. Lawyers would most likely continue to prioritise their discretion towards 
client confidentiality rather than disclose details of transactions of their clients. If lawyers 
intentionally refuse to assist the AML regime in Nigeria, the prosecution of money 
laundering offenders would not be as effective as it should be.361 
 
Fuller also asserts that for an effective justice system, the rule of law must prevail. 
However, the rule of law can only prevail if there are laws that prohibit a particular crime, 
while these laws must not permit what another prohibits. It is the duty of legislators to 
make laws. We may argue that lawyers should not be given all the blame after all; lawyers 
did not enact the laws. 
 
The legislators [PEP] who included the provision for disclosure in the MLPA 2011, should 
have been aware that there is an existing law, which prohibits lawyers from disclosure. 
Legislators should have amended or expunged relevant sections in the RPC 2007, LPA 
1975 and the EA 2011, which mandates lawyers not to disclose before the enactment of 
the MLPA 2011. If the legislators who are also PEP, intend to address this issue of 
contradiction concerning disclosure, why haven’t they amended S19 RPC 2007, S192 EA 
2011 and S 21 LPA 1975? On the other hand, are legislators no longer empowered to 
make laws? Alternatively, could this be a complicity on the part of PEP to frustrate the 
AML regime in Nigeria? Whatever the reason may be, this is an avoidable contradiction of 
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The current judicial resolution of the contradiction of laws as explained above in Chapter 
2 is not ideal. It did resolve the contradiction, holding that laws governing legal 
responsibility to be overriding. This solution was effective but had the effect of 
undermining the AML regime to a large extent. A superior resolution of conflict has been 







Lawyers have an important role to play when dealing with prosecutorial discretion and 
money laundering. In most cases, the defence and the prosecution are lawyers. Both 
parties are governed by a code of conduct or ethics. The duty of confidentiality between 
an attorney and client in the AML regime in Nigeria has been criticized by AML regulators. 
Lawyers as DNFI cannot be compelled to disclose financial transactions to the EFCC and 
other regulatory bodies. This is because the Legal Practitioners Act 1975, the Evidence Act 
2011 and the Rules of Professional Conduct 2007 has created an enabling environment 
for lawyers not to disclose. This is the current position in Nigerian. 
 
Lawyers must not abuse the provisions of S192 of the Evidence Act of Nigeria and S 12& 
13 off the Legal Practitioners Act 1975. Lawyers must be ready to assist and cooperate 
with AML regulatory bodies for the successful prosecution of money laundering, 
particularly PEP. Lawyers who are involved in money laundering should be prosecuted by 
the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Committee [LPDC]. 
 
The LPDC should put in more effort in identifying lawyers who have violated their ethics 
and aided their clients in money laundering by prosecuting them. Client accounts and 
non-disclosure of financial transactions by lawyers should be reviewed by the Nigerian 
Bar Association and the General Council of the Bar with a view to an amendment on S 192 
of the Evidence Act 2011 and S13 & 21 of the LPA 1975. It is in the best interest of Nigeria 
and the AML regime for these laws to be reviewed. 
 
For an effective AML regime, lawyers should be able to report suspicious transactions of 
their clients to AML regulatory bodies. This would assist in the successful prosecution of 




Finally, the deontological approach of the ethics of lawyers in Nigeria should be reviewed. 
The system where rules are given and if these rules are not broken, then action taken by 
the lawyer is deemed right. This approach appears not to be as effective as anticipated. 
There should be an amalgamation between deontology and virtue ethics. Lawyers should 
be ready to willingly assist the AML regime in Nigeria because it is the right thing to do. 
The typology of money laundering offences in Nigeria, which is corruption and abuse of 
office by PEP, has caused enough damage to the development of the country. Lawyers 
should see themselves as a part of the country and owe a duty to the public to participate 
in the fixing of the country by fighting corruption and assisting the AML regime. This duty 
should be born out of the will to do what is right whether the Rules of Professional 
conduct permits them to do so. 
 
Prosecutors must also prosecute diligently and with regard to public interest. Prosecutors 
must understand that they are rendering a service to the nation by diligently prosecuting 
PEP who have stolen the nation’s wealth and have impoverished the people. Prosecutors 









































PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING REGIME IN NIGERIA 
 
 
4.1 The Role of and Independence of a Prosecutor 
 
The prosecutor plays significant role in the administration of justice in the criminal justice 
system of a nation. The prosecutor’s role is crucial to the efficacy of the criminal justice 
system more importantly; the independence of the prosecutor is essential to the 
appropriate application of prosecutorial discretion. 
 
This is because in exercising the role of a prosecutor, it is essential that the independence 
of the prosecutor is not in doubt hence, it undermines the integration of the rule of law in 
the application of discretionary powers of the prosecutor. 
 
Who is a prosecutor? A prosecutor is a person who institutes or conducts legal proceedings in 
court against persons who have committed criminal offences. Essentially, the function of a 
prosecutor is to proffer a charge against a defendant and prosecute the charge.362 
 
More recently, investigation has been accepted to be part of the role of a prosecutor in the 
administration of criminal justice. It is common these days to have prosecutors carry out 
investigative functions on cases they are prosecuting. Ideally, prosecutors ought to be lawyers 
with a special training on how to prosecute criminal cases, with the aim of seeing that justice 
is served against the defendant.363 This special training includes the application of 
prosecutorial discretion while dealing with criminal cases. Hence, a prosecutor should not be 
just a lawyer, but a lawyer with the emotional intelligence and skill in selecting the most 
applicable charge from a crime scenario. This emotional intelligence and skill in the selection 
of a charge from a crime scenario can be described as prosecutorial discretion. 
 
What is prosecutorial discretion? There are several definitions of prosecutorial discretion. 
In the case of Krieger v. Law Society of Alberta, the supreme court of Canada defined 
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“Prosecutorial discretion refers to the discretion exercised by the Attorney-
General in matters within his authority in relation to the prosecution of 
criminal offences. The Attorney-General is the chief law officer of the Crown 
and a member of the Cabinet. He heads a ministry of the government that 
exercises the authority over the administration of justice and the constitution 
and the maintenance and organization of the courts that is conferred upon the 
provincial government by the constitution”.364 
 
The Black’s Law dictionary defines prosecutorial discretion as the “ Discretionary powers 
exercised by the government's prosecution service such as whether to prosecute charge 
recommended by police, to stay an ongoing proceeding, plea bargaining, or the taking 
over of a private prosecution”.365 In simple terms, prosecutorial discretion can be defined 
as the powers vested on a particular individual or office with a choice on whether or not 
to prosecute criminal offences. 
 
These discretionary powers that are vested on an individual in the criminal justice system, 
is for the administration of justice. If the purpose of prosecutorial discretion is to 
administer justice then, the application of this discretionary power must be done with 
fairness, impartiality, integrity and in accordance to the rule of law.366 To maintain the 
integrity of prosecutors and to ensure that prosecutors apply this discretionary powers in 
accordance to the rule of law, nations must ensure that prosecutors can carry out their 
duties without undue influence, harassment, intimidation or any form of interference 
from the State or representatives of the state.367 Hence, the independence of the 
prosecutor is sacrosanct for prosecutors to carry out their functions in accordance to the 
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Also, prosecutors should be held accountable in carrying out their functions. The 
accountability of a prosecutor is as important as the independence of the prosecutor. 
There must be guidelines or checks and balances depending on the jurisdiction, to check 
the actions of prosecutors in the course of their duties. This is because, “over 
independence” of the prosecutor can be dangerous for the administration of justice.369 
There should be systems that can regulate the conduct of prosecutors to ensure that 
despite the independence of a prosecutor, the prosecutor is acting with fairness, equity 
and in accordance to the rule of law.370 
 
Principles regarding fairness of a prosecutor have been enforced a long time ago. In 
 
the United States of America in Berger v United States, the court said: 
 
“The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary 
party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern 
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all, and whose 
interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a 
case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very 
definite sense the servant of the law, the two-fold aim of which is that 
guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with 
earnestness and vigor – indeed, he should do so. But, while he may 
strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much 
his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a 
wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring 
about a just one.”371 
 
The importance of fairness in carrying out the functions of a prosecutor cannot be over 
emphasised, even as the supreme court said this in the above case, the Universal 
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presumption of innocence, right to fair hearing and an impartial prosecutorial system.372 
Furthermore the UN Havana guidelines attempt to ensure prosecutorial independence, 
fairness and meets with the requirements of international standards. In articles: 
 
 States shall ensure that prosecutors are able to perform their professional 
functions 
 
without intimidation, hindrance, harassment, improper interference or 
unjustified exposure to civil, penal or other liability ………… 
 
(10) The office of prosecutors shall be strictly separated from judicial 
functions…………. 
 
(13) In the performance of their duties, prosecutors shall: 
 
(a) Carry out their functions impartially and avoid all political, social, religious, 
racial, cultural, sexual, or any other kind of discrimination ……………….. (b) … 
act with objectivity … 
 
Also, the International Association of Prosecutors, [IAP] the only global association for 
prosecutors and prosecution agencies, established in 1995 have also given standards 
which prosecutors must meet.373 The IAP standards provide: 
 
(2.1) The use of prosecutorial discretion, when permitted in a particular 
jurisdiction, 
 
should be exercised independently and be free from political interference. 
(2.2) If non-prosecutorial authorities have the right to give general or specific 




 consistent with lawful authority. 
 
 subject to established guidelines to safeguard the actuality and the 
 
perception of prosecutorial independence. 
 
(2.3) Any right of non-prosecutorial authorities to direct the institution of 






 Prosecution Independence and Accountability: Principles, Challenges and Recommendations[2017] Commonwealth Law 





The IAP standards enforces the concept of independence of a prosecutor, however 
in enforcing this concept emphasis on fairness is laid. The independence of the 
prosecutor would not only immune the prosecutor from undue interference from 
the agents of the state, particularly when prosecuting high profile persons, but also 
immune the criminal justice system from undue interference. For justice to be 
served on defendants in criminal trials, the prosecution must be independent. This 
might also be one of the challenges of the AML regime in Nigeria. Since 
prosecutorial Independence is subject to the discretion of the AG, prosecutorial 
agencies cannot prosecute without the consent of the AG, knowing also that the AG 
possesses powers to discontinue trial without the consent of the prosecutors.374 
This poses a problem in the administration of criminal justice, undermines the 
principles of the rule of law and can erode public confidence in the justice system. 
This is because justice must not be done but be seen to done. 
 
Hence, for justice to be seen to be done, prosecutorial accountability is another 
issue that must be considered. The executive and the legislative branch of 
governments in nations must be able to hold their prosecutors to account. 
Prosecutors must be seen to be carrying out their duties within the limits of the law, 
therefore securing convictions by any means shouldn’t be the focus of a prosecutor. 
A prosecutor should be more interested in ensuring that he carries out his duties 
with respect to public interest and justice, certainly not with the motive of securing 
a conviction at all cost.375 Hence, there must be a mechanism to check the activities 
of prosecutors in ensuring that they are acting within the limits of the law. 
 
The special rapporteur between on the independence of Judges and lawyers stated: 
“The fair, independent and impartial administration of justice also requires 
prosecutors to be held to account should they not fulfil their functions in 















Special Rapporteur emphasizes that autonomy should not exist to the 
detriment of accountability.”376 
 
This further emphasis the need to hold prosecutors accountable alongside with enforcing 
their independence. Hence, to make prosecutors accountable, members of the public 
owe a collective responsibility, the media, courts, professional associations and of course 
the judiciary in ensuring that prosecutors act in accordance to the rule of law, where 
fairness and equality before the law will not be in doubt. 
 
4.2 Constitutional Role of the Attorney General in Prosecutorial Discretion 
 
Having discussed the AML regime of Nigeria in chapter 2, it is important to give a critical 
analysis of the role of the AG and the application of prosecutorial discretion in the 
criminal justice system, which gives birth to the AML regime of Nigeria. 
 
In the Nigeria’s criminal justice system, the AG is vested with an enormous responsibility 
and discretionary powers. The AG has Tripartite roles. First, the occupant of the office of 
AG doubles as the minister for justice. This dual function of the AG is vested in S 150 of 
the 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. It states as follows: 
 
“ (1) There shall be an Attorney-General of the Federation who shall be 
the Chief Law Officer of the Federation and a Minister of the 
Government of the Federation. 
 
 A person shall not be qualified to hold or perform the functions of 
the office of the Attorney-General of the Federation unless he is 
qualified to practise as a legal practitioner in Nigeria and has been so 
 
qualified for not less than ten years.”377 
 
The responsibility of the Ministry of Justice is to oversee the general administration of the 
justice system, for the easy dispensation of justice. This ministerial responsibility is carried 
out by the minister/AG and any person the minister delegates the responsibility to. The 
second responsibility of the office of the AG is to provide legal representation on disputes 
 
 









that concern the government and proffer legal advice where necessary.378 The third 
responsibility, which is essential to this research is the prosecutorial responsibility 
attached to the office of the AG. The office of the AG is responsible for the 
commencement of criminal proceedings in court, irrespective of the nature of the crime. 
 
It is important that a distinction is made between the office of the AG and the incumbent of 
the office. As stated in s.150, of the Nigerian Constitution 1999, the office of the AG is the 
only ministerial role which is created by the constitution. The office of the AG does not only 
institute proceeding on behalf of the government but also represents the government when 
criminal and civil claims are brought against the state. The office of the AG plays a 
constitutional role, which therefore derives its powers from constitution. The distinction 
between the office of the AG and the occupant of the office has been substantiated in the 
case of, Attorney General of the Federation v All NigeriaPeople’s Party.379 
 
In this case an appeal to the supreme court of Nigeria was filed after the dissolution of the 
executive council by the President. The AG being a member of the executive council, was 
affected by the dissolution. A preliminary objection was raised on the grounds that there 
was no valid appeal, since there was no occupant of the office of the AG at that time. The 
supreme court overruled the preliminary objection and defined the office of the attorney 
general as a corporate person who can sue and be sued. The supreme court stated that: 
 
“An office created by the Constitution though occupied at any given time 
by a natural person as a constitutional office, is a corporation sole, and 
having regard to the functions conferred on it by the Constitution, it can 
be safely said to be a public authority. As a public authority and a 
corporation, it is a legal person that can sue and be sued. Thus, the office 
of the Attorney General of the Federation is different and distinct from 
the person occupying it. And so, while the office continues in perpetuity 
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could leave the office at the expiration of his tenure or upon his 
removal as the case may be”. 
 
If we follow the judgment of the Supreme Court, with regards to the distinction between 
the office of the AG and the occupant of the office, it can be argued that the prosecutorial 
powers vested on the AG is as a result of the office and not the occupant. There have 
been several AG’s since Nigeria’s independence and there will be more. The provisions of 
S174 of the constitution of Nigeria 1999, vests powers on the occupant of the office. If we 
go by the interpretation in the All Nigeria Peoples party case, it means that when an 
occupant vacates the office, all powers and liabilities that accrue with the office remains 
in the office. It also means that once the occupant of the office vacates the office, the 
person can no longer institute proceedings in court or constitute legal representation on 
behalf of the government.380 
 
The office of the AG is central to the criminal justice system in Nigeria, the implication of 
the central role the AG plays demands for delegated responsibility. It may be almost 
impossible for the AG to personally carry out all the functions of the office, without any 
form of delegated duties roles. Hence, the directorate of public prosecution [DPP], is 
directly responsible for the prosecution of criminal trial in court.381 This office is headed 
by a director who acts on the instruction of the AG. The directorate of public prosecution 
assist’s the AG in carrying out a key constitutional requirement which is to prosecute 
criminal offences. 
 
One of the delegated functions of the DPP, is the application of prosecutorial discretion in the 
criminal justice system. For practical purposes, the AG cannot personally institute criminal 
proceedings in court against a defendant. By virtue of the enormous responsibilities attached 
to the office, there is a high tendency that the primary ingredient of prosecutorial 
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of prosecutorial duties falls within the powers of the AG. These are some practical 
realities of the prosecutorial system in Nigeria. 
 
S 174 of the 1999 constitution makes provision for the powers of the AG. It states: 
 
“(1) The Attorney-General of the Federation shall have power - 
 
 to institute and undertake criminal proceedings against any person 
before any court of law in Nigeria, other than a court-martial, in respect 
of any offence created by or under any Act of the National Assembly; 
 
 to take over and continue any such criminal proceedings that may 
have been instituted by any other authority or person; and 
 
 to discontinue at any stage before judgement is delivered any such 
criminal proceedings instituted or undertaken by him or any other 
authority or person. 
 
 The powers conferred upon the Attorney-General of the Federation 
under subsection (1) of this section may be exercised by him in person 
or through officers of his department. 
 
 In exercising his powers under this section, the Attorney-General of 
the Federation shall have regard to the public interest, the interest of 
 
justice and the need to prevent abuse of legal process.”382 
 
From the above quotation, it is evident that the office of the AG is central to the 
prosecutorial system and also plays a constitutional role in the administration of the 
criminal justice system in Nigeria. If the powers of the AG emanate from the constitution 
and it settled law that the constitution of any democratic society is supreme, it can be 
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This argument is important because some government agencies that have prosecutorial 
powers have attempted to prosecute criminal charges, without the authorisation of the 
AG. The argument of the administrators of these agencies is that, it is within the enabling 
legislation of these agencies to prosecute offences which these agencies were created to 
regulate.384 
 
For example, the AML regime in Nigeria is primarily regulated by two agencies established by 
statute. The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission Act 2004 [EFCC] and the 
Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Act 2000 [ICPC]. These two AML 
regulatory agencies can investigate and prosecute money laundering offences. If we agree, 
that money laundering offences are criminal in nature, then we can further argue that despite 
the enabling laws which empowers the EFCC and the ICPC to prosecute money laundering 
related offences, the consent of the AG is needed to prosecute. Since the AG is the primary 
custodian of prosecutorial discretion in the criminal justice system in Nigeria.385 
 
If we agree with the previous argument, then certain critical questions should be asked. Is 
there a need to integrate prosecutorial powers in the establishment act of government 
agencies, when the application of prosecutorial discretion by government agencies is 
limited and its subject to the approval of the office of the AG? Are the prosecutorial 
powers by government agencies not contradicting the provisions of S174 of the 
constitution of Nigeria? If there is a conflict between the constitution of the country and 
any other legislation/law which should prevail? 
 
Despite the constitutional and central role the AG plays with regards to prosecutorial 
discretion, the bureaucracy and the extent of responsibility reposed on the AG may make 
it unrealistic for the AG to personally be involved In all prosecutions. The reason why 
government agencies are empowered to prosecute is for the easy administration of the 
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could be the reason why the enabling laws that govern these agencies, permits them to 
prosecute. 
 
It can be argued further that, government agencies with enabling laws to prosecute, do 
not in any way undermine the prosecutorial powers of the AG as the sole administrator of 
prosecutorial discretion. This is because when there is a conflict of laws, the superior law 
should prevail.386 
 
The apex law which governs the administration of a nation is the constitution. If there is 
conflict between any provision of the constitution and other laws enacted by the 
parliament of a nation, the ideal is that the constitutional provision prevails over any 
other legislation. It should not be any different in the Nigerian state. S1 of the constitution 
of the federal republic of Nigeria states: 
 
“1. (1) This Constitution is supreme, and its provisions shall have 
binding force on the authorities and persons throughout the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria. 
 
 The Federal Republic of Nigeria shall not be governed, nor shall any 
persons or group of persons take control of the Government of Nigeria 
or any part thereof, except in accordance with the provisions of this 
Constitution. 
 
 If any other law is inconsistent with the provisions of this 
Constitution, this Constitution shall prevail, and that other law shall, to 
 
the extent of the inconsistency, be void.”387 
 
From the provisions of S1, and S1(3) of the Nigerian constitution 1999, it could be interpreted 
to mean that if there is a conflict of laws within the nation, the provision of the constitution is 
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prosecute all money laundering offences in accordance with any of the AML legislations in 
 
Nigeria. S13(2) of the EFCC ACT 2004 states: 
 
“(2) The Legal and Prosecution Unit shall be charged with responsibility 
for – 
 
 Prosecuting offenders under this Act; (b) Supporting the general 
and assets investigation unit by providing the unit with legal advice and 
assistance whenever it is required; 
 
 Conducting such proceedings as may be necessary towards the 
recovery of any assets or property forfeited under this Act; (d) 
Performing such other legal duties as the Commission may refer to it 
 
from time to time”388 
 
It can be further interpreted that, if there is a conflict between S174 of the constitution 
which empowers the AG to institute criminal proceedings and S13 (2) of the EFCC ACT 
2004 which empowers the AML commission to prosecute money laundering offences, S 
174 of the constitution should prevail. This is because the constitution which the AG 
derives powers from, is the supreme law in the nation. 
 
Furthermore, another important legislation with specific responsibility for the 
administration of justice in Nigeria is the Administration of Criminal Justice Act 
2015[ACJA]. The powers of the AG with regards to criminal prosecution is stated in S 104 
and S105 of the ACJA. It states: 
 
“104.The Attorney-General of the Federation may proffer information 
in any court in respect of an offence created by an Act of the National 
Assembly. 
 
 The Attorney General of the Federation may authorize any other 











Information by the Attorney General. 
 
105.(1) The Attorney General of the Federation may issue legal advice or 
such other directive to the Police or any other law enforcement agency in 
respect of an offence created by an Act of the National Assembly. 
 
 Where any proceeding is pending in respect of the offence for which 
legal advice or other direction referred to in subsection (1) of this section 
is given, a copy of the legal advice or direction shall be forwarded by the 
Attorney General of the Federation or Director of Public Prosecutions to 
the court before whom the proceeding is pending. 
 
 The Attorney-General of the Federation may request from the 
Police or any other agency for the case file in any matter in respect of 
an offence created by an Act of the National Assembly and the Police 
or other agency shall immediately send the case file as requested”389 
 
The provisions in S104 and 105 of the ACJA 2015, reinforces the provision of S174 of the 
constitution of Nigeria, which empowers the AG as the “sole administrator” of 
prosecutorial discretion in the criminal justice system in Nigeria. 
 
There are problems associated with the sole discretionary powers allocated to the AG by 
the constitution and the ACJA. These sole discretionary powers can be likened to the 
problems of monopoly that most economist frown upon. One of the problems associated 
with monopolistic powers in a nation’s economy, is the inability for the consumers to 
have access to an efficient alternative.390 
 
The same monopolistic tendencies appear be applicable to the criminal justice of Nigeria. The 
sole administration of prosecutorial discretion in the criminal justice system of Nigeria by the 
AG, appears to be a dangerous but legal reality. This is because the discretionary powers 
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constitution. This could be interpreted to mean that the alternative means of prosecution 
which are government agencies with prosecutorial powers cannot be as effective as they 
ought to be. This is primarily because the discretion to prosecute criminal offences could 
be subjected to the approval of the AG, if the AG so wishes. The AG’s oversight and 
ultimate power to determine issues could be dangerous to the development of the 
criminal justice system and branches under the criminal justice system. 
 
This system could be best described as a “monopolistic prosecutorial system”, where the 
AG controls and dictates the narrative of the prosecutorial system in Nigeria. This could 
be dangerous for an effective criminal justice system. Such control creates an opportunity 
for abuse of powers by the AG in the application of prosecutorial discretion, which 
negates the principles of rule of law.391 The powers to determine whom to prosecute 
should not be subjected to the approval of the occupant of an office, where government 
agencies have been given independent prosecutorial powers.392 
 
4.3 Powers of the AG to Discontinue Criminal Proceedings, “Nolle Prosqui” as a 
Discretionary Technique of Prosecution 
 
The powers of the AG is not limited only to commencement of Criminal cases, the AG also 
possesses powers to discontinue cases that are being tried by courts of competent 
jurisdiction. This process traditionally known as “nolle prosequi” which means a notice of 
discontinuance, can be issued by the AG to stop all criminal proceedings against the 
defendant. The AG possesses powers to issue a notice of discontinuance to the 
prosecutors and a written notice to the court, informing the courts of the intention to 
withdraw all criminal charges against an accused. 
 
This notice of discontinuance can be issued to the courts even before judgement is delivered, 
irrespective of the nature of the offence that is been tried by the courts.393 This discretionary 
powers to discontinue criminal cases is a constitutional provision as seen in S 
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174 (1)(b)and (c) of the constitution of the federal republic of Nigeria 1999.394 From the 
provisions in S174(b)and(c),we could interpret that, the powers to discontinue criminal 
proceeding against an accused is not only limited to charges instituted by the AG, but also 
charges instituted by any delegated authority with prosecutorial powers. Delegated 
authorities with prosecutorial powers mean, all agencies of government with 
prosecutorial functions including the EFCC. This can be interpreted to mean that, the AG 
can discontinue cases instituted by AML regulatory agencies in court.395 This could be a 
challenge for an effective AML regime in Nigeria. The EFCC, ICPC and other stakeholders 
of the AML regime in Nigeria cannot operate independently without interference from an 
“external force” outside these organisations, in this case the AG. 
 
Apart from the provisions in S174 of the constitution of Nigeria, which gives the AG 
powers to discontinue criminal proceedings, the primary legislation responsible for the 
administration of the criminal justice system, ACJA 2015, also gives powers to the AG to 
discontinue criminal proceedings. S 107 and 108 of the ACJA 2015, states: 
 
“(1) In any criminal proceeding for an offence created by an Act of the 
National Assembly, and at any stage of the proceeding before 
judgment, the Attorney-General of the Federation may discontinue the 
proceedings either by stating in court or informing the court in writing 
that the Attorney-General of the Federation intends that the 
proceeding shall not continue and based on the notice the suspect shall 
immediately be discharged in respect of the charge or information for 
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 Where the suspect:(a) has been committed to prison, he shall be 
released; or 
 
(b) is on bail, the recognizance shall be discharged. 
 
 Where the suspect is not:(a) before the court when the 
discontinuance is entered, the registrar or other proper officer of the 
court shall immediately cause notice in writing of the entry of the 
discontinuance to be given to the officer in charge of the prison or 
other place in which the suspect may be detained and the notice shall 
be sufficient authority to discharge the suspect or) in custody the court 
shall immediately cause notice in writing to be given to the suspect and 
his sureties and shall in either case cause a similar notice in writing to 
be given to any witness bound over to prosecute. 
 
 Where discontinuance is entered in accordance with the provisions 
of this section, the discharge of a suspect shall not operate as a bar to 
any subsequent proceeding against him on account of the same facts. 
 
108.(1) In any trial or proceeding before a court, a prosecutor may, or 
on the instruction of the Attorney-General of the Federation, in case of 
offence against an Act of the National Assembly, may, at any stage 
before judgment is pronounced, withdraw the charge against any 
defendant either generally or in respect of one or more of the offences 
with which the defendant is charged”396 
 
From the provisions in S107 and S108 of the ACJA 2015, the application of notice of 
discontinuance by the AG, is discretionary and is not subject to approval or ratification from 
any authority or regulatory body. Despite it being constitutional for the AG to discontinue 
criminal proceedings, as stated in S174 of the constitution and S107&108 of the ACJA, this 
position has been put to question before the courts and it has been upheld by the supreme 










“For the reasons which given therein, I would dismiss the appeal. I 
would, however, like to stress the following points which I consider 
pertinent. The Attorney-General of a State in Nigeria has many powers 
and duties with regard to criminal proceedings in respect of any 
offence created by or under any law of the House of Assembly of the 
State. These powers are clearly spelt out in section 191 of the 1979 
Constitution. He may, for example, stop any prosecution under a State 
Law by entering a nolle prosequi. He need not give any reasons for his 
decision. All he needed to do when deciding to discontinue any such 
criminal proceedings at any stage of the proceedings is to "have regard 
to the public interest, the interest of justice, and the need to prevent 
abuse of legal process." A number of factors, known to the Attorney-
General, must, of necessity, come to his mind when he decides 
whether to prosecute or not. It may not be in the public interest to 
disclose any of these. 
 
To my knowledge, and presumably for these reasons, the courts have 
never sought to interfere with the exercise of that power. That is how it 
should be, bearing in mind that the Attorney-General is the principal 
law officer of the State coupled with the fact that he should not be 
subjected to any pressure either by the Executive or by the Courts in 
the exercise of this enormous power. 
 
Incidentally, the Attorney-General of the Federation has the same pow-
ers and duties under section 160 of the same Constitution with regard to 
criminal proceedings in respect of any offence created by or under any 
Act of the National Assembly. It must, of course, be understood that any 
Attorney-General, be he the Attorney-General of the Federation or of a 
State, is answerable for his actions not only to his appointor, but also to 
the National or State Assembly as the case may be. He is, of course, also 
subject to the comments, favorable or otherwise, of the members of the 
legal profession and to the glaring scrutiny of public opinion. It may not 




general aversion to mixing politics with the enforcement of the criminal 
law. The supreme importance of maintaining the independence of the 
Attorney-General when discharging his responsibility, inherent in his 
office, for the proper administration of the criminal law must, therefore, 
be emphasized. For all these reasons, it cannot be too strongly stressed 
that this preeminent position of the Attorney-General with respect to 
criminal proceedings in our Constitution carries with it grave and onerous 
responsibility which should not be discharged with levity. Because of this, 
it is of paramount importance that when an Attorney-General is being 
appointed, the appointor should, at all times, bear in mind the integrity, 
ability, experience, and maturity required of the person holding this high 
and important office. He should be a person who, in the discharge of his 
duties, will always have regard to the public interest, the interest of 
justice, and to the need to prevent any abuse of legal process."397 
 
 
From judgement in Ilori’s case, the supreme court has clarified the application of a notice 
of discontinuance in the criminal justice system as, a technique at the discretion of the 
AG, which is not subject to approval from any person or authority before it is applied, nor 
any substantive review by the court after its application.398 The danger of this 
“monopoly” in determining what case to withdraw and what not to withdraw is that, 
there could be a potential abuse of powers by the AG. Hence there is a constitutional 
provision in S174(3) which provides that, the application of a notice of discontinuance by 
the AG must be in the public’s interest. 
 
In the case of FRN v Danjuma Goje, the defendant was being prosecuted by the EFCC for 
misappropriation of public funds, to the tune of 6 Billion Naira [$ 40,000,000] and money 
laundering, while he was governor of Gombe state. The EFCC commenced his prosecution 












on a 21count charge. The EFCC commenced his prosecution in 2011 however, on the 9th 
of June 2019, the AG used his discretionary powers by entering a notice of discontinuance 
before the courts. This was done without the knowledge of the EFCC, as the EFCC insisted 
the case must continue. The courts held that the AG’s decision is supreme, and that 
despite the EFCC having discretionary powers to prosecute, the AG is the chief prosecutor 
of the country and his discretionary decision cannot be questioned.399 It is important to 
note that this case was not reported in any law report, yet it is the most recent landmark 
decision with regards to the application of notice of discontinuance on money laundering 
cases. However, part of the application for the notice of discontinuance by the 
representative of the AGF goes as follows: 
 
“My Lord, we have an application having taken over the case and reviewed the 21 count 
charges. As it is, the Federal Ministry of Justice wishes to withdraw all charges against the 
accused persons 
 
“This action is in line with the power vested on the AGF by virtue of section 128 of the 
Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015 particularly sub section 1 of that section (128). 
 
It’s in accordance with the power vested on the AGF by the constitution that we wish to 
withdraw the charges before your Lordship. This is our humble application and urge your 
Lordship to grant our application”. 
 
The counsel to the defendant, Niyi Akintola [SAN] stated: 
 
“My Lord, we are not opposing the application but we are urging your Lordship to evoke the 
provision of section 2(a)(b) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015 and acquit them 
of the charges. The same section gives your Lordship the discretionary power to make an order 
for the accused persons to be discharged and acquitted. My Lord have the power under 
Section III.As we urge your Lordship to consider our humble application, we wish thank you for 
your patience with us since 2011 when we started this journey on the case. We also wish to 
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Justice Quadiri, in his ruling, said pursuant to Section 174(1) particularly sub-section (b) 
and coupled with Section 108 (2) of 2015, “the application by the AGF to withdraw the 
charges is hereby granted.” 
 
The Goje’s case is an example of the AG’s miss-use prosecutorial powers and undermining 
the AML regime in Nigeria. A public official who is been prosecuted for allegedly stealing 
funds that could have been used for the development his state, is been protected by an 
AG who chooses to invoke his powers whenever he so wishes, might not be acting in the 
interest of the public.401 Why did the AG discontinue the trial after 8 years of prosecution 
by the EFCC? Did the AG act in the interest of the public before taking the decision to 
discontinue proceedings? These are questions that might be left unanswered and the 
citizens might never get an explanation for. 
 
If the decision of the AG is subject to judicial review, it would make it impossible for an AG 
to abuse his discretionary powers in the application of a notice of discontinuance. Goje’s 
case, which was been prosecuted for 8 years, is suddenly withdrawn by the AG raises 
some suspicion. However, it is sad that this suspicion cannot be put to questions as 
decisions taken by the AG cannot be subject to judicial review nor can be questioned. It 
means that the application of the phrase “interest of justice” as seen in S 174 (3) is highly 
subjective. Hence, it could be that the AG acted in the interest of justice by withdrawing 
the Goje’s case. This is disappointing. 
 
Despite that S174 of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria makes the AG the 
sole custodian of prosecutorial powers, S174(3) tries to limit the mode of application of 
these powers. However, the attempt to limit these powers appears to be vague as the 
interpretation of the “interest of Justice” is determined by the same AG. An AG who is 
interested in discontinuing the prosecution of a PEP for personal reasons can possibly 
defend his actions by claiming it was done in the interest of justice. After all, S 174 also 
states that the AG has the powers to take over or discontinue the prosecution of a case 
instituted by any person or authority at any stage before judgement is given. This means 









and defend the action using the phrase, “interest of justice”. Hence the limitation in 
S174(3) is not legally enforceable and sound. 
 
Again, there appeared to be a contradiction between S174(1), (2) and S174(3) of the 
constitution. This is because it is almost impossible to insist that the AG acts in the 
interest of justice as stated in S 174(3), when the S174(1)(2) gives him powers to act with 
less accountability or checks and balance. The fact that the same section of the 
constitution gives powers of the AG to discontinue a case at any time of prosecution, 
before judgement, risks an abuse of the legal process. This can make the AG not to act in 
the interest of Justice. Hence a part of a law prohibits what another permits. This in itself 
is the same problem which Fuller identifies in his inner morality of law.402 The implicit 
contradiction of both sub sections has created an opportunity for a power intoxicated AG 
to abuse court process and not act in the interest of the public if he so choses. 
 
More so, there ought to be clear guidelines or rules as to when and how the AG can 
takeover or discontinue criminal proceedings on a case. These discretionary powers to 
discontinue criminal proceeding should be guided by set rules. These rules would set 
certain standards a case or trial must meet, before the AG can utilize the part of his 
powers which allows for a discontinuance and the takeover of a case. This must be done 
to avoid a situation where those who ought to be custodians of the principles of the rule 
of law become the ones who violate the rule of law. 
 
Hence, there must be a working mechanism in the constitution which checks the powers 
of the AG in other to avoid an abuse of legal process, the justice system and the AML 
regime in Nigeria. 
 
However, the application of S 174(3) of the constitution appears not to be practicable within 
the scheme of the Nigerian criminal justice system. This is because the AG’s powers with 
regards to the application of this prosecutorial technique, appears not to be subject to 
approval or ratification from any other authority. Hence, who determines public interest? It 
seems that the determination of what constitutes public interest with regards to the 
application of a notice of discontinuance is subjective, more so subjective only to the 
 
 





AG. It means the AG could chose to act on “public interest” and withdraw the prosecution 
of a criminal case of a friend, or someone who is influential and powerful in the society. 
The withdrawal of a criminal case of a PEP, could be anchored on public interest, since the 
AG does not need to explain or justify to anyone the circumstances surrounding the 
“public interest” driven decision that has been taken. This could be dangerous. 
 
Taking a further look at this prosecutorial technique, certain questions can be asked. 
What guides the decision of the AG in the application of a notice of discontinuance on 
criminal cases? Is the application of a notice of discontinuance by the AG in accordance to 
the rule of law despite the AG’s discretionary powers? 
 
We could argue that the AG is the chief law enforcement officer of the country.403 If this 
is the case, the AG owes it as a duty to maintain the rule of law in the society. To attain a 
progressive society, the application of the rule of law through law and order in the daily 
activities of members of the society is paramount. This “application” could be interpreted 
as an enforcement of law and order.404 In the application of law and order, it must be 
done in accordance to the rule of law, which emphasises on equity and good conscience. 
The application of this prosecutorial technique must be done in accordance to the rule of 
law. A Notice of Discontinuance by the AG should not be used as a technique to stop 
prosecution of PEP or persons who are privileged in the society. This discretionary powers 
by the AG should be applied with caution and equity, in other to achieve a just society and 
an effective criminal justice system. 
 
It could be argued further that, there should be a significant ethical consideration in the 
application of a Notice of Discontinuance on criminal cases by the AG, if the AG’s primary 
duty is to maintain law and order in the society. The integrity of the occupant of the office 
of the AG should not be in doubt or else, it could send a wrong message to members of 
the society that the occupant of the office might be compromised. Hence the important 
of virtue ethics. If Aristotle argues that virtue looks at the moral nature an action that has 
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the moral nature of the case should be a guiding factor in the application of a Notice of 
Discontinuance on criminal cases. 
 
Proponents of virtue ethics argue that, what is good is good and what is bad is bad. It 
means that for the greater good of a society, there must always be a moral consciousness 
to do the right thing. Deontologist would argue that in the application of a notice of 
discontinuance in a criminal case, the laws are clear and should be respected whether or 
not it passes a moral test. Proponents of deontology could argue further that, if we allow 
the conscience/ virtue to determine whether or not to apply laid down rules and 
regulations, then it could bring a state of lawlessness. Lawlessness in the sense that 
members of a society might not see a need to follow rules and regulations but do what is 
“good” in accordance to their conscience, which is also dangerous as it is subjective.405 
 
The amalgamation of virtue ethics and deontology might seem to be a workable path in 
the application of a Notice of Discontinuance in the criminal justice system of Nigeria. 
Since the AG has exclusive discretion in applying this prosecutorial technique by virtue of 
S174 of the constitution and S108 of the ACJA 2015, which can be interpreted as a 
deontological approach, the moral consciousness of doing what is “good” must be 
applied. This moral consciousness by the AG which can be interpreted as public interest in 
this regard, is virtue on its own. Hence, the importance of an amalgamation of virtue and 
deontological ethics in the application of a nolle prosequi [notice of discontinuance]. 
When and if this amalgamation is done in the application of this prosecutorial technique, 
the principle of public interest and good faith will be the focal point of any AG. 
 
4.7 Plea Bargain as a Prosecutorial Discretionary Technique in the Criminal Justice 
System of Nigeria 
 
Plea bargain has been a prosecutorial technique in several jurisdictions particularly in the 
UK and the USA. However, the concept of plea bargain as a prosecutorial technique in the 
criminal justice system of Nigeria has been alien until as recent as 2011. Prior to the 
integration of plea bargain in Nigeria’s criminal justice system, the criminal justice system 









system appeared to be more interested in securing a conviction at any expense without 
considering the weight of the evidence in connection with the charge.406 
 
Taxpayers money was spent on prosecuting bogus charges that could ideally have been 
“negotiated” between the prosecution and the defendant. A considerable amount of time 
is also spent in the attempt to adduce evidence on each charge, which on its own slows 
down the administration of justice.407 This is also because, there are a limited number of 
judges in the entire justice system. These judges hear both criminal and civil cases that 
are filed to them and if more time is spent unnecessarily in the hearing of a case, which 
could be as a result of cumbersome charges and poor use of prosecutorial discretion, the 
entirety of the justice system Is delayed.408 Hence, these among others could be reason 
for the integration of plea bargain in the criminal justice system in Nigeria. 
 
For a critical analysis, it is important we understand the meaning and concept of plea 
bargain. What is plea bargain? According to the Black’s law dictionary, plea bargain can be 
defined as “the negotiation of an agreement between the prosecution and the defence 
whereby the defendant pleads guilty to a lesser offense or to one or some of multiple 
offenses usually in exchange for more lenient sentencing recommendations, a specific 
sentence, or dismissal of other charges”.409 
 
The concept of plea bargain can be classified into two. Charge bargain and sentencing 
bargain. The idea of charge bargain is when the defendant negotiates with the prosecution to 
plead guilty on a lesser crime. when this happens, the prosecutor expunges the more serious 
crimes and charges the defendant on the lesser crime. While the concept of sentencing 
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because all sides i.e. the prosecution and defence have agreed on what sentence to 
recommend to the judge. 
 
It is important to note that the criminal justice system of Nigeria accommodates any form 
of “negotiated sentencing”. The scope of prosecutorial discretion in Nigeria’s criminal 
justice system permits the integration of negotiated sentencing to plea bargain. However, 
it is at the discretion of a judge to determine what sentence to give, with regards to the 
extant laws of the country.410 
 
The concept of plea bargain as a prosecutorial technique ideally is to make the job easier for 
the prosecution. It could be argued that the ultimate beneficiary the integration of plea 
bargain in the prosecutorial system is the prosecutor and not the defendant. However, the 
defendant also enjoys certain benefits by agreeing to a plea bargain. The primary benefit the 
defendant enjoys is the opportunity to be charged on a lesser offence on the condition that 
the defendant pleads guilty to the lesser charge. This implies that the defendant upon 
conviction could be sentenced to a much lesser punishment than he would have got, if he 
hadn’t entered a plea bargain. It also saves the defendant the psychological torture of the 
prosecutorial process and a lengthy trial with the thought’s conviction. On the other hand, 
the time and money spent by the prosecution and indeed taxpayers is significantly reduced 
when a defendant enters a plea bargain. The time that would have been spent in the 
prosecutorial process and the admissibility of evidence on the charge against the defendant, 
is saved once a defendant agrees to the terms of a plea bargain agreement. 411 Hence, the 
primary beneficiaries of the concept of plea bargain is the defence, due to the high probability 
of getting a lighter sentence and the prosecution for the time saved and the avoidance of the 
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prosecutorial discretion in the AML regime of Nigeria is limited to charge bargain, as 
sentencing bargain is an uncommon practice within the jurisdiction. 
 
4.8 The Application of Plea Bargain as a Prosecutorial Technique in the Administration 
of Justice in Nigeria. 
 
Some legal scholars have named this prosecutorial technique as “negotiated justice”. The 
negotiation between the defendant and the prosecutor could have a positive impact on a 
nations criminal justice system, particularly with regards to speedy dispensation of 
justice.413 However, it could be argued that the concept of plea bargain or “negotiated 
justice” as some would call it could have a negative impact on the criminal justice system 
if wrongly applied. It could also be argued that the term “negotiated justice”, appears to 
give a derogatory meaning to the rationale and concept of plea bargain itself.414 This is 
because when we refer to the concept of plea bargain as “negotiated justice”, it cheapens 
the entire criminal justice system and brings a connotation of a market place where goods 
and services are negotiated for. Nevertheless, plea bargain plays a critical role in many 
nations criminal justice systems.415 
 
The application of plea bargain as a discretionary technique in most cases could be on the 
advice of the prosecutor. Normally, the prosecutor advises the defendant to plead guilty 
for a smaller offence in exchange for a lighter punishment. However, there appears to be 
a conflict of interest in this advisory role of the prosecutor. There could be a conflict of 
interest between the prosecutors’ interest and defendants interest hence, one wonders 
the quality of advice the prosecutor would give the defendant. It would certainly not be 
impartial. The defence also has a duty to advise clients properly on what charges to plead 
to and evaluate if there could be any collateral consequence as a result of accepting a 
plea bargain. This is because sometimes, the client may not be aware of the entire legal 
implication of accepting a plea bargain and may get into more serious problems than 













Collateral consequences could arise if a defendant enters a plea bargain without proper 
advice or proper legal representation. It is ideal that a complete analysis of the terms in 
the plea bargain agreement should be looked into by the lawyers representing the 
defendant, to ascertain whether or not there could be other consequences that might not 
be related to the charge, if the defendant pleads guilty.416 
 
The successful integration of plea bargain in a nations criminal justice system is dependent on 
the effectiveness of the stakeholders. The stakeholders include the prosecution, defence and 
the Judge. However, the most influential stakeholder with regards to plea bargain and 
prosecutorial discretion is the prosecution. This is because the prosecution uses a “carrot and 
stick” approach when negotiating for a plea bargain. The prosecution applies subtle threats 
on the defendant, by magnifying the potential punishment upon conviction which scares the 
defendant into agreeing to a plea bargain.417 
 
It cannot be overemphasised that the idea and rationale behind plea bargain should not 
be to scare the defendant into submission nor to create an avenue for “negotiated 
justice”, but to assist in the quick dispensation of justice. In so doing, before a defendant 
pleads guilty on a charge the defence lawyers must thoroughly evaluate the implication of 
the defendants pleading guilty on the charge. This is because the stakeholders of a plea 
bargain agreement is like a tripod i.e (prosecution, defence and the judge), of which each 
of these stakeholders play a unique role.418 
 
The defence should vet and be assured before accepting proposed terms brought by the 
most influential of the tripod, which in this case is the prosecution. This is because the 
prosecution at times may not also fully understand the real implication of a defendant 
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basically the duty of the defence to scrutinise the terms on a charge bargain to avoid any 
form of collateral consequence upon conviction.419 
 
In Nigeria, prior to 2015 the current regulatory framework that governs the application of 
plea bargain in the criminal justice system was limited to Lagos state. There were no laws 
that regulated the use and application of plea bargain as a discretionary technique for 
prosecution in the federation as a whole. This had a negative impact in the administration 
of justice and the AML regime in particular. The application of charge bargain as a plea 
bargain technique in the criminal justice system of Nigeria, appeared to be “too 
discretionary” and still is. There were no guidelines or rules that regulated the extent to 
which the prosecution can apply discretion in the charging of a defendant, which gave the 
opportunity for unnecessary favours, corruption and undue pressure by the prosecution 
with regards to federal offences. It is important to also note that money laundering 
related offences are federal offences and the application of state laws for a federal 
offence does not suffice. However, it is worthy of note that proactive state governments 
within Nigeria have integrated plea bargain as a law, for easy administration of justice. 
S.76 of the administration of criminal justice law 2011, Laws of Lagos state, clearly makes 
provision for plea bargain. 
 
S.76 of the Administration of Criminal Justice Law 2011, Laws of Lagos State, States: 
 
“1) the prosecutor and a defendant or his legal practitioner may before 
the plea to the charge, enter into an agreement in respect of: 
 
 A plea of guilty by the defendant to the offence charged or a lesser 
offence of which he may be convicted on the charge, and 
 
 An appropriate sentence to be imposed by the Court if the defendant is 
convicted of the offence to which he intends to plead guilty. 
 
 The prosecutor may only enter into an agreement contemplated in 
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 After consultation with the Police Officer responsible for the 
investigation of the case and if reasonably feasible, the victim, and 
 
 With due regard to the nature of and circumstances relating to the 
offence, the defendant and the interest of the community. 
 
 The prosecutor, if reasonably feasible shall afford the complainant or 
his representative the opportunity to make representations to the 
prosecutor regarding: 
 
 The contents of the agreement; and 
 
 The inclusion in the agreement of a compensation or restitution 
order. 
 
 An agreement between the parties contemplated in subsection (1) 
shall be reduced to writing and shall: 
 
 State that, before conclusion of the agreement, the defendant has 
been informed (i) that he has a right to remain silent; (ii) of the 
consequences of not remaining silent; (iii) that he is not obliged to make 
any confession or admission that could be used in evidence against him. 
 
 State fully the terms of the agreement and any admissions made and, 
 
 Be signed by the prosecutor, the defendant, the legal practitioner 
and the interpreter as the case may be. 
 
 The Presiding Judge, or Magistrate before whom criminal proceedings 
are pending shall not participate in the discussions contemplated in 
subsection (1). Provided that he may be approached by Counsel regarding 
the contents of the discussions and he may inform them in general terms 
of the possible advantages of discussions, possible sentencing options or 
the acceptability of a proposed agreement. 
 
 Where a plea agreement is reached by the prosecution and defence, 






agreement and the Presiding Judge or Magistrate shall then inquire 
from the defendant to confirm the correctness of the agreement. 
 
 The Presiding Judge or Magistrate shall ascertain whether the 
defendant admits the allegations in the charge to which he has pleaded 
guilty and whether he entered into the agreement voluntarily and 
without undue influence and May: 
 
 if satisfied that the defendant is guilty of the offence to which he has 
pleaded guilty, convict the defendant on his plea of guilty to that 
offence, or; 
 
 if he is for any reason of the opinion that the defendant cannot be 
 
convicted of the offence in respect of which the agreement was 
reached and to which the defendant has pleaded guilty or that the 
agreement is in conflict with the defendant’s rights referred to in 
subsection (4) of this Section, he shall record a plea of not guilty in 
respect of such charge and order that the trial proceed. 
 
 Where a defendant has been convicted in terms of subsection (7) 
(a), the Presiding Judge or Magistrate shall consider the sentence 
agreed upon in the agreement and if he is: 
 
 Satisfied that such sentence is an appropriate sentence impose the 
sentence; or 
 
 Of the view that he would have imposed a lesser sentence than the 
sentence agreed upon in the agreement impose the lesser sentence; or 
 
 Of the view that the offence requires a heavier sentence than the 
sentence agreed upon in the agreement, he shall inform the defendant 
of such heavier sentence he considers to be appropriate. 
 
 Where the defendant has been informed of the heavier sentence as 








8) Above, the defendant may: a) Abide by his plea of guilty as agreed 
upon in the agreement and agree that, subject to the defendant’s right 
to lead evidence and to present argument relevant to sentencing, the 
Presiding Judge, or Magistrate proceed with the sentencing; or 
 
 Withdraw from his plea agreement, in which event the trial shall 
proceed de novo before another Presiding Judge, or Magistrate, as the 
case maybe. 
 
 Where a trial proceeds as contemplated under subsection (9) (a) or 
de novo before another Presiding Judge, or Magistrate as 
contemplated in subsection (9) (b): 
 
 No reference shall be made to the agreement; 
 
 No admissions contained therein or statements relating thereto shall 
be admissible against the defendant; and 
 
 The prosecutor and the defendant may not enter into a similar plea 
and sentence agreement.”420 
 
From the provision above, the integration of plea bargain in the administration criminal 
justice in law Lagos state was a step in the right direction. It was a step in the right 
direction because, prior to the enactment of the Criminal Justice Laws of Lagos state in 
2011, the concept of plea bargain could not have been integrated even if it had been 
advocated for prior to 2011. The successful integration of plea bargain in Lagos state gave 
the federal government the will to integrate it in the ACJA 2015. The quick dispensation of 
justice in Lagos, with the most population within Nigeria encouraged the federal 
government to integrate the concept of plea bargain across all states of the federation. 
 
. For federal offences, S 270 of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015 [ACJA] ought to 
regulate the application of plea bargain in the criminal justice system. However, S 270 of the 
ACJA only states the guidelines on how a prosecutor should negotiate for a plea bargain with 
a defendant. It could be argued that the application of plea bargain is still largely 
 
 





unregulated, as the guidelines on the terms and conditions a prosecutor must fulfil with 
regards to applying discretion when negotiating a plea bargain, appears to be vague. Core 
issues that affect branches of the criminal justice system like the AML regime has not 
been properly dealt with in the ACJA. For example, negotiating the recovery of assets 
from PEP prosecuted for money laundering offences has to be considered and captured in 
such a way that the principles of plea bargain is not abused. The limitation on minimum 
sentencing with regards to plea bargain and asset recovery must be incorporated. 
 
S 270 of the ACJA 2015 states: 
 




 receive and consider a plea bargain from a defendant charged with 
an offence either directly from that defendant or on his behalf; or (b) 
offer a plea bargain to a defendant charged with an offence. 
 
 The prosecution may enter into plea bargaining with the defendant, 
with the consent of the victim or his representative during or after the 
presentation of the evidence of the prosecution, but before the 
presentation of the evidence of the defence, provided that all of the 
following conditions are present: 
 
 the evidence of the prosecution is insufficient to prove the offence 
charged beyond reasonable doubt;(b) where the defendant has agreed 
to return the proceeds of the crime or make restitution to the victim or 
his representative; or (c) where the defendant, in a case of conspiracy, 
has fully cooperated with the investigation and prosecution of the 
crime by providing relevant information for the successful prosecution 
of other offenders. 
 
 Where the prosecutor is of the view that the offer or acceptance of 
a plea bargain is in the interest of justice, the public interest, public 
policy and the need to prevent abuse of legal process, he may offer or 





 The prosecutor and the defendant or his legal practitioner may, 
before the plea to the charge, enter into an agreement in respect 
of:Plea bargain guidelines. 
 
 the term of the plea bargain which may include the sentence 
recommended within the appropriate range of punishment stipulated for 
the offence or a plea of guilty by the defendant to the offence charged or 
a lesser offence of which he may be convicted on the charge; and (b) an 
appropriate sentence to be imposed by the court where the defendant is 
convicted of the offence to which he intends to plead guilty. 
 
 The prosecutor may only enter into an agreement contemplated in 
subsection (3) of this section: 
 
 after consultation with the police responsible for the investigation 
of the case and the victim or his representative; and (b) with due 
regard to the nature of and circumstances relating to the offence, the 
defendant and public interest; 
 
Provided that in determining whether it is in the public interest to 
enter into a plea bargain, the prosecution shall weigh all relevant 
factors, including: 
 
(i) the defendant’s willingness to cooperate in the investigation or 
prosecution of others, 
 
 the defendant’s history with respect to criminal activity, 
 
 the defendant’s remorse or contrition and his willingness to assume 
 
responsibility for his conduct, 
 
 the desirability of prompt and certain disposition of the case, 
 
 the likelihood of obtaining a conviction at trial and the probable 
effect on witnesses, 
 




 the need to avoid delay in the disposition of other pending cases, 
 
 the expense of trial and appeal, and 
 
 the defendant’s willingness to make restitution or pay compensation 
 
to the victim where appropriate. 
 
 The prosecution shall afford the victim or his representative the 
opportunity to make 
 
representations to the prosecutor regarding:(a) the content of the 
agreement; and (b) the inclusion in the agreement of a compensation 




 Where a plea agreement is reached by the prosecution and the 
defence, the prosecutor shall inform the court that the parties have 
reached an agreement and the presiding judge or magistrate shall then 
inquire from the defendant to confirm the terms of the agreement. 
 
 The presiding judge or magistrate shall ascertain whether the 
defendant admits the allegation in the charge to which he has pleaded 
guilty and whether he entered into the agreement voluntarily and 
without undue influence and may where: 
 
 he is satisfied that the defendant is guilty of the offence to which he 
has pleaded guilty, convict the defendant on his plea of guilty to that 
offence, and shall award the compensation to the victim in accordance 





 Notwithstanding the provisions of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act, 
the prosecutor shall take reasonable steps to ensure that any money, 






under a plea bargain are transferred to or vested in the victim, his 
representative or other person lawfully entitled to it. 
 
 Any person who, wilfully and without just cause, obstructs or 
impedes the vesting or transfer of any money, asset or property under this 
Act, commits an offence and is liable on conviction to imprisonment 
 
for 7 years without an option of fine.” 
 
From the provisions in section 270, it can be argued that there is no limitation to the 
application and integration of plea bargain in the justice system. The provisions in S270 of 
the ACJA 2015, appears to only legitimise the application of plea bargain but fails to 
regulate the discretion applicable to prosecutors. There should be certain requirements 
that should fulfilled by a defendant before the integration of a plea bargain agreement. 
The discretionary powers bestowed on the prosecutor shouldn’t be limitless. 421 
 
These requirements should include the type of offence, who is the offender and 
circumstances surrounding the offence, before a plea bargain agreement could be 
considered by the prosecutor, else it would be abused. S270 of the ACJA fails to give the 
conditions that should serve as a guide for the prosecutors in applying their discretion. 
The section appears to be focused on rules which serves as a procedural application for 
plea bargain.422 This implies that if the procedure for the application of a plea bargain is 
met, the intention of the prosecutor does not matter. This could be a dangerous 
endorsement for the miss-application of prosecutorial discretion and plea bargain in 
specific. It could create an opportunity for the abuse of prosecutorial discretion, where 
prosecutors could engage in favouritism and undue influence in determining what charge 
to prosecute a defendant with.423 
 
It can be argued that the application of plea bargain in the criminal justice system of Nigeria 
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the laid down rules and procedure without recourse to the intent/motive and moral 
values. However, there are problems associated with a deontological system with the 
application of discretion in plea bargain, particularly with money laundering offences. This 
is because if there is a regulatory framework on the application of a principle of law 
without its limitations, it can create a gap for “over discretion”, which could undermine 
the very rationale behind plea bargain itself. What do I mean by “over discretion”? 
 
The fact that there is a principle of law[plea bargain] which is accepted and applicable in 
the criminal justice system of a nation, without extant laws that regulate how discretion is 
applied to this principle, could give room for an abuse of powers. An abuse of powers or 
office by the custodians of prosecutorial discretion, (the AG and other prosecutorial 
agencies empowered by law) may not be easily curtailed with regards to the application 
of plea bargain. Custodians of prosecutorial discretion may choose to prosecute a 
defendant for a much lesser offence that may be considered unreasonable on the altar of 
a plea bargain agreement. The presence of laid down rules, without emphasis on what 
factors prosecutors should be considered in the application of this technique, could give 
room for unnecessary compromise and corruption by the prosecutors, particularly if the 
defendant is a PEP.424 
 
It means that a prosecutor, having met the procedural requirement for entering a plea 
bargain could reach an agreement with a defendant who has no justification for entering 
a plea bargain, particularly if the evidence is overwhelming. The defendant would plead 
guilty to a lesser offence and may be given a light sentence. This can undermine the 
criminal justice system, as some corrupt prosecutors can reach an agreement with a 
defendant and prosecute them with a light charge, on the excuse of a plea bargain.425 
 
It can be also argued that some of the dangers this deontological approach on the regulation 
of plea bargain, is the absence of the concept of Justice. Some philosophers have 
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argued that justice are moral ideals which we must live by. Immanuel Kant conceives 
Justice as “living honourably, injuring no one, and to give every person his due”.426 In The 
Republic Plato upheld that “justice involves giving a man his due. For him, justice is truth 
telling and paying of one’s debts”427 Plato is of the view that a man’s reward should be 
according to his deeds. The concept of plea bargain if not properly administered could 
create some form of injustice where defendants would be sentenced not according to 
their deeds but according to the laid down rules and procedure. The negative effect of 
this procedural approach[deontology] is that, it could sacrifice equity and justice on the 
altar of rules and regulation. 
 
The deontological approach with the regulation of plea bargain in the criminal justice 
system of Nigeria has had its effect on money laundering cases. Prosecutors apply this 
discretionary technique, for the easy administration of justice and a faster trial process on 
money laundering cases.428 However, prosecutors must be careful with the application of 
plea bargain and focus on motive, but not rules. 
 
Persons who have committed very serious offences against the state and the citizens may 
be given an opportunity to escape justice, if the application of plea bargain as a 
prosecutorial technique is abused. Hence, there is a need to have limitations on the 
application of plea bargain. 
 
4.9 The Integration of Plea Bargain and Notice of Discontinuance as Prosecutorial 
Discretion Techniques, in the AML regime of Nigeria: A Focus on Politically Exposed 
Persons 
 
The regulation of AML in Nigeria has been dependent on regulatory agencies. These 
agencies assist the government in making policies that could regulate money laundering 
and other related offences in Nigeria.429 Policy direction and prosecutorial powers are 
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carried out by AML regulatory agencies like the EFCC and ICPC. These agencies by the 
enabling Act have the powers to prosecute offenders on money laundering and related 
offences, particularly with the typology of money laundering offence that is prevalent in 
Nigeria.430 As discussed earlier, the typology of money laundering offence prevalent in 
Nigeria is focused on PEP. 
 
The AML regime in Nigeria makes provision for several typology of money laundering 
offences, however more emphasis is placed on money laundering offences by PEP due to 
the prevalent money laundering issues surrounding these category of persons.431 The 
primary AML regulatory agency, the EFCC has the discretionary powers to prosecute 
money laundering and other related offences. The discretionary powers of the 
commission to prosecute, is subject to the provisions in S6 of the EFCC act. S6(a), (b) and 
(c) of the EFCC act states: 
 
“ The Commission shall be responsible for·- 
 
 the enforcement and the due administration of the provisions of 
this Act; 
 
 the investigation of all financial crimes including advance fee fraud, 
money laundering, counterfeiting, illegal charge transfers, futures 
market fraud. Fraudulent encashment of negotiable instruments, 
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 the co-ordination and enforcement of all economic and financial 
crimes laws and enforcement functions conferred on any other person 
 
or authority ;”432 
 
From the provisions in S 6 of the EFCC act is clear that the commission does not only 
possess regulatory powers but also enforcement and prosecutorial powers. It’s 
interesting to note that from the above provision, the EFCC is not primarily aimed at 
prosecuting PEPS for corruption. It ought to have been clearly included in the enabling 
Act. These prosecutorial powers are not only limited to the EFCC . ICPC also possesses 
powers to prosecute money laundering offences, particularly with regards to the typology 
of money laundering offence that is prevalent in Nigeria. However, the EFCC happens to 
be a more effective AML regulatory and prosecutorial agency.433 This might be as a result 
lack of political will to empower the ICPC with funding and necessary, manpower to 
investigate and prosecute money laundering offences by PEP. This has rendered the ICPC 
as mere regulatory body in existence and not AML regulatory body with the will and drive 
to prosecute, which ideally by its enabling Act should have its focus on PEP.434 Hence, the 
EFCC has since taken over its functions by all practical means. S 5 & 6 of the ICPC act, 
makes provision for the prosecutorial powers the commission possesses. 
 
S5 & 6 of the ICPC act states: 
 
“1) Subject to the provision of this Act, an officer of the Commission 
when investigating or prosecuting a case of corruption shall have all 
the powers and immunities of the police officer under the police Act 
and any other laws conferring power on the police, or empowering and 
protecting law enforcement agents. 
 
 If, in the course of any investigations or proceedings in court in 
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there is disclosed an offence under any other written law, not being an 
offence under this Act, irrespective of whether the offence was 
committed by the same person or any other person, the officer of the 
Commission responsible for the investigation or proceedings, as the case 
may be, shall notify the director of public prosecutions or any other officer 
charged with responsibility for the prosecution of criminal cases, who may 
issue such directions as shall meet the justice of the case. 
 
General Duties of the Commission to receive investigate the complaint 
and prosecute offenders. Etc 6.it shall be the duty of the Commission-
(a) Where reasonable grounds exist for suspecting that any person has 
conspire to commit or has attempted to commit or has committed an 
offence under this Act or any other law prohibiting Corruption, to 
receive and investigate any report of the conspiracy to commit, 
attempt to commit or the Commission of such offence and, in 
appropriate cases, to prosecute the offenders; 
 
 To examine the practices, system and procedures of public bodies 
and where, in the opinion of the Commission, such practices, systems 
or procedures aid or facilitate fraud or corruption, to direct and 
supervise a review of the case 
 
 To instruct, advise and assist any officer, agency or parastatals on 
ways by which fraud or corruption may be eliminated or minimized by 
 
such officer, agency or parastatal;”435 
 
The provisions in S 5&6 of the above act, clearly empowers the commission to prosecute 
offences related to corruption. It is important to note as discussed earlier, that the 
prosecutorial powers of these regulatory agencies i.e the EFCC and the ICPC are subject to 
the discretionary powers of the AG, as seen in S174 of the constitution of Nigeria. 
 
As a fact, ICPC was established in 2000, four years before the establishment of the EFCC, 
yet the EFCC happens to be the only pro-active AML regulatory body with records of 
 
 





ongoing prosecution and convictions of PEP.436 However, how effective is the EFCC with 
regards to the prosecution of PEP? If we agree that the typology of money laundering 
offence that is prevalent in Nigeria is centred on corruption, then the prosecutorial 
technique applied by the AML agencies should be evidenced by considering how effective 
the fight against corruption is.437 
 
There has been a tendency of PEP in developing nations particularly in Nigeria, to abuse the 
office and powers bestowed on them by the people. This negative trend in the Nigerian 
political environment is that PEPS either elected or appointed, have not been discouraged by 
the prosecutorial system and the criminal justice system from stealing public funds and abuse 
of public office. There is a connection between the efficacy of the prosecutorial system in the 
AML regime and corruption. This connection can be attributed to the fact that, if there is an 
ineffective AML regime with regards to the prosecution of PEP, then PEP would not be 
discouraged from stealing public funds and laundering the proceeds.438 
 
If the typology of money laundering offences in Nigeria which is most prevalent is on 
political corruption and abuse of office by PEP, then we could argue that the AML regime 
in Nigeria is not as effective as it should be. Maybe, the regime would be more effective if 
its prosecutorial approach is more effective and serves as a deterrent to political office 
holders. The prosecutorial approach by AML regulatory agencies is not bringing the 
desired results, which should ideally serve as punitive and preventive measures against 
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4.10 A Critique of the Integration of Prosecutorial Techniques on Money Laundering 
Cases in Nigeria. 
 
Several cases that have been prosecuted by these regulatory agencies, can be criticised 
from the point of view of ineffective prosecutorial technique.440 Some of these cases 
have been decided by courts of competent jurisdiction. 
 
In the case of Federal Republic of Nigeria V Cecilia Ibru the defendant was prosecuted for 
money laundering and granting of a credit facility above her credit limit of $20 million as 
chief executive of Oceanic Bank. Upon a plea bargain arrangement, the defendant 
forfeited assets and cash worth $1.2 billion. The court sentenced the defendant to 6 
months imprisonment, and she was allowed to spend the 6 months sentence in a hospital 
due to a health challenge, as this was part of the plea bargain.441 
 
The judgement by the court in the Cecilia Ibrus case, was criticised from a legal and a 
moral point of view. It is important to point out that at the time of this judgement, the 
integration of plea bargain in the trial of federal offences like money laundering, was 
technically illegal. This is because the law which, makes provision for the application of 
plea bargain in prosecution federal offences is the ACJA 2015.442 If the defendant in the 
above case was convicted and sentenced based on a plea bargain agreement with the 
EFCC in the year 2010, it the begs the question. What law did the EFCC rely on to 
negotiate a plea bargain in the Cecelia’s case? If the ACJA which makes provision for plea 
bargain for federal offences was enacted in the year 2015, then it can be argued that the 
EFCC acted outside the scope of the criminal justice system at that time, in getting into 
that agreement with the defendant. 
 
There could have been other reasons best known to the EFCC in applying the discretionary 
technique of plea bargain in the Cecelia Ibrus case. However, whatever these reasons could 
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integrated into the justice system of the Nigeria in 2015, which therefore makes that 
agreement and judgement illegitimate. This argument maybe best seen as academic, 
however it an opinion. 
 
Furthermore, from the Cecelia’s case, there is a tendency for AML regulatory agencies to 
abuse these discretionary techniques, particularly plea bargain. The rationale behind the 
integration of plea bargain in the justice system in Nigeria is to provide a faster route to 
getting justice and not a technical route in availing criminals of justice.443 This on its own 
is immoral. Even if there is a law which permits the application of plea bargain in Nigeria, 
the way and manner which prosecutors apply this discretionary technique is worrisome. It 
is been perceived by the public as a selective prosecutorial technique, used in availing the 
rich and powerful from conviction and justice. 
 
It is understandable that, part the rationale behind the application of plea bargain particularly 
when dealing with PEP is to recover a significant amount of money or asset. However, the 
recovery of asset should not erode the basic principles of the criminal justice system, which is 
to dispense justice. More so, if recovery of asset is the primary motive of AML regulatory 
agencies in applying a plea bargain, then it means a wrong message is been passed. The 
message is simple, “steal as much as you can, if you get prosecuted, you enter a plea bargain 
and get a light sentence”. This is a dangerous trend for the AML regime in Nigeria, if the entire 
motive behind the application of this prosecutorial technique is to recover stolen asset. There 
must be a balance in the application of this technique. 
 
The application of plea bargain as a prosecutorial technique should not be used for the PEP or 
the influential in the society but also the average criminal who has committed other typology 
of money laundering offences. Even with the application of plea bargain across all classes of 
money laundering offenders, the prosecutors must act reasonably and justifiably when 
concluding on the plea bargain agreement. If this is not so, it could make mockery of the 
criminal justice system of the nation, thereby encouraging PEP to steal more and negotiate 
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justice” may be right after all. Prosecutors must apply caution and ethics particularly 
virtue, in the application of plea bargain on money laundering offences. 
 
In the case of FRN V Lucky Igbenedion, the defendant was the governor of Edo state, Nigeria. 
A 147-count charged was proferred against him, which included money laundering, and 
stealing of public funds. The defendant upon reaching a plea bargain agreement pleaded 
guilty to some counts on the charge sheet, including stealing the sum of $26 million {4 billion 
naira}. The accused was convicted and sentenced to a fine of $23,000 {N3.5 million Naria}. 
There was no recovery of asset, there was no money recovered.444 
 
The prosecution of lucky Igbenedion and the subsequent sentence upon conviction was 
an affront to the criminal justice system of Nigeria. From a critical point of view, the EFCC 
which prosecuted this case appears to have abused the concept of plea bargain as a 
discretionary technique. It can be argued that the plea bargain reached by the 
prosecution and the defendant is an affront on equity natural justice and good 
conscience, which are fundamental elements in the application of the rule of law. 
 
The integration of prosecutorial techniques particularly plea bargain in the AML regime, 
should be justice driven rather than technicality driven. What this means is that if less 
attention is given to technicalities of law, rules and regulation, statutes and ordinances, as 
against justice, then the entire prosecutorial system would be centred on “rules” as 
against justice. This could portend danger to the criminal justice system of the nation. 
Hence, the importance of the integration of ethics in the application of prosecutorial 
discretion on money laundering cases. The ethical consideration of prosecutors is pivotal 
to the success of the AML regime. 
 
The Igbinedion case, suggest that the prosecutors followed a deontological approach in the 
plea bargain agreement reached with the defendant. The prosecutors appeared to either 
innocently misconstrue the rationale behind plea bargain by reaching an agreement where 
the defendant pays a fine, or acted out of mischief or compromise, with the intent of 
undermining the entire AML regime and hiding under the cover of the plea bargain rule. This 









importance of the integration of virtue ethics in the AML regime cannot be over 
emphasised. The character of prosecutors, who are supposed to be custodians and 
protectors of the AML regime in Nigeria, should not be in doubt. If virtue emphasises on 
doing what is morally right for the greater good of the society, then prosecutors should 
not hide under the pretentious cover of rules that could enable them to do what is 
morally wrong.445 
 
Prosecutors hiding under the cover of rules is one of the problems of the deontological 
approach in ethics and conduct of lawyers in Nigeria.446 This is because if the rules make 
provision for the prosecutor to apply discretion when administering plea bargain, without 
any form of review with regards to how the bargain was done, it might be dangerous. It is 
dangerous because, rules are rules and rules must be obeyed whether or not the rules are 
bad. This deontological approach gives a perfect opportunity for rogue prosecutors to 
insist that they followed the rules in administering this discretionary technique. Hence, 
the lawyers who assist in regulating and prosecuting for the AML regime, might have 
directly or indirectly contributed to the underdevelopment of the country by not 
diligently prosecuting PEP for corruption and money laundering. If we agree that a major 
problem that affects Nigeria’s growth is corruption by PEP and money laundering, then 
regulatory agencies empowered to prosecute money laundering offenders should do 
everything possible to punish these offenders. Prosecutors should not use their 
discretionary powers as a leverage to fail certain ethical standards expected from them by 
the society. This is very important particularly in the interest of justice.447 The society 
wants justice to be served on those who have stolen public funds and laundered their 
common resources. The society does not want fines served on those who have stolen 
their commonwealth as punishment. The Igbenedion’s case can be best defined as the 
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4.11 The Role of Flexibility of Charges in the Application of Prosecutorial Discretion in 
the AML Regime. 
 
It is important to note that, it is at the discretion of the prosecutor to choose what law to 
prosecute under. It can be argued that, the integration of prosecutorial discretion in the 
AML regime also includes the choice of legislation which the prosecutor would anchor the 
charge on. This is because in some instances, it may be difficult to prove money 
laundering charges, due to the technicalities involved in this peculiar crime.448 
 
However, the prosecutor might be able to successfully prosecute on other offences linked 
with money laundering, but not money laundering as an offence. This is because it can be 
argued, as it has been argued in several cases including the case of FRN V Ibori, that 
money laundering cannot be a stand-alone offence.449 If we follow this line argument 
then, we could assert that there is a parent offence that should be attached to a money 
laundering charge. After all, if we agree that money laundering is the proceeds of crime, 
then the crime itself (parent offence) creates an opportunity for the money laundering 
offence to take place.450 
 
For example, in a recent judgement delivered on the 29th of august 2019 in the case of 
FRN V Waripamo Owei-Dudafa the defendant who was an aide to a former President of 
Nigeria, Goodluck Jonathan was prosecuted on a 22 count charge on money laundering. 
The Judge held that, the case of the EFCC was built on suspicion of crime and suspicion, 
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He further held, that the EFCC did not conclude an investigation before rushing to court, 
thereby leaving loopholes. He dismissed the entire 22 counts against Dudafa, discharged 
and acquitted him.451 
 
From the judgement in the Dudafa case, it is obvious that prosecutors were ignorant of the 
fact that money laundering is a technical offence, which makes securing a conviction on mere 
suspicion of money laundering without compelling evidence difficult. Prosecutors in this case 
had failed to apply the discretion of flexibility of charges, if it seemed too technical to prove 
money laundering charges in court. The prosecutors might have been successful, if the 
prosecutors focused their charges around corruption and abuse of office, rather than money 
laundering. Maybe the EFCC prosecutors would have succeeded in admitting evidence that 
would have been more compelling to secure a conviction. 
 
If we apply this argument to the AML regime in Nigeria in relation with the typology of 
money laundering offences which is mostly abuse of office and stealing of public funds, 
then prosecutors do not necessarily have to anchor their charge based on the provisions 
of MLPA 2011. The AML regulatory agencies could prosecute money laundering offences 
alongside other offences (parent offence). 
 
The discretionary powers of prosecutors in the AML regime should not be limited to the 
MLPA 2011, other laws which regulate the criminal justice system should be applied. This is 
because the rationale behind the establishment of an AML regime in Nigeria, is to create 
preventive measures and punitive measures in relation to the typology of money laundering 
offences [PEP], and not a mere existence of an AML regime. Hence, prosecutors should pay 
more attention to other laws regulating the criminal justice system, and reduce the fixated 
approach that a PEP must be prosecuted for money laundering. 
 
For an effective AML regime, prosecutors must apply prosecutorial discretion in such a 
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to the potential problems of overcharging.452 This way, it would be more difficult for the 
defendant to escape justice. The focus on only money laundering charges by AML 
regulatory agencies and prosecutors could have contributed to the ineffective 
prosecution of money laundering cases by PEP. 
 
In the case of FRN V. Jolly Tevoru Nyame the defendant was the governor of Taraba state 
in Nigeria. The EFCC began his prosecution for money laundering charges in the year 
2007. In 2014, the EFCC through the leave of court, amended the charges to a forty count 
charge against the defendant for criminal breach of trust, which is punishable under S315 
of the Penal Code Act, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990.453 The defendant was 
sentenced to 14 years imprisonment. 
 
An excerpt of judgement held as follows: 
 
“There were Clear Breaches of Trust under these Counts. The Defendant 
had the Duty to notify or engage the Correct Offices or Officers, and in 
summoning Mr. Nev, the Permanent Secretary of Government House 
instead of the Secretary to the State Government, the First breach was 
committed. There was also a Clear Breach of Trust by the way Funds were 
utilized and disposed off. There was no Accountability of the Monies 
Expended and there were no Retirement of the Funds or Audit Queries 
issued. Misappropriation under the Offence of Criminal Breach of Trust 
does not equate to Conversion to one’s Use. The lack of Adequate 
Documentation, the fact of the Impracticability and the Non-accountability 
injects a Dishonest element to this Breach of Trust. The Element of 
Disposal is one of the Modes under Criminal Breach of Trust, and any 
Disposal of Government Funds contrary to the Financial Rules and 
Regulations of the State constitutes Criminal Breach of Trust. The 




452 Gifford Donald ‘Meaningful Reform of Plea Bargaining: The Control of Prosecutorial 
Discretion’[1983]37 University of Illinois Law Review 41. 
 





and he is to Direct the Expenditure in Compliance with the Laws under 
which he governs. At the Time he approved the Memos in ExhibitsO1, 
O2 and O3, he ought to have known that these Huge Expenses for a 
One Day Visit, with a One Day Notice was absurd and extreme to say 
the least. From the above Analysis, the Court is satisfied that as regards 
the Offences in Counts 10, 12 and 14, the Prosecution has satisfied the 
Court that the defendant committed Criminal Breach of Trust beyond 
reasonable Doubt.”454 
 
The successful prosecution of Jolly Nyame and subsequent conviction was regarded as a 
major success in the AML regime and the fight against corruption.455 From the case, it can be 
argued that, for the successful prosecution of PEP, emphasis should be placed on the parent 
offence while the money laundering offence should be secondary. Criminal breach of trust is a 
parent offence that is common with most money laundering offences by PEP. 
 
If we agree that a PEP is the custodian of public trust, then if a PEP misappropriates public 
funds or steals from public treasury, it is breach of public trust. Hence it was a tactical 
integration of prosecutorial discretion on the part of the EFCC by amending the charge, 
with the inclusion of criminal breach of trust. 
 
It is important to note that in the Jolly Nyame’s case, the defendant was not convicted for 
money laundering charges. Which implies that if the EFCC had focused the charge on only 
money laundering, Jolly Nyame would have been added to the list of the many 
unsuccessful prosecution of money laundering cases by PEP.456 Hence the importance of 
flexibility of charges and an inclusion of “parent” offences when prosecuting PEP for 
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Furthermore, in the case of FRN V Joshua Dariye, the defendant was the governor of 
Plateau state Nigeria. He was prosecuted with money laundering charges by the EFCC 
which began in 2007. The defendant was been prosecuted for laundering the sum of 1.6 
billion Naira [N1,600,000,000], [$10,600,000] equivalent. In 2016, nine years after the 
prosecution proffered charges on money laundering, the charges were amended to 
criminal breach of trust, which is punishable under S 315 of the Penal Code Act. The 
defendant was found guilty and sentenced to 14 years imprisonment in June 2018, for 
criminal breach of trust. 
 
An excerpt from the judgement is as follows: 
 
“ As regards the Sum of N53, 600, 643.056, as seen from the Statement 
of Account, the Statement of account speaks for itself, as it showed 
that the Defendant made several disbursements after this Sum of 
Money was lodged into his Account, which he dishonestly converted to 
his own Use to carry out banking transaction to other beneficiaries 
other than the Plateau State Government. 
 
Further reasoning is as held under Criminal Breach of Trust and the Court 
finds that these Funds in both Counts 9 and 11 belonged to the Plateau 
State Government and were converted by the defendant to his own use, 
without any reasonable explanation and the manner of lodging these 
Sums showed a dishonest intent to misappropriate the Funds. 
 
Without further ado, the Court finds these Counts as proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt and accordingly, finds the Defendant Guilty as 
Charged for the Offences of Criminal Misappropriation under Count 9 
and Count 11.” 
 
“I cannot imagine such Brazen Act of Systematic Looting and Stealing, as 
what occurred in this Case, is it the transfer of nearly half a Billion from 
the Ecological Funds Account meant for his State? Or is it the Transfer of 
Funds from the Account of the Plateau State Government into his Personal 
Ventures Account? The Facts of this Case and the Ensuing Events left a 




though they were Adults capable of making Rational Choices, ended up 
being scarred. How do we count the Physical, Moral and Sociological 
Costs of the People involved In this Tragedy of Corruption? There was 
Dr. Kingsley Nkrumah, the Permanent Secretary under the Ecological 
Office of the Presidency, who lost his Job and Reputation, was charged 
to Court and upon the grant of his Bail, left the Country. Then there 
was Mr. Awe Odessa, the Banker at the All States Trust Bank, who lost 
his Job, was jailed and had his Reputation soiled. His bank suffered no 
less fate when it had its Certificate of Incorporation revoked after being 
fined. There was also Mrs Joyce Oyebanjo in London who was jailed for 
Three and Half Years for Money 
 
Laundering Offences. The most shocking aspect is that regarding the 
People of Plateau State, who suffered Financial Losses, and at some 
period in time, as seen from the Accounts of Ebenezer Retnan Ventures 
and Plateau State Government Account before the Court, the 
 
Defendant, through this Venture was richer than Plateau State. More 
importantly, his Family would no doubt have suffered as a Result of the 
Long drawn out Trauma of the Trial. 
 
It is unfortunate, but there is no Compromise to Corruption. By whatever 
Shade of Colour, Tribe, religion and Status, Corruption will forever be 
Corruption. This Statement is akin to the Law of Gravity, whatever is 
thrown up, invariably will come down, and sometimes hard. It is rather 
unfortunate. Having found the Defendant Guilty as Charged in regard to 
these Counts of the Offences under Criminal Breach of Trust, the Court 
hereby Sentences the Defendant, Chief Joshua Chibi Dariye to Terms of 
Imprisonment in Each of these Offence, as follows: - 
 
As regards the Offence of CRIMINAL BREACH OF TRUST, the Defendant 









COUNT 1-Fourteen (14) Years Term of Imprisonment with No Option of 
Fine”457 
 
The judgement in the Dariyes case, came as a positive shock to the AML regime and the 
criminal justice system at large. This is because the Dariye and Nyame’s judgements were 
delivered by the same judge in a time frame of two weeks, in the year 2018. The AML 
regime in Nigeria has suffered setbacks with the prosecution of PEP, due to the 
misapplication of prosecutorial discretion, due to the “fixated” application of the MLPA 
2011. There is a clear similarity between the case of Joshua Dariye and Jolly Nyame. It can 
be argued that the successful prosecution of Dariye and Nyame can be attributed to the 
flexibility of the prosecutor, by not relying solely on money laundering charges to convict 
the defendant. The technicality of proving money laundering charges could have been 
responsible for the slow pace of prosecution, since the prosecution commenced trial in 
2007. It can be further argued that when prosecuting PEP for money laundering offences, 
it may be easier to prove the parent offence than the money laundering offence itself. 
Hence, the reason why the EFCC could establish a case of criminal breach of trust against 
the defendants in the Dariye and Nyame’s cases respectively. 
 
The flexibility of charges is a discretionary power attached to prosecutors in the AML 
regime as seen in the Dariye and Nyame’s case, which many prosecutors may not be 
conversant with. The fact that a PEP is prosecuted for money laundering related charges 
does not necessarily mean that emphasis should be placed on the enabling laws 
regulating money laundering. There appears to be a high probability that, if prosecutors 
place emphasis on the parent offence as the primary offence when prosecuting PEP for 
money laundering offences and allowing the money laundering offence to remain as a 
secondary offence, there would be a higher rate of conviction. Again, this shows the 
importance of flexibility of charges in the application of prosecutorial discretion. 
 
Furthermore, in the Dariye and Nyame’s cases, there was an obvious consideration of 
professional ethics. The prosecutors acted in the interest of the public in doing what was 










additional charge. The prosecutors amended the charges because they might have felt 
that, relying on strict rules which regulate money laundering might not be in the best 
interest of nation and the public, with respect to these cases. The prosecutors merged the 
principles of deontological ethics and virtue ethics. They did so by “obeying” the rules and 
prosecuting on money laundering offences but acted in the greater good and interest of 
the society, by amending the charge to include breach of public trust. A charge which was 
included years after the prosecution of both defendants had begun. 
 
What must have been going through the minds of the prosecutors between 2007 when 
the charge was proffered and 2017 when the charge was amended? Could it be because 
the prosecutors envisaged that they might not have been able to secure a conviction, if 
they had continued prosecution on that charge and felt that they owed the public a duty 
to bring the defendant to justice? 
 
Whatever the reason could be, the prosecutors in these cases acted with virtue, in the 
interest of the greater good of the public and the AML regime. It may be interesting to also 
add, that it is the same prosecutor who prosecuted both Dariye’s and Nyam’e cases, which 
has been the only significant conviction of a high-profile PEP since 2004.458 We do not want 
to believe that there are only a few prosecutors in the AML regime, who are diligent and act 
with virtue. May be Other prosecutors in the AML regime of Nigeria, should take lessons from 
the prosecutor who successfully prosecuted these landmark cases. 
 
4.12 The Integration of the Rule of Law in the Application of Prosecutorial Discretion in 
the AML regime in Nigeria. 
 
The prosecution of the typology of money laundering offence [PEP], which is prevalent in 
Nigeria, has suffered some setback since Nigeria began her AML regime. As discussed 
earlier the prevalent typology of money laundering offence in Nigeria is centered on 
political corruption.459 It’s a fact that the Nigerian AML regime has recorded very few 
successes in the prosecution of PEP. AML regulatory and prosecutorial agencies have not 
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recorded with the regulation and prosecution of other typologies of money 
laundering.460 It can be argued that a primary factor which is responsible for the 
ineffectiveness, is the absence of the core values of the rule of law in the regulation and 
the prosecution of money laundering offences by PEP.461 
 
One of the core values of the rule of law is equality before the law. The fundamental 
principle which drives positive development in a nations justice system is the application 
of legal equity in the dispensation of justice.462 This principle is essential if the AML 
regime in Nigeria must be successful. The integration of the rule of law in the AML regime 
in Nigeria, is not only to ensure that the AML regime is successful but to ensure that this 
principle is applied in enforcing AML regulations. 
 
Theodore Roosevelt a former American President once said: 
 
“No man is above the law and no man is below it; nor do we ask any 
man's permission when we ask him to obey it. Obedience to the law is 
demanded as a right; not asked as a favour.”463 
 
If we agree that legal equity is fundamental in the application of the rule of law in Nigeria, 
then we can also agree that the same set rules that are applicable in the enforcement of 
other typology of money laundering, should be applicable in the enforcement of money 
laundering with regards to PEP. This is because the prosecution of other typology of 
money laundering offences appears to be more effective, as discretionary techniques are 
used correctly in the prosecution of narcotics related offences, human trafficking, arms 
trafficking, tax evasion etc.464 The level of professionalism and zeal applied in prosecuting 
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other typology of money laundering offences appears to be higher. Hence, it can be 
argued that there is a higher ethical standard applicable by AML regulatory agencies and 
prosecutors, in the prosecution of other typology of money laundering offences. This is an 
affront on the basic principles of equity and the rule of law. 
 
Applying Fuller’s principles into the AML regime in Nigeria, there must be set rules and these 
set rules must be general.465 The generality in the application of laws is an indication of the 
integration of the rule of law in that society. There are set rules that regulate the AML regime 
in Nigeria and the prosecution of money laundering offences. However, the problem is not 
associated with the existence of set rules but the applicability and generality of these set 
rules. The principal officials regulating the AML regime and those with discretionary powers 
to prosecute cannot apply a set of rules for a typology of offenders and not apply same for 
another typology of money laundering offenders. 
 
It can be argued that the lopsided application of “set rules” with regards to prosecutorial 
discretion in the AML regime, could possibly be what Fuller had attempted to avoid. Fuller 
must have envisaged that there could be a time in the regulation of human activities and 
society, when there could be discrimination or favoritism in the application of these set 
rules. This is appearing to be the situation of the AML regime of Nigeria. This again is 
inked to adherence of the rule of law. 
 
Furthermore, the issue of prosecutorial competency as seen in both Dariye and Nyame’s 
might be another problem the AML regime in Nigeria faces. One can argue that the success 
recorded in these cases is an ethical issue revolving round prosecutorial competency. The 
prosecutor displayed a high level of competence in carrying out his responsibility by 
amending the charge, rather than prosecuting solely on money laundering. One might also 
argue that there is an element of virtue ethic displayed by the prosecutor in these cases.466 
This is because it is most unlikely that the former prosecutors prosecuting these cases were 
uninformed that to successfully prosecute PEP for money laundering, all charges do not need 
to be hinged on money laundering. Hence, it can be argued that if the former prosecutors 
knew that they can prosecute on breach of public trust, (which is obviously 
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easier to prosecute from the outcome in the Dariye and Nyame’s cases), then it means 
that the moral inclination on the part of the prosecutors to do what is right is absent. This 
also is an ethical issue. 
 
If you apply a high level of ethical standards in prosecuting money laundering offenders 
who are considered to be ordinary citizens and persons who do not have access to the 
instruments of state power, then the same ethical standard should be applied to those 
who are powerful and influential in the society. 
 
The integration of prosecutorial techniques in the AML regime of Nigeria is not enough to 
ensure an effective regime, these prosecutorial techniques must be applied with strict 
adherence to the rule of law. Hence, the provision in S 174(3) which attempts to limit the 
powers of the AG, does so with reference to fundamental principles of the rule of law, which 
is public interest.467 The interest of the public must be put into consideration before AML 
regulatory and prosecuting agencies apply a plea bargain or a notice of discontinuance in the 
prosecution of PEP. This is because this typology of money laundering offence affects the 
elements of the nation the most, as it creates an enabling environment for corruption and 
underdevelopment as against other typology of money laundering offences.468 
 
When monies appropriated for development of basic infrastructure and welfare of the 
citizens are stolen and laundered by persons elected or appointed into office, it affects 
virtually all categories of persons living in the society. Hence, prosecutors owe the public and 
members of the society a duty to ensure that PEP are diligently prosecuted without an abuse 
of court process or a deliberate misapplication of prosecutorial techniques, thereby 
undermining the rule of law. When AML regulatory and prosecutorial agencies act in the 
interest of the public, it will reflect on the number of PEP convicted for corruption and money 
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could give a better opportunity for accountability and transparency of spending of public 
funds. 
 
Hence, we can argue further that, there is a relationship between the rule of law and 
successful prosecution of PEP and development. This is because if the fundamental 
principles of the rule of law are applied in the prosecution of PEP for money laundering 
offences, monies appropriated for the development of the society would be properly 
utilized and accounted for.470 The implication is that those responsible for the regulation 
of the AML regime in Nigeria, can play a key role to ensure the fast growth and 
development of the society. 
 
Prosecutors can accelerate development in the Nigerian society, if they adhere to strict 
ethical standards by doing what they consider morally right, in accordance to strict rules of 
professional conduct to act in the interest of justice. This means that in the process of 
prosecuting PEP, the ethical standard of the prosecutor can influence his adherence to the 
principles of the rule of law, which in turn could influence a lesser tendency of the 
misapplication of prosecutorial discretion, which could increase the conviction rate of PEP. 
 
For example, we can argue that the absence of the element of the rule of law in the 
application of prosecutorial discretion with regards to PEP, is responsible for the high rate 
of unsuccessful prosecution for money laundering offences. The case of FRN V Ibori471 is 
a clear example of the absence of the fundamental elements of law in flexibility of 
charges, in prosecuting PEP for money laundering. The application of this technique, as a 
discretionary technique, should be done with a focus on equity and justice, morality and 
truth, in accordance with the rules and regulations. 
 
It is an affront to the rule of law for the judge to reach a conclusion on a mere definition of 
money laundering in accordance to the MLPA 2004, in the Ibori case. Some can also argue 















a prosecutor. Hence, we can further argue that, the prosecutors unwittingly or 
intentionally placed the Judge in a situation where he cannot function in accordance to 
the rule of law and moral standards, which made the judge stick to strict rules and 
regulations (MLPA 2004). It was the duty of the prosecutor to have acted with the intent 
of ensuring that justice is reached. Part of that duty is to ensure that “realistic” charges 
were proffered against the defendant other than money laundering, which could have 
guaranteed a conviction. A prosecutor acting with the intent to ensure the enforcement 
of the rule of law in the Ibori case, would have done so by proffering a charge that could 
most likely secure a conviction against a PEP who had stolen public funds. 
 
This would have been possible if the prosecutor had proffered charges hinging on breach 
of public trust in the Ibori case. This is because, it would have been easier to prove breach 
of public trust rather than money laundering. This is also because, money laundering 
charges are usually technical to prove and the vagueness of the MLPA 2004 which created 
a gap in this typology of money laundering offence, would have been difficult to prove. 
The onus was on the prosecutor to have acted within the ambits of the rule of law, by 
considering public interest, in the prosecution of Ibori. If this interest was considered, the 
prosecutor would have proffered a “realistic” charge within the context of the AML 
regime at the time. As argued earlier, that realistic charge which the prosecutor should 
have proffered was breach of public trust.472 It is expected that an experienced 
prosecutor such as the EFCC, should understand these fundamental rudiments of 
prosecution and as such might not have innocently made that mistake in prosecuting 
solely on money laundering offences. This argument is subjective. 
 
Again, as argued earlier, there is a linkage between virtue ethics and the successful 
application of the rule of law in the AML regime. This link can be established because, 
robots do not act as prosecutors of PEP but humans. Virtue ethics critically examines the 
fundamental element which directs the human mind in taking decisions because they 
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should take in entrenching the rule of law and administering prosecutorial discretion in 
AML cases involving PEP. 
 
A good prosecutor who intends to carry out his responsibility with the understanding of 
the damage corrupt PEP have caused in Nigeria, should be able to reach a balance 
between Virtue ethics and deontological ethics. This balance can be best described as an 
amalgamation of both ethical approaches to enforce the rule of law in the AML regime in 
Nigeria. It is not enough for a prosecutor to act in accordance with what the law states 
but must do so in accordance with ethical principles and public interest. If this was 
applied, maybe the Ibori case would not have generated a national embarrassment, 
acquitting a man who stole public funds by courts in Nigeria and conviction of the same 
person on similar charges in the UK. The fundamental difference here is the application of 
the rule of law in one AML regime and a deficit of it in another. 
 
Finally, another fundamental flaw in the application of the rule of law was seen in the 
case of FRN V Bode George. In this case the defendant was prosecuted by the EFCC and 
convicted by the High court for money laundering. He was convicted for awarding the 
sum of $533,000,000 [United State Dollar], to his company as chief executive of the 
Nigerian Ports Authority. On appeal, the supreme court discharged and acquitted him 
stating that, contract inflation was not known to law. The supreme court held that if the 
parent offence was not known to law then, the high court should not have convicted him 
for money laundering.474 
 
The Bode George case was an affront on the criminal justice system of Nigeria and the 
AML regime. This is because the Supreme Court should have considered public interest 
before discharging and acquitting the defendant. The judgment of the High court should 
have been upheld based on public interest and not technicalities of law. Hence, the need 
to integrate the rule of law in the AML regime and the Nigeria’s criminal justice system. 
 
Hence, the significant role the application of the rule of law plays in any advanced AML 












and since the AML regime is under the criminal justice system, the AML regime cannot 
work in isolation without the rule of law. 
 
4.13 A Brief Review of Literature on the Integration of Prosecutorial Discretion in the AML 
Regime in Nigeria. 
 
This research takes into cognizance the analysis and contribution by other authors, 
contributing to the literature on prosecutorial discretion. The literature review is 
integrated throughout the thesis. It is important to note that there is little literature on 
prosecutorial discretion.475 There is also little literature on prosecutorial discretion and 
the application of this technique on money laundering.476 
 
Most international recommendations contributing to the existing knowledge on 
prosecutorial discretion and prosecutorial independence have not given a critical analysis 
on the integration of prosecutorial techniques in dealing with PEP and money laundering 
related offences. For example, the recommendations form the common wealth 
secretariat titled “Prosecution independence and accountability: principles, challenges 
and recommendations” places emphasis on prosecutorial independence and 
prosecutorial competency.477 The recommendations here gives a guideline on how 
prosecutors should conduct themselves when carrying out their duties especially as it 
relates with fairness and accountability.478 However, little or no discussion is done linking 
these prosecutorial standards e.g. the IAP standards and crimes like money laundering, 
especially the typology of PEP. 
 
The little literature on prosecutorial discretion and the problem of PEPs is problematic for 




 See discussion on the role of prosecutors in 4.11 and discussion on a critique on the integration of prosecutorial 
techniques in 4.10. 
 
 The commonwealth recommendations focus on prosecutorial standards. Discussions on prosecutorial discretion with 
regards to money laundering by PEP is still novel. Furthermore, no discussion has been done 
 
integrating the powers of the AG on money laundering case by PEP. There have been discussions linking 
money laundering and corruption and the effect on Nigeria’s development. However, none has been done 
 
integrating prosecutorial discretion and the powers of the AG with corruption related money laundering. 
 





is a problem because there has been no analysis on the application of these prosecutorial 
powers in AML regimes especially as it relates with the Nigerian state. As discussed 
throughout the thesis, prosecutorial powers within the Nigerian state is central and 
revolves around the office of the AG.479 This is problematic for the integration of the rule 
of law which existing literature ignores. It is problematic for the integration of the rule of 
law because there is a high chance of potential abuse of powers by the AG, as the sole 
custodian of discretionary powers.480 It is important to also note that this potential 
problem affects the prosecution of PEP for money laundering cases, as the arbitrary 
application of these prosecutorial techniques by the AG can jeopardize the fight against 
the prevalent typology in Nigeria. 
 
Furthermore, an analysis of the Nigerian Constitution and the ACJA 2015 shows that there 
is a gap with the integration of the rule of law and the prosecutorial powers of the AG. 
There is little literature discussing the powers of the AG and the side effects it could have 
on the AML regime. There is also little literature discussing the potential amendments of 
S174 as recommended in this thesis. Several literature discussing the powers of the AG 
and prosecutorial discretion have not linked the effect of such discretionary powers on 
the AML regime. 
 
Furthermore, it is essential to note that, the application of S174(3) which attempts to limit the 
powers of the AG to act in the interest of the public has not been addressed in any 
literature.481 For example, the application of a nolle prosequi by the AG in FRN V Danjuma 
Goje case is a clear case of abuse of powers by the AG, with regards to a PEP that has been 
prosecuted for money laundering.482 Emphasis on the word attempt because, the provision 
has not been effective in regulating the powers of the AG. His acting in public interest without 
any guide on how the AG can act is highly subjective. For example, in jurisdictions like the UK, 
the Code of Conduct for Crown prosecutors clearly gives guidelines with regard to the 
consideration of public interest in the application of discretionary powers of the AG. 
 
 
 See discussion on the powers of the AG in 4.3.  
 Ibid. 
 
 There are several literature discussing the powers of the AG, however, there is no discussion analyzing the powers of 
S174(3), as it relates to public interest. See discussions on power of the AG in chapter 4.3. 




This is seen from S 4.9 to 5.1 in the Code of Conduct for Crown Prosecutors.483 Unlike the 





 “4.9. In every case where there is sufficient evidence to justify a prosecution or to offer an out-of-court disposal, 
prosecutors must go on to consider whether a prosecution is required in the public interest. 4.10. It has never been the rule 
that a prosecution will automatically take place once the evidential stage is met. A prosecution will usually take place unless 
the prosecutor is satisfied that there are public interest factors tending against prosecution which outweigh those tending in 
favour. In some cases the prosecutor may be satisfied that the public interest can be properly served by offering the offender 
the opportunity to have the matter dealt with by an out-of-court disposal rather than bringing a prosecution. 4.11. When 
deciding the public interest, prosecutors should consider each of the questions set out below in paragraphs 4.14 a) to g) so as 
to identify and determine the relevant public interest factors tending for and against prosecution. These factors, together with 
any public interest factors set out in relevant guidance or policy issued by the DPP, should enable prosecutors to form an 
overall assessment of the public interest. 4.12. The explanatory text below each question in paragraphs 4.14 a) to g) provides 
guidance to prosecutors when addressing each particular question and determining whether it identifies public interest factors 
for or against prosecution. The questions identified are not exhaustive, and not all the questions may be relevant in every case. 
The weight to be attached to each of the questions, and the factors identified, will also vary according to the facts and merits 
of each case. 4.13. It is quite possible that one public interest factor alone may outweigh a number of other factors which tend 
in the opposite direction. Although there may be public interest factors tending against prosecution in a particular case, 
prosecutors should consider whether nonetheless a prosecution should go ahead and those factors put to the court for 
consideration when sentence is passed. 9 4.14. Prosecutors should consider each of the following questions: a) How serious is 
the offence committed? • The more serious the offence, the more likely it is that a prosecution is required. 
 
• When assessing the seriousness of an offence, prosecutors should include in their consideration the 
suspect’s culpability and the harm caused, by asking themselves the questions at b) and c). b) What is the 
level of culpability of the suspect? • The greater the suspect’s level of culpability, the more likely it is that a 
prosecution is required. • Culpability is likely to be determined by: i. the suspect’s level of involvement; ii. 
the extent to which the offending was premeditated and/or planned; iii. the extent to which the suspect 
has benefitted from criminal conduct; iv. whether the suspect has previous criminal convictions and/or out-
of-court disposals and any offending whilst on bail or whilst subject to a court order; v. whether the 
offending was or is likely to be continued, repeated or escalated; vi. the suspect’s age and maturity (see 
paragraph d below). • A suspect is likely to have a much lower level of culpability if the suspect has been 
compelled, coerced or exploited, particularly if they are the victim of a crime that is linked to their 
offending. • Prosecutors should also have regard to whether the suspect is, or was at the time of the 
offence, affected by any significant mental or physical ill health or disability, as in some circumstances this 
may mean that it is less likely that a prosecution is required. However, prosecutors will also need to 
consider how serious the offence was, whether the suspect is likely to re-offend and the need to safeguard 
the public or those providing care to such persons. c) What are the circumstances of and the harm caused 
to the victim? • The circumstances of the victim are highly relevant. The more vulnerable the victim’s 
situation, or the greater the perceived vulnerability of the victim, the more likely it is that a prosecution is 
required. • This includes where a position of trust or authority exists between the suspect and victim. • A 
prosecution is also more likely if the offence has been committed against a victim who was at the time a 
person serving the public. • It is more likely that prosecution is required if the offence was motivated by any 
form of prejudice against the victim’s actual or presumed ethnic or 10 national origin, gender, disability, 
age, religion or belief, sexual orientation or gender identity; or if the suspect targeted or exploited the 
victim, or demonstrated hostility towards the victim, based on any of those characteristics. • Prosecutors 




Hence, the AG acting in public interest is subjective. This also has created gap in literature 
with regards to the discussion on prosecutorial discretion and AML in Nigeria, which this 
thesis addresses. The integration of Fuller’s work to analyze the role of the rule of law in the 
application of prosecutorial discretion in AML regimes is novel.484Furthermore, an analysis on 
other renowned authors e.g Tom Bingham, A,v Dicey and Aristotle is introduced at the 
beginning of the thesis. An analysis of A.v Dicey and Tom Bingham’s principles on the rule of 
law proves that the rule of law is central to the AML regime. However, the Fullers principles re 
more linked to the issues surrounding prosecutorial discretion in the AML regime in 
Nigeria.485 It is also important to note that there are several literature analyzing Fullers eight 
principles, however there is little literature integrating Fullers principles with AML and 
prosecutorial discretion. No literature makes a critique of Fullers eight principles while 
discussing issues of corruption and money laundering. This is part of the novel nature of this 
thesis. If the rule of law is crucial in analyzing issues of corruption related money laundering 
and the powers of the AG, then then a critique on the application of laws must be done. 
Hence, Fuller plays a crucial role in the literature of what law ought to be, and how law should 
be integrated into the society.486 
 
Hence, there is a clear gap in the discussion on the role of the rule of law in the 
integration of prosecutor discretion with PEP, which this thesis addresses. 
 
Furthermore, in analyzing issues of prosecutorial discretion and money laundering by PEP, 
the integration of legal ethics is done. This is important because for a successful AML 




health, always bearing in mind the seriousness of the offence, the availability of special measures and the 
possibility of a prosecution without the participation of the victim. • Prosecutors should take into account 
the views expressed by the victim about the impact that the offence has had. In appropriate cases, this may 
also include the views of the victim’s family. • However, the CPS does not act for victims or their families in 
the same way as solicitors act for their clients, and prosecutors must form an overall view of the public 
interest.” 
 
 Fullers work on Morality of Law is used throughout the thesis. A critical analysis on the eight principles of law has been 
integrated to the AML regime in Nigeria. Fullers work contributes significantly to the existing 
 
literature on rule of law. It is important to note that an analysis on other authors on the rule of law 
was done. Hence, the literature review is liked directly to the thesis.  





with what is best for society. Hence, the integration of virtue and deontological ethics in 
this thesis. It is important to note that the there are several literatures on legal ethics, but 
no literature has been applied in the discussion of corruption by PEP and prosecutorial 
discretion. An analysis of Immanuel Kant’s theory on deontological ethics is done and it is 
linked to issue of money laundering by PEP and the role lawyers could play in regulating 
AML.487 A critical analysis is also done using several theories advocating for virtue ethics. 




The success of the AML regime in Nigeria is central to the development of Nigeria. The 
primary setback the AML regime in Nigeria suffers, is its inability to successfully prosecute 
and convict PEP who have stolen the commonwealth of the nation. 
 
The application of prosecutorial discretion particularly plea bargain in the AML regime, 
has been wrongly applied in several cases. The rationale behind prosecution is to get 
justice. There cannot be any better rationale for prosecution than justice, hence the 
importance of the application of ethical conduct of prosecutors in the AML regime. 
 
The integration of virtue ethics in the existing deontological framework of the AML 
regime, will create an enabling environment for the rule of law to thrive. In a society 
where the rule of law is sacrosanct, the chief prosecutor [AG] will not be in a haste to 
enter a nolle prosequi without considering the ethical implications, particularly if it goes 
against public interest.489 The deontological framework of the AML regime appears to 
have given prosecutors more discretionary powers than they should have, after all, “the 
rules are clear”, and the “rules must be obeyed”. This should not be the case. Prosecutors 
must be guided by their conscience in determining how to apply prosecutorial powers.490 
This in itself is virtue. This could be one of the key problems the AML regime suffers. 
 
Also, upholding the rule of law no matter how highly placed the defendant, is plays a pivotal 
role to the success of the AML regime. This was seen in the Jolly Nyame and Joshua Dariyes 
cases, which is regarded as a major success that the AML regime has not recorded in a long 
 
 
487487 See discussion on deontology ethics in chapter 
 See discussion on thess amalgamation of virtue and deontological ethics in chapter 3.  
 See cases as discussed above.  




time, particularly with regards to PEP. This further proves that the integration of Fuller’s 
principle of generality in the application of prosecutorial discretion is central to the 
growth and success of the AML regime in Nigeria. 
 
Having examined legal philosophers and their argument on the issues on rule of law, the 
assertions and arguments of thee scholars with emphasis on Fuller and Bingham have 
shown the significant value the rule of law impacts in a society.491 The integration of 
these principles of law particularly with regards to Fuller’s inner morality of law can be 
used as an efficacy test, to evaluate Nigeria’s AML regime and its respect for fundamental 
rules of society and how these rules are applied. 
 
It is obvious that for the positive advancement of the AML regime in Nigeria, the 
integration of key principles are essential particularly with regards to the typology of 
money laundering offences Nigeria faces. In addressing the problems of money 
laundering by PEP in Nigeria, the gaps in the administration of criminal justice and 
prosecutorial discretion has to be addressed. These gaps particularly with regards to the 
prosecution of PEP are caused by the concentration of powers by the constitution on an 
office or individual, the AG. As discussed earlier, the problem associated with too much 
concentration of powers in the office of the AG, creates a gap for the abuse of 
prosecutorial powers, discretionary techniques and the rule of law.492 
 
This gap also creates an avenue for lopsided application of discretionary techniques either in 
favor of PEP or against other typology of money laundering offences. Situations where the 
arbitrary withdrawal of money laundering case by PEP, invoking the powers of S 174 of the 
constitution is clearly lopsided. S174 of the constitution was not enacted for the protection of 
the powerful and influential in the society.493 It might be “good” if the application of these 
prosecutorial techniques including a notice of discontinuance, is applied on other typology of 
money laundering offences. Where these offenders are ordinary people in the society and 
their offences are mainly narcotics related, trafficking related, cyber fraud related money 
laundering offences, the rule of law and the AML regime appears to be effective. Hence, this 
is the importance of Fuller’s integration of Generality, 
 
 
 See Introduction Chapter.  
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in the application of rules or the members of the society. The laws that regulate 
prosecutorial discretion should be applicable to all categories of persons in the society, no 
matter the class or status. Until when this happens, the citizens might not have 
confidence in the AML regime in Nigeria. 
 
Finally, ethical consideration of lawyers particularly prosecutors play a pivotal role in the 
integration of the rule of law in the AML regime. As discussed earlier, there is a connection 
between legal ethics and the rule of law, particularly virtue ethics. If the rule of law is 
centered on justice, equity and fairness, so is virtue ethics. Virtue ethics revolves around 
intent/motive, wrong or right. Hence, prosecutors must balance the strict application of 
rules(deontology) with their intent or motive by doing what is right (virtue ethics).494 
 
For the positive advancement of the AML regime in Nigeria, prosecutors must adhere to 
ethical principles which could serve as a guide in applying the rule of law when integrating 













































CONCLUSION AND FINAL RECCOMMENDATIONS 
 
Setting up an AML regime in a nation is one thing but having an enabling environment 
and institutional structure within the criminal justice system that regulates the AML 
regime and makes it effective, with a focus on the prevalent typology is another thing. 
The typology of political corruption by PEP has not been effectively prosecuted, yet this 
typology is the most prevalent and dangerous, not only to the Nigerian justice system but 
to the development and growth of the nation. The uniqueness of Nigeria’s AML regime is 
in its typology of PEP, the same way the uniqueness of other nations AML regimes could 
be the typology of narcotics, human trafficking, arms trafficking, tax evasion, banking 
regulation etc.495 
 
Having critically examined the AML regime in Nigeria and the problems with the 
application of prosecutorial discretion in the prosecution of PEP, there seems to be a link 
between the application of this discretion and the success or failure of the AML regime. If 
there is a failure, the primary factor responsible for this is the misapplication of 
prosecutorial discretion in the AML regime. This is because money laundering, which is a 
criminal offence, is within the purview of what should be administered by the criminal 
justice system of the country. Hence, for a more effective AML regime, vital elements 
which form a successful criminal justice system must be taken into consideration, of 
which prosecutorial discretion is an element.496 
 
The primary problem of the AML regime in Nigeria with regards to the typology of PEP, is the 
gap between the laws that regulate the AML regime and the enforcement procedure, which 
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in this research, this gap is in the discretionary powers given to AML regulatory agencies 
and the application of this discretion in the prosecution of PEP for money laundering 
offences. If there is a misapplication of prosecutorial discretion with regards to PEP, which 
has been identified in a number of cases in this research, it can have a negative effect on 
the society. 
 
In the Nigerian context, the inappropriate application or misapplication of prosecutorial 
discretion in cases involving PEP has been responsible for the underdevelopment and the 
slow rate of economic, human capital and infrastructural growth. From the findings, when 
prosecutors lose cases involving PEP, or the cases spend a decade in court without making 
any significant progress, there is a wrong signal passed to members of the political class. It 
signals that the regulation and enforcement of the AML regime is weak hence, there is no 
effective punitive measure in place for these high-level offenders. 
 
This is also because, for a punitive measure to be in place, there has to be an effective 
prosecutorial system, which would bring offenders particularly PEP to face justice. When 
justice is not served on these PEP as a result of the misapplication of prosecutorial 
discretion by prosecutors, an opportunity for the continuous looting of the national 
treasury has been created.498 
 
Hence, there is an important link between the application of prosecutorial discretion in the 
AML regime and development in Nigeria. The positive implication of the diligent application 
of prosecutorial discretion in the AML regime, is economic growth and confidence by the 
citizens and members of the international community in the justice system of Nigeria. For an 
effective application of prosecutorial discretion in the AML regime and for the successful 
prosecution of PEP, certain factors must be placed into consideration and implemented. 
 
These factors include : 
 
 An evaluation of the role and application of prosecutorial discretion with regards to 












general as the sole authority with discretionary powers to prosecute and 
withdraw charges. 
 
 A re- examination of international policies and recommendations on the 
measurement of what a successful AML regime must achieve. 
 
 An integration of the rule of law into the AML regime of Nigeria irrespective of the 
status or class of the offender. 
 
 A critical evaluation on the role of stakeholders, prosecutors and lawyers in the 
AML regime. 
 
There is a strong link between these factors. Each of these factors cannot be implemented 
on its own. For an effective AML regime, particularly a regime which’s prevalent typology 
is PEP, the application of all these factors can propel the current regime to be a success. 
To achieve this success, this research has contributed originally to the body of knowledge. 
 
5.1 Original Contribution to Knowledge: 
 
In carrying out this research, I have been able to synthesise and put together ethical theory; 
rule of law theory and specifically Fuller, as a source for an evaluative stance. Substantive law 
of AML in Nigeria, an account of the institutional structure for the prosecution of crime under 
Nigerian law; legal ethics of both defence and prosecution lawyers in Nigeria). I have forged 
new insights and identified key problems. I have done this by not only bringing these aspects 
of this research together, but by integrating them into a coherent account of the AML in 
Nigeria and identified structural problems arising from two sources: 
 
 The process by which the intentional AML regime was formulated and adopted by 
Nigeria and a lack of an understanding at that time of how it should have been integrated 
into the Nigerian legal system. 
 
 The over centralisation of prosecutorial discretion in Nigeria on the AG, the lack of any 
judicial review of the discretion held by the AG, and a lack of appreciation of the centrality 







5.2 Unconditional Integration of the Rule of Law 
 
The rule of law is central to the success of any nations criminal justice system. Since the 
AML regime is a branch of the criminal justice system, it is safe to assert that if 
prosecutors adhere to the rule of law in the application of discretionary techniques in 
prosecuting, the AML regime would be more effective. Prosecutors should not feel 
intimidated by PEP into compromising the central element of Justice, which is the rule of 
law. In Lord Acton’s letter to Bishop Creighton he stated : 
 
“I cannot accept your canon that we are to judge Pope and King unlike 
other men, with a favourable presumption that they did no wrong. If 
there is any presumption it is the other way against holders of power, 
increasing as the power increases. Historic responsibility has to make 
up for the want of legal responsibility. Power tends to corrupt and 
absolute power corrupts absolutely. Great men are almost always bad 
men, even when they exercise influence and not authority: still more 
when you superadd the tendency or the certainty of corruption by 
authority. There is no worse heresy than that the office sanctifies the 
holder of it. That is the point at which the negation of Catholicism and 
the negation of Liberalism meet and keep high festival, and the end 
learns to justify the means. You would hang a man of no position, like 
Ravaillac; but if what one hears is true, then Elizabeth asked the 
gaoler to murder Mary, and William III ordered his Scots minister to 
extirpate a clan. Here are the greater names coupled with the greater 
crimes. You would spare these criminals, for some mysterious reason. 
I would hang them, higher than Haman, for reasons of quite obvious 
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Lord Acton might have envisaged that there would come a time in the life of a society called 
Nigeria, where favouritism in the application of laws would exist. The views of Acton appear 
to be very alive in the criminal justice system and indeed the AML regime of Nigeria today. 
 
The AG who is the chief law enforcement officer of the country owes a duty to nation to 
adhere to the rule of law hence, occupants of the office shouldn’t be in haste to apply 
discretionary powers in favour of a particular class and status of money laundering 
offenders. Prosecutors must understand that these class of persons [PEP] perpetuate the 
typology which negatively affects the growth and stability of the nation. 
 
In most developed nations, the institutions are pivotal in the administration of 
governance and not individuals. The institutional supremacy over individuals no matter 
how highly placed the individual is, further consolidates on Dicey’s rule through law. This 
principle given by Dicey, appears to be one of the elements lacking in the criminal justice 
system of Nigeria. The integration of the principles of the rule of law in the criminal justice 
system of Nigeria could make the administration of justice more effective, particularly 
with regards to the prosecution of PEP for money laundering.500 
 
The institutional supremacy in the regulation and prosecution of AML should be present. 
The transparency and non-selective prosecution of money laundering offenders would 
strengthen the institutions and the citizens of the state would have confidence in these 
institutions.501 This in itself, could see to the application of the rule of law in the 
prosecution of money laundering cases in Nigeria. 
 
For example, the rules and the application of the rules that govern the prosecution of 
money laundering offenders in Nigeria should be Uniform. The prosecution of PEP for 
money laundering offences should not be any different from the prosecution of other 
typology of money laundering offence. The treatment of those who have stolen 
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stringent as other money laundering offenders who do not have access to government 
patronage and the corridors of power. 
 
The application of prosecutorial techniques like plea bargain should be applicable to other 
typologies of money laundering and not only PEP. The application of prosecutorial 
techniques in favour of certain class of persons by prosecutors is an affront to the concept 
of equality before the law, which could undermine the criminal justice system of Nigeria 
and indeed the AML regime. Government officials who have committed offences against 
the state should treated the same as commoners who have committed offences against 
the state. When this happens, members of the society would have confidence in the 
justice system and would understand that nobody is above the law. 
 
For the integration of the rule of law in the justice system of a nation, the civil rights of 
individuals particularly persons under trial must be respected. There must be a 
presumption of innocence on a defendant during trial hence, the defendant cannot and 
should not be treated like a convict. This is a fundamental element in the application of 
the rule of law in criminal justice systems. The application of this rule must also not be 
one sided. It has to be applied from bottom to top, irrespective of your status in the 
society. The rule of law must be adhered to in the administration of criminal justice, 
particularly the AML regime in Nigeria. The rights and liberties of money laundering 
offenders irrespective of their status must be protected. 
 
The adherence to the fundamental rights and liberties in prosecution of money 
laundering offenders in Nigeria appears to be present in a typology of money laundering 
offence, which is PEP. When prosecuting those who have enriched themselves through 
corruption and abuse of office, the prosecuting agencies appear to enforce the “the rule 
of law”. These offenders are treated with respect and courtesy, bail is usually granted on 
self-recognition, yet this typology of offenders use all sorts of technicalities in the course 







 Again, reference is made to fullers principles on generality of law. The application of discretionary powers should not be 
lopsided to the rich and powerful. The rule of law must run from bottom to top of the society, not the opposite. 
227 
 
The same courtesy and respect of fundamental rights is never given to other typology of 
money laundering offenders. In most cases, AML regulatory agencies would arrest and 
not grant bail to these offenders. It can be argued that this discriminatory treatment is 
primarily because other typology of money laundering offences e.g. drugs and narcotics, 
human trafficking, arms trafficking etc, are most likely perpetuated by persons who have 
no high standing in the society.503 These persons cannot take advantage of the system by 
mounting undue pressure on the instruments of power and prosecuting agencies hence, 
their civil rights and liberties are abused. This is wrong. 
 
The application of the rule of should know no class and status, irrespective of whom an 
offender is the rights and liberties of the offender must be respected. 
 
It important to note that the categories of persons whose rights and liberties are abused 
are ordinary citizens. This abuse of fundamental human rights never happens to PEP who 
have stolen government funds and have laundered the proceeds. A justice system where 
the ordinary offender’s rights are abused while the big offender’s rights are respected are 
signs of underdevelopment. Hence the linkage between the enforcement of fundamental 
human rights/liberties, the rule of law and development.504 
 
PEP must understand that they represent the public and the public has entrusted their 
resources with them. 
 
For example, the AG of Nigeria is a PEP and interestingly is the sole custodian of 
prosecutorial discretion in the country. The implication of an AG not acting in good faith 
particularly in the prosecution of fellow PEP is that it could undermine the AML regime. 
The AML regime which might not reach its full potential and might not be able to hold 
public officials accountable, if the AG refuses to exercise his powers in good faith in the 
prosecution of PEP. The AG should not deploy prosecutorial techniques that could 
frustrate the trial of PEP, by virtue of the powers conferred on the AG by the constitution 
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actions taken while in office, particularly with the way the AG applies prosecutorial 
techniques in the AML regime in Nigeria.505 
 
The Attorney General [AG] plays a central role in the administration of criminal justice 
system in Nigeria. This central role played by the AG is the supervision of and application 
of prosecutorial discretion. As discussed in the preceding chapter, the AG is the principal 
officer empowered by the constitution of Nigeria, to prosecute criminal cases on behalf of 
the government. This clear implication is that, the AG possesses prosecutorial powers by 
virtue of S 174 of the constitution of the Federal republic of Nigeria 1999, which confers 
powers on the AG.506 
 
The AG doubles as the minister for Justice who heads the justice system, which includes 
procedural administration, civil servants working under the ministry for justice and the 
administration of courts.507 The AG is the only cabinet member whose powers are clearly 
stated in the Nigerian Constitution. It can be argued that by virtue of how the constitution 
is drafted, the AG holds enormous powers, particularly with regards to the administration 
of the criminal justice system.508 
 
The AG by virtue of the Constitution and the Administration of the Criminal Justice Act 2015, 
has the exclusive authority to administer prosecutorial discretion. As discussed in the 
preceding chapter, the application of prosecutorial discretion in the criminal justice system is 
the exclusive responsibility of the AG. AML regulatory agencies that have prosecutorial 
powers by virtue of their establishment Act including the EFCC and the ICPC, prosecute on 
behalf of the AG. The AG’s discretionary powers not only includes whom to prosecute or the 
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prosecution even a day before judgement is to be delivered.509 The implication of these 
discretionary powers given to the AG by the constitution is that, the AG could also decide 
on the application of a prosecutorial technique irrespective of whether or not the 
prosecutorial technique is best applicable to the case at hand. 
 
For example, the EFCC as an AML regulatory agency can decide to propose a plea bargain 
to a defendant in the process of prosecution, and the AG can reject the proposal and 
demand for prosecution on all the charges proffered against the defendant. This is 
primarily because AML regulatory agencies like the EFCC and the ICPC despite possessing 
prosecutorial powers, are prosecuting on behalf of the AG who derives powers from the 
constitution.510 
 
The EFCC is established as an independent body with the sole responsibility of 
investigating and prosecuting money laundering related offences, which ideally should 
mean that the EFCC can prosecute without consulting or authorization from the office of 
the AG. Unfortunately, this is not the situation in Nigeria.511 This is because the AG 
derives powers from the constitution, while the EFCC derives its powers from an Act of 
parliament. Hence, the AG has overriding powers over the AML regulatory agencies by 
virtue of S1 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999.512 This cannot 
continue. The independence of AML prosecutorial agencies must be guaranteed by 
amending the constitution and making these AML regulatory agencies truly independent 
from the influence of the AG. 
 
Hence, if an individual who happens to be a political appointee of the President [AG], 
possesses such powers to influence the process of prosecution and withdraw a case from 
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attached with this individual discretionary power has to do with the limitation of the 
application of prosecutorial discretion and the rule of law. 
 
From the provision in S1 of the constitution, the AG can decide to undermine the powers 
of AML regulatory agencies and withdraw a case, or alter a plea bargain agreement, which 
could lead to a lack of transparency in the prosecution of money laundering offenders. 
The lack of transparency and the arbitrary application of the AG’s powers, in selecting 
who to prosecute and what case to withdraw, is necessitated by the “supremacy of the 
constitution”. Therefore, any AG who chooses not to adhere to the principles of the rule 
of law, or is ready to compromise certain ethical standards in favor of a PEP that is been 
prosecuted, could do so, using the provisions of the constitution as a defense. This 
enormous power unwittingly given to the AG has caused problems with the integration of 
the rule of law in the AML regime and the criminal justice system in general.513 
 
Hence, the need for a constitutional amendment. The provisions of S174 needs to be 
amended, decentralizing the powers of the AG. 
 
In the process of making laws particularly AML regulations in Nigeria, members of parliament 
should carry out due diligence, with the aim of ensuring that there are no possible existing 
laws that are contrary, or would undermine the laws that are been made to regulate the AML 
regime in Nigeria. From all indicators, the provisions of S174 of the constitution appears to be 
the greatest threat to the AML regime in Nigeria.514 While the EFCC Act gives powers to the 
commission to regulate and prosecute money laundering activities, the constitution 
empowers a potentially corrupt AG to frustrate the activities of the EFCC and undermine the 
rule of law. A corrupt AG can take advantage of the provisions of S 174 basically because, 
there is a contradiction with regards to the powers of the EFCC and the powers of the 
constitution. The constitution is a law while the EFCC Act and other money laundering 
regulations are laws. However, since its settled law that the constitution is supreme over any 












regulate the AML regime should have put the constitution into consideration with the 
intent of not enacting a law that is contradictory to an existing superior law.515 This alone 
is enough to frustrate the AML regime in Nigeria and undermine the rule of law. Hence, in 
enacting laws that regulate the AML regime in Nigeria, law makers must avoid any form of 
contradiction with any existing law, whether superior or inferior. This is the reason why 
Fuller emphasizes on the non- contradiction as an element of a good law which could In 
turn integrate the rule of law in the society.516 If Fuller’s opinion is that a law does not 
allow what another law prohibits, then it can be argued that the provisions of S6 of the 
EFCC act contradicts the provision of S174 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria. 
 
Another problem attached with this contradiction is that, AML regulatory agencies like 
the EFCC would not be able to exercise their full discretionary powers in prosecuting 
money laundering offences without undue interference from the office of the AG. The 
EFCC and other AM regulatory bodies like the ICPC and the NFIU may lack the political will 
to prosecute money laundering offenders particularly PEP. This is because the PEP in most 
instances might have “political friends” and political connections.517 The PEP might enjoy 
government patronage and might have access to the AG. The implication of this 
contradictory law is that the EFCC in prosecuting a PEP, understands the peculiarity of this 
typology of money laundering offender, and also understands that such an offender 
might have access to the AG who in return could interfere with the proceedings, either at 
investigation or prosecution stages. 518 
 
If there were no legislation contradicting the powers of AML regulatory and prosecutorial 
agencies, there would be a lesser probability of an AG or any occupant of the office to misuse 
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Which can be described as not only misuse of office, but obstruction of justice backed 
with legality and rules. 
 
Hence, it can be argued further that there is a connection between the contradiction of 
laws regulating the AML regime in Nigeria and ethics, which in turn might be responsible 
for the unsuccessful prosecution of PEP. There is a connection because if there was no 
contradiction between the legislation that regulates AML in Nigeria and the provisions of 
the constitution which gives the AG sole discretionary powers to prosecute (as the 
constitution is supreme), then AML regulatory agencies would have been able to act 
independently as a prosecutors of money laundering offences.519 
 
The ethical implication is that an AG could misuses the office by applying the provision of 
S174 of the constitution of the Federal republic of Nigeria 1999, with intent to obstruct 
the course of justice and ensure that a PEP doesn’t face justice for stealing and 
misappropriating public funds. After all, the AG can argue that he’s acting within the 
constraints of the law, as the law permits the AG to “legally” violate the principles of the 
rule of law. Hence, again there is a connection between ethics and the rule of law for an 
effective AML regime in Nigeria. 
 
This is arguably so because the intentional misapplication of the provision of s174 of the 
constitution might be as a result of the deontological ethical approach in the criminal 
justice system in Nigeria, rather than virtue ethics.520 The adherence to strict rules which 
regulate and govern the conduct of man is good. A society without rules and laws could 
give evolve into a state of anarchy and chaos. Life would be nasty brutish and short.521 
 
This is the reason why nations are regulated by laws, to avoid a situation where there will 
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justification as to determine whether or not actions or inactions are morally right or 
wrong. The character of the individual carrying out an action can relate with the motive 
behind the action, which is virtue.523 The application of discretionary powers with 
regards to the principles of right and wrong as prosecutors, is virtue. It can be further 
argued, for the integration of the rule of law in the AML regime and the justice system of 
Nigeria, there should be an amalgamation of application of virtue ethics and 
deontological ethics. This is because, prosecutors particularly the AG, would not hide 
under the provisions of S 174 of the constitution of the federal republic of Nigeria to 
undermine the rule of law. An AG whose motive is to obstruct the course of justice would 
use deontological ethics (adhering to strict rules) as a shield, protecting him from doing 
what is right, thereby claiming to be adhering to principles of the rule of law.524 
 
It must be understood that the same obligation the AG owes the state when authorizing 
the prosecution of other typology of money laundering offenders, is the same obligation 
the AG owes when prosecuting persons who are influential and have been given a 
political mandate by the people, whom they are meant to govern. 
 
What this means is that there must be a general attitude and perception that there is no 
preferential treatment in the prosecution of a “class” of money laundering offenders. The 
typology of money laundering offence is inconsequential when the character of the 
prosecutor is not in question. The AG would care less if he is prosecuting a governor, 
senator or any other PEP who has the political privilege or access to the corridors of 
powers, if doing what is right is all that matters. The AG would most likely ensure an 
efficient prosecution of the PEP the same way the prosecution of other typology of 
money laundering offenders e.g. drugs and narcotics, arms trafficking. Human trafficking, 
cyber fraud etc are effective. 
 
Hence the importance of an integration of Fullers generality in the AML regime in Nigeria. 
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class or status, would create an enabling environment for the rule of law to thrive. When 
members of a society understand that no matter their class or status, the long arm of the law 
would catch up with them when they break the law, then we can feel the complete 
integration of the rule of law in the society.526 For this to happen, set rules that are 
applicable to persons who are considered as ordinary citizens, must be the same set rule that 
are applicable to persons PEP, particularly in the AML regime. If the AG gives an impression 
that some money laundering offenders are “superior” [PEP] to other money laundering 
offenders, then the AG is consciously creating an enabling environment of corruption, 
mismanagement of public funds and not holding public officials accountable.527 
 
Again, relationship between ethics and the rule of law. The ideal situation for the effective 
integration of the rule law in prosecutorial discretion is that, there must be an 
amalgamation of strict rules[deontology] and moral values[virtue]. What this does is that 
the AG who is the final authority with discretionary powers, would be properly guided by 
the laws of the land and core values that promote the interest of equity natural justice 
and good conscience. The integration of both ethical ideologies could assist in having a 
more effective AML regime in Nigeria. It can be argued further that, S 174(3) of the 
constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, had envisaged the need of an AG to 
possess the moral consciousness in the application of his prosecutorial powers. 
 
From the provisions in S 174(3), it the interest of the public must be put into consideration 
before an AG should apply discretionary powers on the decision to prosecute.528 Maybe it 
exists to guide the AG in the application of this discretion. This is because the constitution 
envisaged a situation whereby the occupant of the office of AG, would attempt to abuse the 
office. It can be argued that the interest of justice is the hallmark of the rule of law, hence all 
actions of the occupant of the office of the AG should revolve around the interest of 
justice.529 The AG should not compromise the office by discontinuing the prosecution of PEP 
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the interest of justice that those who have unjustly enriched themselves at the expense of 
the development of the Nigerian state should be prosecuted, irrespective of their class or 
status in the society. The AG should not apply prosecutorial techniques with sole aim of 
obstructing the course of justice and undermining the AML regime. Again, the need to 
decentralize and amend the constitution. 
 
Efforts must be made by stakeholders in the justice sector and the citizens to ensure that 
persons, irrespective of their status are diligently prosecuted, without fear or favour and 
without compromise of these discretionary technicalities.530 This is a collective 
responsibility of citizens and regulators. 
 
The rule of law is supreme, and its supremacy lies in the General application of laws and 
not lopsided application of laws to the advantage of a class of persons. Hence, Fuller’s 
Morality of Law can be used as a model to guide regulators in the AML regime. If this is 
done, there would be a general procedure in the application of discretionary techniques 
irrespective of the defendant’s class and typology of money laundering offence. 
 
5.3 Amalgamation of Virtue Ethics and Deontological Ethics as a Guide for the Legal 
Profession and Stakeholders in the AML Regime. 
 
There has to be a critical evaluation of core values and ethics of stakeholders, particularly 
prosecutors and defence lawyers. This is very important and central to the success of a 
nations AML regime. The core ethics and code of conduct of lawyers must be evaluated 
and possible reforms should be carried out. This is because most regulators and 
prosecutors in the AML regime in Nigeria, are legal practitioners. Legal practitioners are 
called to the bar not only by learning but also character. The character of a prospective 
lawyer who ends up been a prosecutor or a defence lawyer, severs as a guiding factor in 
the decisions that would be made. Hence, most law schools in Nigeria emphasise on 
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However, one cannot enforce character on would be lawyers and practicing lawyers 
through promulgation of a code of conduct or rules alone, hence the RPC has not been as 
effective as it should be. As discussed in the ethics chapter, the deontological approach of 
legal ethics in Nigeria has not been as effective as it should be, particularly in the AML 
regime in Nigeria. This ineffectiveness is because of the “rules” based assessment of 
ethical conduct, which has enabled some bad elements in the legal profession to 
manipulate these rules to their advantage.532 Adherence to the Rules of Professional 
Conduct 2007 and the Legal Practitioners Act 1975 is good. The existence of these rules 
and regulation gives a guide to lawyer’s behaviour and conduct. However, what the 
proponents of strict adherence to rules in the legal professional fail to understand is that, 
“bad” decision or actions can be made under the guise of adhering to these rules. It is 
usually better when there is a moral motivation and inclination, alongside adhering to 
strict rules and regulation. The motive behind a lawyer’s action should be for the greater 
good of the society rather than strict adherence to rules and regulation. Hence, the 
importance of the incorporation of virtue ethics in the regulation of lawyers within the 
Nigerian Jurisdiction.533 
 
If there is an amalgamation of deontological ethics and Virtue ethics, problems arising 
from the conflict of interest between the AML regime, the Rules of Professional Conduct 
2007 and the Legal Practitioners Act 1975 would not arise. As discussed in the ethics 
chapter, the primary conflict of interest between the AML regime and the Laws that 
regulate the conduct of lawyers is centred on confidentiality.534 The laws that regulate 
the AML regime classify lawyers as DNFI, when regulators of the regime insist that lawyers 
must disclose. Lawyers have also insisted that the classification of DNFI does not apply to 
them and have refused to disclose suspicious financial transactions, on the basis that the 
laws which regulates the conduct of lawyers forbids them to disclose. This conflict would 
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In as much as lawyers have a duty to obey their rules lawyers also owe a moral duty to the 
society because if there is no society there would be no place for lawyers to practice law. 
The incorporation of virtue ethics in the regulation of the conduct of lawyers, would 
compel them to report suspicious transaction of their client, particularly if these clients 
are PEP. Knowing the enormous damage political corruption and money laundering has 
done to the Nigerian state, lawyers owe a moral obligation to assist the AML regime in 
achieving her goals by not withholding information that could assist the prosecutor AML 
regulators. There needs to be a change to the rules to permit disclosure. 
 
Furthermore, it might be better for the AML regime and the criminal justice system, if the 
sections of the Rules of Professional Conduct and the Legal Practitioners Act which 
enforce strict adherence to confidentiality, should be amended or possibly expunged. The 
strict adherence to confidentiality should be subjected to the public interest and the rule 
of law. Confidentiality between lawyer and client is of less interest than the interest of the 
public. Lawyers must understand that is virtuous to disclose suspicious transactions to the 
regulatory authorities, which in turn would make the work of the prosecutor easier. It is 
virtuous because Nigeria would be a nation when political corruption reduces to the 
minimum, which can only be possible when and if lawyers obey the Rules and act with 
virtue. 
 
Again, lawyer/client confidentiality is necessary for the rule of law. Hence, the has to be a 
harmonisation between confidentiality and suspicious reporting. 
 
The integration of virtue ethics also applies to prosecutors in the AML regime. 
Prosecutors must be able to take firm decisions which could create an enabling 
environment for a fair trial. The integration of virtue ethics also applies to prosecutors in 
the AML regime. Prosecutors must be able to take firm decisions which could create an 
enabling environment for a fair and speedy trial of PEP. As discussed in the ethics chapter, 
compromised prosecutors can hide under the cover of adherence to strict rules including 











problem, which the application of deontology ethics alone to legal practitioner’s conduct 
cannot solve. 
 
For prosecutors in the AML regime to understand that, it is in the greater good of the 
nation for the AML regime to be effective and political corruption is adequately 
addressed, there must be a moral conviction on the part of the prosecutors. This moral 
conviction alongside with laid down rules and principles, would serve as a guide in the 
application of a notice of discontinuance and plea bargain on money laundering cases by 
PEP. The potential abuse of powers by the AG and prosecutors would be a lesser 
probability, when they feel there is a moral obligation to do what is right and act in the 
interest of justice. The fact that some prosecutor choses to act in the interest of justice 
shows that there is a moral conviction, which the prosecutor believes in, and a moral 
obligation which the prosecutor feels should be owed to the public. 
 
Hence, there should be background checks on persons who aspire to be members of the 
bar. These background checks should include the criminal history, financial history, 
emotional stability and general behaviour. Lawyers should not be admitted to the Bar 
solely on academic and intellectual requirements. The character and conduct of persons 
admitted would determine quality of the justice system. This is because a Judge who is an 
integral part of the justice system, is primarily a lawyer that has been called to the bar 
before been appointed on the Bench. The defence lawyer and prosecutor also play an 
integral role particularly the prosecutor, who has a discretionary role to play. Hence the 
importance of ethics. 
 
Therefore, it is understandable that it might be difficult to enforce virtue ethics or to 
ensure that lawyers act in accordance with morality, this is because one cannot enforce 
people’s character.537 Character is formed over time. However, this problem in the legal 
profession can be managed by ensuring that that those who are called to the Bar are 
worthy of character. Only then, the deontological approach (Rules of Professional 












5.4 Decentralisation of the Powers of the AG/ a Review of S 174 of the Constitution of 
the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 and the Independence of AML Prosecutorial 
Agencies 
 
There must be a decentralisation of the powers of the AG. The provisions of S174 of the 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria has to be amended. This is because power 
corrupt, and absolute power corrupt absolutely. The criminal justice system of a nation 
cannot be anchored on one individual. The negative implication of this is obvious, as seen 
in the Nigerian criminal justice system. The decision to prosecute criminal offences should 
be addressed at entry level by ensuring that that those who are called to the Bar are 
worthy of character. Only then, the deontological approach (Rules of Professional 
Conduct) should be introduced to lawyers who are already worthy of character(virtue). 
and shouldn’t be subject to the discretion of the AG alone.538 The decision to withdraw a 
criminal charge should not be subject to the sole discretion of the AG. As discussed in the 
prosecutorial discretion chapter, a primary problem of the criminal justice system and the 
AML regime is the misapplication of discretionary techniques. The misuse of the powers 
of the AG in the application plea bargains and notice of discontinuance in money 
laundering cases of PEP without recourse to the consent of AML regulatory agencies, is as 
a result of the centralisation of powers.539 The powers of the AG with regards to the 
discretionary right to prosecute must be subject to judicial review. The discretionary right 
to prosecute in a nations criminal justice system cannot be left at the mercy of an 
individual without any checks and balance. 
 
The political check on the AG is inadequate. Since the Ag is an appointee of the President, 
the President who heads the executive arm of government and members of the legislative 
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Decisions taken by the AG must be subject to review by the supreme court, particularly if 
the public considers the case sensitive one, or the AG has acted against the interest of the 
public.540 S 174(3) of the constitution which makes provisions for an AG to act in the 
interest of the public, would be meaningless if there are no checks and balances that can 
be deployed by the judiciary to ascertain whether or not the AG acted in the interest of 
the public.541 Hence, S 174 of the constitution must be amended to include a clause 
which would subject the AG decision to apply a “nolle prosequi” to judicial review by the 
Supreme Court. Nothing less than the Supreme court should review the decisions made 
by the AG when applying this discretionary technique, so that the AG would not be given 
an opportunity to challenge the review any further. 
 
There also needs to be a decentralisation of the AML regulatory agencies in Nigeria. the 
AML regulatory agencies need to act independently from the office of the AG. AML 
regulatory agencies like the EFCC and the ICPC would need to amend their Act, creating a 
caveat stating that the actions of the agencies should not be subject to the powers and 
jurisdiction of the AG. If this happens, it could eliminate any form of undue interference 
and pressure from the AG, in dictating how these agencies should prosecute and who 
they should prosecute, particularly when prosecuting PEP. However, the problem could 
remain if a caveat which allows for the independence of the AML agencies without 
recourse to the AG is included in the amended Act of these agencies, while the 
constitution itself is not amended. This is because the constitution is supreme. Hence, the 
amendment of S174 of the constitution is key to the survival and efficiency of the AML 
regime and the prosecution of PEP in Nigeria. Also, the use of prosecutorial discretion by 
these agencies should be subject to possible judicial review. 
 
5.5 A Review of the Test and Assessment of What a Successful AML Regime Should be. 
 
In as much as success is a process, the real measurement for assessing success is the result. 
International organisations like the FATF and influential nations like the USA and the UK, have 
in the past been concerned about Nigeria’s corruption and money laundering problem. Hence 
pressure from these countries and international organisations like the 
 
 





FATF made Nigeria to integrate the typology of corruption in her AML regime.542 Since 
then it appears the international community and FATF have been satisfied with Nigeria 
and have given Nigeria a pass mark on her fight against corruption and money laundering. 
This is because it is public knowledge that Nigeria has an AML regime, and has been 
prosecuting high profile persons for money laundering.543 
 
However, the international community needs to continuously mount pressure on Nigeria. This 
is because when you measure the numbers of convictions secured by the AML regime against 
the number of ongoing money laundering cases, the convictions are insignificant. As a fact, 
Nigeria’s last high-profile conviction on a money laundering related offence was in 2018, prior 
to that it was in 2011 and 2007 respectively. The EFCC has been prosecuting over 40 high 
profile PEP since 2004, most of which are still ongoing.544 A nation that spends almost two 
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 See appendix, A list of ongoing and decided cases by the EFCC. It is important to note here that most of these cases have 
not been decided. Some of these cases have been ongoing since 2004(the year EFCC was 
 
created). What is more worrisome is the fact that these high-profile cases remain in court while other 
typology of money laundering offences e.g drugs and narcotics, cyber fraud, trafficking etc are quickly 
dispensed with. Yet the most prevalent typology in Nigeria appears not to be getting its deserved attention. 
The table shows that out of about 40 high profile cases less than 5% have been dispensed with. It also 
important to note that high profile cases where the EFCC lost in court, are not included in the table. Only 
three of these case have judgement been delivered in favour of the Federal Government. Of course, the 
EFCC as the regulatory agency in charge of money laundering related offences prosecutes on behalf of the 
government. The table is an indication that the prosecuting agency has not met its obligation by ensuring 
that most of these cases are concluded and offenders are punished for stealing the commonwealth of the 
nation. 
 
Organisations like the FATF should ask the right questions by using tables and data like this in assessing 
whether or not the AML regime in Nigeria has loved up to its expectation. 
 




is certainly not making progress in her AML regime.545 Hence, the assessment of the 
international community and the FATF with regards to Nigeria’s progress with the 
typology of corruption is wrong. 
 
It appears the wrong questions have continuously been asked hence, Nigeria is not under 
pressure to muster the political will to ensure that these high-profile offenders are 
successfully prosecuted. The wrong question is: How many PEP is Nigeria prosecuting for 
corruption and money laundering offences? Of course, with this question and by any 
standard Nigeria is performing and living up to expectation with regards to the 
prosecution of PEP for money laundering offences. 
 
However, the right question should be: How many high-profile PEP has Nigeria 
successfully prosecuted since the inception of these AML regulatory agencies? If this is 
the question, then Nigeria’s AML regime is seriously underperforming. Until the right 
questions are asked, the greatest concern of the AML regime in Nigeria, which is the 
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   forgery,     
   uttering and     
   gratification in relation to  prosecution. 
   N6.5billion Safetower  Case delayed 
   Project    by 
       an 
       interlocutor y 
       appeal up to 
       the Supreme 
       Court on the 
       admissibility 
       of 


























16  FRN V RASHEED FHC/L/336C/08 The accused person 2008 Federal Case on 
LADOJA  who was the Executive  High Court, interlocutory 
  Governor of OyO State  Lagos. appeal up 
  is standing trial for   to the 
  corruption related   Supreme 
  money laundering   Court. 
  allegedly committed    













17 FRNV   CHIMAROKEFHC/L/09C/2007 The 1st accused person 2007 Federal  HighTrial has 
 NNAMANI & ORS  
who  was  the Executive 
 Court, Lagos been  
        
    
Governor of Anambra 
  delayed by 
        
    
State is standing trial with 
  the alleged 
        
    others for corruption  illness of the 
    related money laundering   1t  
    allegedly committed while   
defendant          
    in office.       
         
18  FRN v SANI ABJ/CR/147/2010 Accused persons are 2010 Federal Trial  
  LULU  standing for alleged  High Court, ongoing  
  ABDULLAH! & 3  fraud in relation to the  Abuja   
  ORS  fund earmarked for the     
    2010 World Cup.     











19 FRN V BOLANLE ID/143C/2015 Money laundering 2015 High Court Trial yet 
 BABALAKIN    of Lagos commence 
     State after the 
      striking 
      out of the 
      initial 
      charge. 
       
20 FRN V GBENGA AB/EFCC/02/11 The accused person, 2011 High Court Trial 
 DANIEL  the former Executive  of Ogun ongoing 
   Governor of Ogun State  State  
   is standing trial for    
   corruption committed    

























































 ENGR. SAMUEL IBI GEKPE &  on crimInaI oreacn  OT rl, I .  
 5 ORS      
of trust in the sum of 
   
            
         N5billion in the   
         purported award of rural    
         electrification contracts.    
             
        FHC/LF/CR/34/2011 The 1st accused who was2011 Federal HighTrial ongoing 
         the Executive Governor Court, Lagos. 
         
of  Nassarawa State  is 
  
           
           
 DOMA & 2 ORS    standing trial with others              
         for  corruption related   
         money laundering.   
             
 FRN V ATTAHIRUSS/33C/2009 1st   accused  was  the High Court,Trial ongoing 
 BAFARAWA & ORS Executive Governor of Sokoto.  
         Sokoto State. He   









was  charged  alongside 
 






embezzlements  of  the 
 




     FHC/LF/CRS/2010 The 1
st accused was the2010 Federal HighCase on 
      Executive  Governor  of Court, Lafia interlocutory  
      
Nassarawa State. 
 
appeal. Trial yet to        
ADAMU & ORS.     
      He was charged  commence.  
 





















      money laundering     
      while being the     
      Executive Governor of     
      the State.        
         
25 FRN V MAMMAN TUKUR &ID/120C/2012 Oil subsidy scam in the2012 High Court ofTrial has 
 ORS.     sum of N1.2bn   Lagos, State commenced 
           
26 FRN  VWALTERID/115C/2012 Oil subsidy scam in the2012 High Court ofTrial has 
 WAGBATOMA & ORS.   sum of    Lagos State. commenced 
            
27 FRN V NASAMAN OILID/116C/2012 Oil subsidy scam in the2012 High Court ofTrial has 
 SERVICES LTD &ORS   sum of more than N4bn Lagos State commenced 
          
28 FRN V ABDULLAH!  ID/119C/12 Oil subsidy scam in the2012 High Court ofTrial has 
 
ALAO & ORS. 
  sum of N2.6bn   Lagos State commenced 
           
           
29 FRN V OLUWASEUNID/122C/12 Oil subsidy scam in the2012 High Court ofDefendant jumped 
 OGUNBAMBO   sum of N1bn   Lagos State court bail.  








30 FRN V ANOSYKE GROUP OFID/179C/12 Oil subsidy scam in the2012 High Court ofTrial has 
 COMPANIES & ORS.  sum of N1,5bn Lagos State commenced  
         
31 FRN V   DOWNSTREAMID/180C/12 Oil subsidy scam in the2012 High Court ofTrial has 
 SOURCES LTD & ORS. sum of N880m Lagos State commenced  
        
32 FRN V ASB INVESTMENTID/ 178C/12 Oil subsidy scam in the2012 High Court ofTrial has 
 CO.   sum N1.2bn Lagos  commenced  


































 LTD & ORS       State    
        
33 FRN V MAJOPE INVESTMENTID/181C/12 Oil subsidy scam in the2012 High  Court ofTrial has 
 LTD & ORS  sum of N1.1bn   Lagos State  commenced  
           
34 FRN V CHIDI FHC/ABJ/54/2012 Money Laundering2012 Federal HighTrial has 
 
ADABANY A & Others 
involving  the sum of Court, Abuja commenced  
          
   about N2bn obtained     
   from Shell Petroleum     
   Dev. Company       
           
35 FRN  V  AYODELE FESTUS;FHC/IB/31C/2015 Stealing of naira2015 Federal HighCase on 
 OYEBAMIJI AKEEM; AYODEJI currencies meant for Court, Ibadan interlocutory appeal 
 ALESHE  ;  AJIWE SUNDAY pricketing or burning at   following an 
 ADEGOKE; OLANIRU the  Central Bank of   objection   to the 
 MUNIRU ADEOLA  Nigeria.      charge  and ruling 
          thereon.  










36 FRN   V   ONI   DAMOLAFHC/IB/32C/2015 Stealing of  naira2015 Federal HighCase   on 
 DOLAPO; AFOLABI ESTHER currencies meant  for Court, Ibadan interlocutory appeal 
 OLUNIKE; OLANIRAN pricketing or burning at   following  an 
 MUNIRU ADEOLA the Central Bank of   objection to the 
   Nigeria.       charge and ruling 
           thereon.    
              
37 FRN V OLANIRAN MUNIRUFHC/IB/33C/2015 Stealing of  naira2015 Federal HighCase   on 
 ADEOLA  currencies meant  for Court, Ibadan interlocutory appeal 
   pricketing or burning at   following  an 
   the Central Bank of   objection to the 
   Nigeria.       charge and ruling 
           thereon.    






















38 FRN V OLANIRAN FHC/IB/34C/2015 Stealing of naira2015 Federal HighCase  on 
 
MUNIRU ADEOLA 
 currencies meant for Court, Ibadan interlocutory  
          
    burning or destruction   appeal following an 
    at the Central Bank of   objection to the 
    Nigeria.     charge  and ruling 
         thereon.   
            
39 FRN V ODDIAHFHC/IB/35C/2015 Stealing of naira2015 Federal HighCase  on 
 EMMANUEL;   OLANIRAN currencies meant for Court, Ibadan interlocutory  
 MUNIRU ADEOLA; SALAMI burning or destruction   appeal following an 
 IBRAHIM   at the Central Bank of   objection to the 
    Nigeria.     charge  and ruling 
         thereon.   
          
40 FRN V ILORI FHC/IB/36C/2015 Stealing of naira 2015 Federal  Case on   
 ADEKUNLE  currencies meant  High Court,  Interlocutory  
 SUNDAY;AFOLABI  for burning or  Ibadan  Appeal   







 OLUFEMI  destruction at the   following an 
 JOHNSON ;  Central Bank of   objection to the 
 PATIENCE OKORO  Nigeria.   charge and 
 EYE; FATAi     ruling thereon. 
 ADEDOKUN      
 YUSUSF      
       
41 FRN V OLANIRAN FHC/37C/2015 Stealing of naira 2015 Federal Case on 
 MUNIRU  currencies meant  High Court, Interlocutory 
   for burning or  Ibadan Appeal 
   destruction at the   following an 
   Central Bank of   objection to the 
   Nigeria.   charge and 
      ruling thereon. 








42 FHC/ABJ/CR/86/2009 FRN V THOMAS ISEGHOHIDefendant are standing2009 Federal HighTrial is ongoing 
  & 2 OTHERS trial for money Court, Abuja 
   laundering    
   with respect to the   






































   sale Transcorp shares    
       
43 FHC/ABJ/111/2009 FRN V DAYO The Defendants 2009 Federal Trial ongoing 
  OLAGUNJU & 10 are standing trial  High Court,  
  Others for money  Abuja  
   laundering and    
   flagrant violation of    
   the Public    
   Procurement Act.    
       
Source  EFCC website      
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